Child Labor by Eric V. Edmonds









Forthcoming in Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 4, John Strauss and T. Paul Schultz,
eds. I appreciate the comments and helpful discussions with Kathleen Beegle, Debopam Bhattacharya,
Patrick Emerson, Deborah Levison, Peter Orazem, Nina Pavcnik, Norbert Schady, T. Paul Schultz,
Najib Shafiq, Furio Rosati, Ken Swinnerton, and participants at the Bellagio conference for the Handbook
of Development Economics, Volume 4.  I am grateful to John Bellows, Zakariah Lakel, Ariel Rodman,
Smita Reddy, Salil Sharma, Maheshwor Shrestha, and Jiawen Ye for research assistance.   The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Eric V. Edmonds. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Child Labor
Eric V. Edmonds




In recent years, there has been an astonishing proliferation of empirical work on child labor.  An Econlit
search of keywords "child lab*r" reveals a total of 6 peer reviewed journal articles between 1980 and
1990, 65 between 1990 and 2000, and 143 in the first five years of the present decade.  The purpose
of this essay is to provide a detailed overview of the state of the recent empirical literature on why
and how children work as well as the consequences of that work.  Section 1 defines terms commonly
used in the study of child time allocation and provides a descriptive overview of how children spend
their time in low income countries today.  Section 2 reviews the case for attention to the most common
types of work in which children participate, focusing on that work's impact on schooling, health, as
well as externalities associated with that work.  Section 3 considers the literature on the determinants
of child time allocation such as the influence of local labor markets, family interactions, the net return
to schooling, and poverty.  Section 5 discusses the limited evidence on different policy options aimed
at influencing child labor.  Section 6 concludes by emphasizing important research questions requiring
additional research such as child and parental agency, the effectiveness of child labor policies, and
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1. Introduction
Few issues in developing countries draw as much popular attention as does child labor.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the state of the recent empirical
literature on why and how children work as well as the consequences of that work. A less
detailed overview of recent developments in the child labor literature can be found in Edmonds
and Pavcnik (2005a), and an older review with a more theoretical focus is Basu (1999).
Child labor has received considerable attention in economics throughout the discipline's
history. Early writings tended to focus on child labor solely through the lens of labor demand.
Adam Smith emphasized the value of children in labor shortage societies as motives for fertility.
Friedrich Engels wrote extensively on the conditions of working children in the early industrial
revolution, and to Marx, child labor was created by the industrial revolution. In his view,
machines replaced the need for muscle power, allowing children to do the work formerly
performed by men. Though his views on labor supply are not transparent, in Das Kapital he
seems to assume that parents and capitalists inevitably exploit all opportunities to employ
children. Interestingly, one exception to this assumption that working parents will take all
opportunities to have children work is in Malthus. He argues that the prevalence of child labor in
the late 18th century is evidence that families were unable to meet their most basic needs.3
Modern writings on child labor are largely based on the human capital theory as
developed by T.W. Schultz, Gary Becker, and others. In thinking through the determinants of
investments in education, Schultz (1960) emphasized the importance of foregone earnings in
human capital accumulation. Investors (parents, children) weigh the return on additional
education investments against the costs such investments entail which includes the foregone
economic contribution of children. Becker (1965) extended this argument to emphasize that
non-wage uses of time are apt to be an equally important influence on the opportunity cost of
child time in school. Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) appear to be the first published study to
apply this framework explicitly to analyze child labor in a developing country context.
In recent years, there has been an astonishing proliferation of empirical work on child
labor. An Econlit search of keywords "child lab*r" reveals a total of 6 peer reviewed journal
articles between 1980 and 1990, 65 between 1990 and 2000, and 143 in the first five years of the
present decade. This rise in interest appears driven by three factors. First, child labor has drawn
considerable policy and public attention over the last decade. This public interest seems to be
motivated by a concern about child labor as a human rights issue and its implication for long-run
growth and development through its interaction with education. The rise in interest in recent
years may owe to rising trade and globalization more broadly. They have both raised awareness
about the pervasiveness of child labor and elevated concerns among rich country residents about
their role in its perpetuation. Second, concurrent with this rise in public interest is a booming
theoretical literature on why children work. Prominent theoretical publications such as Basu and
Van (1998, section 3.4 below) and Baland and Robinson (2000, section 4.3 below) have spurred
a large battery of empirical research. Third, large-scale, nationally representative household
surveys from developing countries have become increasingly available over the last fifteen years.
This has both lowered the costs of working on child time allocation and increased the complexity
of the types of questions that can be addressed empirically.
Any study of child labor must begin with a definition of what the researcher means by
child labor. The next section surveys different definitions used in the existing literature and
discusses some examples from a variety of countries about how children work. The types of
activities popularly viewed as child labor are not usually the focus of empirical studies of child
labor. Often, academic studies of child labor are better viewed as child time allocation studies,
and it seems clear that research must consider as wide a scope of activities as data permits in
order to understand the dynamics of child time allocation. Data sources and data problems such
as children that are hard to observe with randomized surveys are also discussed.
Section 3 considers the case for attention to the types of work activities that are most
common in low income countries. Historically, activists sought to move children out of work so
that children could enjoy their childhood, and the Progressive Era's "sacralization" of childhood
(to quote Zelizer 1985) persists in contemporary, anti-child labor resolutions such as the 1989
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Part of the reason for viewing working child work as
a moral issue is that parents may make decisions for children about whether and how children
work without fully internalizing the costs of such activities. Research on child labor tends to
avoid moral arguments about how children should spend their time by focusing on quantifying
the costs of working. Human capital theory generally post-dates the anti-child labor movements
in developed economies, but most of the academic interest in child labor today is because of its
consequences for human capital accumulation. Many studies examine whether specific types of4
work or groupings of activities of common forms of work appear to affect education, physical
and mental health, or nutritional status of working children. This begs the question of why focus
on child labor as anything other than something to explain schooling or health changes. Several
answers to this question are posited in the literature, and they are discussed in section 3.
Section 4 reviews the accumulating evidence on why children work. This literature is of
academic interest in its own right for all the same reasons that adult labor supply is of interest to
research. Moreover, studying the determinants of common forms of work also can be
informative about the case for attention to common activities. That is, how the common forms of
work are affected by changes in the family's broader economic and social environment can reveal
how family decision-makers view the most common forms of work in low income countries.
Policies aimed to influence how and where children work can be useful for understanding by the
causes and consequences of working, and section 5 discusses the minimal evidence that exists on
how policies influence child labor supply. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the critical
issues that have yet to be addressed in the literature.
A simple analytical model will be helpful to fix ideas in this chapter and can illustrate
most of the basic points that have been emphasized in existing research on child labor. This
model is presented in the remainder of this introduction. This model is meant to be heuristic.
Cigno and Rosati (2005) present a more general child labor model that can incorporate most of
the important recent theoretical contributions in the child labor literature.
Consider a household with one parent, one child, and two time periods: the child's youth
when the parent decides how to allocate the child's time and the child's future (the parent has no
future in this model). The parent's labor supply is inelastic and yields an exogenous income Y.
Parental preferences are over the family's current standard of living, S, and the child's future
welfare Vk.   , k u S V is the utility representation of parental preferences. The child's time is
allocated between education E, leisure and play P, work outside of the household M, and work
inside of the household H. Work inside the household can be in the production of goods or
services that might be resold to the market (market work) or it can be in similar activities that are
important for the family in converting purchased inputs into a standard of living (domestic
work). E+P+M+H=1.
The standard of living is produced by a linear homogenous production function and
depends on purchased inputs c and the input of child time H,   , S F c H  . The child's future
welfare depends on the positive, diminishing marginal product production function,
  , k V R E P  . Leisure and play is likely complementary to schooling in the production of child
welfare, but such statements about cross-partial derivatives are not necessary for the present
discussion. Importantly, time spent in education is not necessarily limited to time in the
classroom. Also, beyond the opportunity costs of education inherent in the time constraint,
schooling entails direct costs, e. Direct costs are assumed to be increasing in the time spent in
education. Thus, direct schooling costs entail eE in foregone consumption today. Work outside
of the household is freely available in the formal labor market and brings an exogenous wage w.
This income combines with non-child income Y to purchase inputs used in the production of the
standard of living: c Y wM eE    . In this setting, the parent's problem is:5
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This set-up emphasizes several points that will be raised in sections 2 and 3. First, the
residual claimant on child time outside of work is not schooling, and there is a return to leisure
that parents may value and could be important for the child’ s future welfare. Second, if one is
interested in child labor because of its impact on schooling, there is no theoretical reason to focus
on work outside of the home alone. Consider a child that does not attend school. What are the
possible explanations for this?
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The family's marginal utility from the foregone consumption caused by schooling costs plus the
marginal utility of time  is at least as large as the family's marginal utility that comes through
improving child welfare from additional education. The marginal utility of time will depend on
how the family values the contribution of play to child welfare, the marginal utility of the
standard of living, and how time spent in the wage market and in household production affects
the standard of living. There is no reason to presume that the wage contribution is more likely to
dominate schooling than is the household production contribution. In fact, most children work at
home rather than in the wage labor market. This implies that for most children the return to time
in household production is at least as large as the value the family places on the child’ s wage
contribution. The idea that studies of child time allocation should consider as broad a definition
of child work as the data permits is a main theme in section 2. Of course, there are many reasons
to be interested in why children work beyond its implications for schooling. Section 3 reviews
the literature on the short term and long term consequences of child work.
This setting also implies several key reasons why children work. First, poverty is a key
influence on child labor supply. It influences the family's valuation of child time in household
production and the formal labor market, and it may affect the production function for future child
welfare. Some researchers have emphasized that the influence on child labor of exiting poverty
may differ from the effects of additional income, and this will be discussed in section 4.
Second, the relative return to child time in schooling may be an important factor. The
relative return depends in part on the returns to education as well as the returns to play, the return
to child time in home production, the return to formal labor income, and the direct costs of
schooling. Schooling improvements, labor demand factors including trade, technological
change, and labor regulations all potentially affect child labor through these mechanisms.
Similarly, living arrangements, fertility, and market imperfections in credit, land, or goods
markets may all influence child labor through their impact on the relative return to child time.
Third, parental preferences play a key role in child time allocation decisions. In this set-
up, preferences do not drive differences in the allocation of child time between the formal labor
market and household production, but they affect the family's valuation of child time in work
activities relative to non-work activities. For example, a child engages in wage work and does
not attend school if:6
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The marginal utility from the child's contribution to the production of the standard of living
(through wage income and the lack of educational expenditure) is at least as large as the marginal
utility from the return to education. To the extent that preferences are important, then questions
of intrahousehold allocation such as how household decisions are made and who makes these
decisions become important in understanding child labor supply.
With so many influences on child labor, what types of policies will be useful in reducing
it? Section 5 concludes with a discussion of different policy options that have been used to
influence the activities of children. There is very limited evidence to suggest that anything other
than long-term poverty reduction and development is likely to substantially alter the child labor
picture although some findings from conditional cash transfer programs are encouraging.
However, it is important to note that the general lack of evidence reflects a lack of scientific
research more than a failure of programs. Moreover, very little is known about why children
participate in some of the worst forms of child labor, where human rights issues are most
relevant, and very little formal analysis has been done on the policies being pursued to help these
most vulnerable children.
2. What is Child Labor?
Any discussion of child labor must begin with a precise description of what the term
means. The phrase "child labor" conjures images of children chained into factories, sold as
slaves, or forced into prostitution. Fortunately, while many children work in the developing
world, few experience such atrocities. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the
international body charged with country child labor, and it estimates that in 2004 there are 218
million child laborers in the world (ILO 2006). Most of these working children labeled "child
laborers" are helping their family at home, on the family farm, or in the family business.
Economics research on "child labor" tends to focus on these more commonplace activities, both
because of their greater prevalence and the relative ease in collecting data on the typical types of
activities children perform. There is controversy about whether the types of activities that
children typically participate in are harmful or beneficial to children and others. That discussion
is reviewed in section three.
The present section aims to describe the different definitions of child labor and child
work that are prevalent in the literature and overview how children typically work in low income
countries. It should be clear from the discussion in the introduction that if one is ultimately
interested in influencing the allocation of child time to a particular activity such as some form of
work or schooling then researchers need to consider as broad a set of activities as possible.
Children do not typically participate in the formal wage labor market. When children do not
participate in the formal wage labor market, the shadow value of child time ( in the analytical
model) is determined by the child's involvement in chores, the family business, schooling, etc.
Hence, focusing on a limited set of activities can bias a researcher's understanding of the
dynamics of child time allocation. Of course, a broad focus on child time allocation overall
inevitably means that a paper on "child labor" will consider types of work that are very different
than the popular use of the term.7
2.1 Terminology
Market and domestic work
In both research and policy discussions, there is extraordinary heterogeneity in how child
labor is defined and in what words are used to describe the different categories of work in which
children participate. The purpose of this subsection is to review how words are typically defined
in the literature, but there is no consensus. There is currently work underway to define statistical
standards and develop a fixed terminology (see Guarcello et al 2005) that is the basis for much of
this section, but that work is still in its infancy. Both producers and consumers of research need
to be careful to define exactly what is being studied in a particular research paper.
Table 1 presents a list of commonly used phrases to describe aspects of how children
work. Activities are organized by whether the activity involves the direct production of
economic goods and services that fall under the United Nations System of national Accounts
(SNA). According to the SNA, "the production of economic goods and services includes all
production and processing of primary products whether for the market, for barter, or for own
consumption, the production of all other goods and services for the market and, in the case of
households which produce such goods and services for the market, the corresponding production
for own consumption" (ILO 2000 p1). The production of economic goods and services will
include wage employment, self-employment, participation in agriculture, milling, handicrafts,
construction as well as water and wood collection.
Aggregate statistics of child employment typically cover the economically active
population. Economically active is defined as being involved in economic activity, and it
includes wage workers, employers, own-account workers, members of producer cooperatives,
unpaid family workers, apprentices, members of the armed forces, and the unemployed.
Economic work or market work is used similarly to economically active individuals, except the
unemployed are excluded. Participants in market work are sometimes separated by whether their
work is for the consumption of others (market oriented work) or their own family (non-market
oriented work). One can imagine how this distinction is important in national accounts, but there
is no clear reason why this distinction is important in studying child time allocation. Wage work
is a subcategory of market oriented work, and many authors focus on studying wage employment
alone. One unique challenge in classifying children engaged in market work outside of their own
household is that children are not always paid directly in wages. They either receive pay in-kind
(goods and services) or their labor is contracted for a fixed fee. Typically, these children are
grouped with those paid in cash under "wage work", but some studies separate them, labeling
them unpaid out of household market or economic work.
Child involvement in non-SNA activities is studied infrequently in child labor studies. A
February 2005 review of empirical papers on child labor indexed in EconLit and published in
peer reviewed economics journals since 1995 found that all but two considered wage work, half
additionally considered other forms of market work such as work in the family farm or business,
and 10 percent considered work that would fall outside the SNA definition of economic activity.
The phrase non-economic work is sometimes used to denote participation in the provision of
goods and services to family members or other members of the community that fall outside of
the scope of the official definition of economic goods and services. This includes for example8
community service work that helps build or maintain local schools. It also includes domestic
chores such as caring for family members, cooking, cleaning, or shopping. The phrase
"housework" is sometimes in place of domestic chores or it is used to refer to domestic chores
excluding shopping. Finally, "domestic work" is used in reference to non-economic work
exclusive of community service and volunteer work.
The use of the word "economic" in the SNA is confusing as economists since the early
1960s have emphasized the activities that the SNA defines as non-economic as critical to the
household's standard of living. Moreover, non-economic can be interpreted to imply that the
associated activities are inelastic with respect to economic factors, an assumption that is not born
out by the data. Many writers avoid using the phrases "economic" and "non-economic" work.
Instead, they classify work into market work and domestic work. The remaining classification of
work, community service and volunteer work, is rarely studied and poorly understood. There are
two obvious problem with using this market and domestic work lexicon. First, market work and
market oriented economic work are apt to be confused. Second, domestic work performed for
compensation outside of the child's own household is considered a type of market work and is
often referred to as domestic service or domestic work. The safest solution is for researchers to
be explicit in how they are defining the activities under study.
Two commonly used terms to be avoided are child work and household work. Child
work is typically used synonymously with market work. However, asserting that a child who
works in substantive hours in the provision of services to their home is not working is difficult to
justify. One could make the case for defining child work as covering both domestic and market
work, but simply using the phrase "work" to refer to these activities together is apt to generate
the least confusion given child work's common use as market work. Household work is often
used as a synonym for domestic work. However, this is confusing, because market work most
often occurs within the household.
Child labor
Researchers often avoid labeling any one activity as child labor. Official definitions of
child labor vary. Some countries officially define child labor as wage work (e.g. Pakistan) or
market work that is harmful to the future well-being of children (e.g. Vietnam). This later
standard is based on the precedent of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) C138. C138
on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment was passed in 1973 and has been signed by
135 countries to date. Signatories agree to pursue a national policy to abolish "child labor" and
to increase the minimum age of employment to "a level consistent with the fullest physical and
mental development of young persons" (C138, Article 1). Neither "child labor" nor
"employment" is defined in the convention, but the age appropriateness of various activities
depends on consideration of their effects on the health and development of the young. In
general, the minimum age of employment is the minimum age of completion of compulsory
schooling or at least 15 years old, although 14 can be consistent with the convention in very poor
countries. Light work that is deemed consistent with schooling attendance and unlikely to be
harmful to health and development is consistent with the convention in children as young as 12.
For statistical purposes, defining whether an activity is harmful to a child's health or
development is a challenge, because whether an activity is harmful depends on what the child9
would be doing in the absence of work. The ILO's Statistical Information and Monitoring
Program on Child Labor (SIMPOC) is the international body charged with tracking child labor
around the world. Their definition of what exactly is "child labor" varies over time, in part
because of controversy over what can be considered harmful. At the time of writing, a child
laborer is defined by SIMPOC as an economically active child under 12 that works 1 or more
hours per week, an economically active child 14 and under that works at least 14 hours per week
or 1 or more hours per week in activities that are "hazardous by nature or circumstance," and a
child 17 and under that works in an "unconditional worst form of child labor" (trafficked
children, children in bondage or forced labor, armed conflict, prostitution, pornography, illicit
activities, ILO 2002). The ILO (2006a) estimates that there were 218 million child laborers in
the world in 2004 under this definition.
Some researchers that choose to define an activity status as child labor adopt this
SIMPOC definition, but others are also present in the literature. By far, the most common thing
to do is to define children in wage work as child laborers. Others define child labor as market
work. A few researchers also define child labor by adding in domestic work. Typically, an
arbitrary cutoff in hours is employed in classifying some domestic workers as child laborers and
others as not just as the SIMPOC definition arbitrarily classifies as 13 year old working 14 hours
per week as a child laborer while the 13 year old working 13 hours per week is not. Given that
"child labor" carries a particular connotation in the popular imagination, the safest course is
likely for researchers to avoid labeling any one class of activities child labor.
"Light work" is sometimes used to refer to market work that is not deemed child labor.
That is, market work which is for some reason viewed as unlikely to be harmful to health,
development, and does not affect school attendance, participation in vocational training, or the
child's ability to benefit from any instruction received. Of course, it is not obvious how would
know whether work could be harmful in any of these senses without establishing the
counterfactual of what children would be doing absent this light work.
Worst and hazardous forms of child labor
While the general phrase "child labor" is poorly defined, some specific activities are
labeled as a "hazardous form of child labor" or a "worst form of child labor". The minimum age
convention, C138, places special emphasis on activities that "jeopardise the health, safety, or
morals of young persons" (Article 3 - section 1) and defines 18 as the minimum age of
employment for activities that can be described as such. In 1999, C182 on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor asks signatory countries to clarify what types of activities fall under this label and to
develop specific plans for their eradication. C182 has proven less controversial than C138 on the
minimum age of employment. To date, C182 has 151 signatories.
While it is up to the individual country to identify "worst forms" in their own country,
Article 3 of C182 contains several guidelines for what types of activities are to be considered for
persons under the age of 18. These include all forms of slavery and "practices similar to
slavery." This later clause is noted to include the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage,
serfdom, and forced or compulsory labor including for the purposes of armed conflict. Children
in prostitution, pornography, the production or processing of drugs are also noted as being in
"worst forms" of child labor. Article 3 (d) is the most ambiguous part of the convention as it10
allows worst forms to include "work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is
carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children." Article 4 of the
convention is explicit that it is up to individual countries to define what types of work are
considered "worst forms" of child labor under this clause. Activities labeled "worst forms" under
Article 3(d) of C182 are often labeled as "Hazardous forms of child labor." The companion
recommendation document for C182, R190 Worst Forms of Child Labor Recommendation,
suggests that these hazardous forms of child labor include:
"(a) work which exposes children to physical, psychological, or sexual
abuse; (b) work underground, under water, at dangerous heights, or in
confined spaces; (c) work with dangerous machinery, equipment and
tools, or which involves the handling or transport of heavy loads; (d) work
in an unhealthy environment which may, for example, expose children to
hazardous substances, agents or processes, or to temperature, noise levels,
or vibrations damaging to their health; (e) work under particularly difficult
conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work where
the child is unreasonably confined to the premises or the employer."
(R190, Section II.3.a-e).
It is worth noting that, unlike the more general child labor definitions discussed above, these
hazardous forms of child labor are defined based on the characteristics of the work rather than
relying on understanding what the child might do in the absence of work. Hence, the labeling of
specific activity as a worst or hazardous form does not carry the same assumptions about the
impact of that work as does the phrase child labor, and a specific country's policy definition of
hazardous work or worst forms of child labor can guide researchers in the use of those terms.
2.2 Sources of Data
Available data
Sources of data on child labor are increasing almost daily, and with them, our
understanding of child labor should continue to increase accordingly. Unfortunately, it does not
appear that much work is being done to validate the types of surveys and data collection methods
that are being used extensively. Hence, there is considerable scope for work on how to measure
the activities that children participate in.
Many early studies of child labor relied on cross-country data. Cross-country estimates
of economic active populations come from the ILO's LABORSTA database although the most
recent release (fifth edition) omits the 10-14 age group.
1 These LABORSTA estimates of
economically activity populations are generally believed to understate the extent of work,
because data on work inside the household (even market work) are often not collected.
Moreover, although the LABORSTA data are available over time, very few low-income
countries have multiple data sources on child labor over time. Much of the intertemporal
variation in child labor in the LABORSTA data must thus be driven by the imputations and
1 http://laborsta.ilo.org/. The fourth edition data (used herein) is available from UNSTAT as well.11
adjustments done for LABORSTA rather than independent observations on child labor. As a
result, the LABORSTA data is not reliably useful for analyzing changes in child labor over time.
When the ILO's Statistical Information and Monitoring Program on Child Labor
(SIMPOC) computes global estimates of the incidence of child labor, it does not rely on the
LABORSTA data. Instead, it works wherever possible off available household surveys that
facilitate a more complete picture of how children work and are free from LABORSTA's
imputations. Understanding Children's Work (UCW) is a joint effort of the World Bank,
UNICEF, and the ILO to coordinate studies relevant to child labor, and they maintain a thorough
listing of labor force, child labor, and multi-purpose household surveys with information useful
for studying how and why children work. Many dedicated child labor surveys assisted by
SIMPOC are freely available for download from their website, and there are a variety of multi-
purpose household surveys that can be downloaded for research purposes.
2
This chapter draws extensively from UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
(MICS) from 2000 and 2001.
3 They include a child labor module which asks children 5-14
whether they work outside of their household in the last week and the last year as well as how
many hours they worked outside the household in the last week. The surveys also collect hours
in the last week for work in domestic chores and in the household business (separately). No
information is available on industry of employment, type of employer, nor compensation. An
appealing feature of the MICS data is that survey instruments are nearly identical in each
country. That said, questions are likely to be interpreted in different ways based on local
context.
4
Limitations of household surveys and missing children
Several issues arise in using household survey data to examine child labor supply. First,
there is the general question about who to ask about the child's labor supply. A great deal of
attention has been directed by agencies such as SIMPOC and UCW towards what types of
activities should be monitored, but it is difficult to find detailed analysis of how this information
should be collected. It seems likely that measurement error in hours worked is a first order
problem with this data while participation is perhaps less difficult to gauge.
Second, measurement of compensation is particularly complicated. Most children do not
work for wages, so strong modeling assumptions are required even in detailed data to gauge their
compensation. Moreover, it is not obvious that even in wage work any one respondent will be
fully aware of the child's compensation. For example, a parent may be paid an amount that the
2 At the time of writing: UCW's data archive can be found at http://www.ucw-project.org; SIMPOC's archives are
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/microdata/index.htm; World Bank assisted multi-purpose
household surveys are available from http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/. The most recent Indonesian family life
survey contains rich detail on how children spend their time: http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/. Several of the
Demographic and Health Surveys also contain information on child time allocation: http://www.measuredhs.com/.
3 http://www.childinfo.org/MICS2/MICSDataSet.htm
4For example, 38 percent of children 5-14 in Niger answer that they work in unpaid work outside of their family.
The average across all countries is 6 percent. It could be that this labor arrangement is much more frequent in Niger,
or it may be that respondents are interpreting the question in a different way than are respondents in other countries.12
child is not aware of for the child's services, but an employer may also compensate the child to
reduce moral hazard problems.
Third, estimates of the incidence of any type of work will be sensitive to the recall period
used. It is not unusual for children to work intermittently, and it is not obvious what the "right"
recall period is for any analysis. For example, in agricultural communities, one often observes
high participation rates in market work during harvest seasons but little other than domestic work
at other times of year. Systematic evidence on the dynamics of child labor is extremely rare.
Levison et al (2003) is an exception. Brazil's urban, monthly employment survey follows
approximately 35,000 household for fourth months (the survey is set up as a rotating panel).
Levison et al use this data to document the intermittent nature of market work participation in
urban Brazil from 1982-1999. In their sample, they observe that the percent of children
employed in any given month is roughly half the number of children employed in at least one of
the four months. Moreover, depending on the city, between 20 and 40 percent of children 10-14
experienced 2 or more employment transitions in a four month period. Hence, not only are child
labor measures sensitive to the types of work considered, but they should also be assumed to be
sensitive to the recall periods used to assess employment status. This raises particular problems
for child labor measures based on the intensity of the child's work.
Fourth, some of the most vulnerable children may be impossible to capture with surveys.
Either they do not reside in households or their situation is sufficiently rare that the probability
that they are sampled in a randomized survey is effectively zero. Moreover, there is often little
reason to assume that selection into these activities (relative to other more easily measured forms
of work) is random. To get at these rare or hard to find groups of children, researchers often
employ contaminated sampling procedures, but it is hard to draw inferences with this data when
children outside of the activity are unobserved although this is an active avenue of research (for
example: Edmonds 2006c).
There are two approaches that can be taken to gauge the problem of missing children.
Both have severe limitations. First, enumerators can collect complete fertility histories and then
account for all of the children. In general, this approach may be biased by errors of omission if
children in particular circumstances are also omitted from fertility histories. Alternatively, this
fertility history based approach may overstate the extent of missing children, because children
that set up independent households or that are fostered in to other households should appear in
those household rosters and would not be excluded from any analysis using representative data.
Table 2 presents an example of this approach. A subset of the MICS countries include
fertility histories for women 15-49, and Table 2 lists the mean total births, number dead, and
number absent for women in these countries in this age range that report having given birth in
the last 15 years. Unfortunately, the data do not identify the timing or age of each birth child. It
is impossible to decipher the extent to which differences in adult mobility rates are driving
differences in number of absent children or how many of the absent children would be captured
in other households in a study of children 10-14 (for example). In many countries, a negligible
number of children are missing from the mother's household: less than a percent in Vietnam,
Uzbekistan, Tajikstan, Azerbaijan, and Albania. However, nearly 20 percent of living births are
absent in Sierra Leone and Swaziland. 15 percent are absent in Gambia and Guinea Bissau.
Altogether, 10 percent or more of births are absent in 9 of 22 countries. It is impossible to tell13
whether these missing children would be relevant for an analysis of child labor supply or
schooling. It is also impossible to identify how many of these children would appear in other
households in nationally representative randomized survey. However, there seems to be ample
potential for a substantive problem in some settings.
The problem of missing children is most acute in panel data, because children that exit a
panel household who would be captured in a representative survey are unlikely to reappear in
other panel households. However, panel data permits a second approach to evaluate the scale of
missing children. Many household panels collect information on individuals, including missing
individuals over time. This data can be tabulated to gauge the scale of missing children for
work. Extrapolating from this tabulation to representative data overstates the problem of missing
children as many children that exit panel households would be captured in a survey of non-panel
households, but it is an accurate reflection of the incidence of missing children in panel
households.
Table 3 contains counts of missing and recaptured children in two household level panel
datasets from Nepal and Vietnam. A comparison of missing children in the two panels is
illustrative, because the questionnaires regarding attrition are very similar, both datasets are
World Bank assisted Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), and at the start of each
panel, the two countries have similar living standards as measured by GDP per capita. The
counts in Table 3 are only for recaptured household and are not relevant for assessing child
attrition in households that are not in the panel for each country. In the Vietnam data, 93 percent
of boys and girls are recaptured. Of the missing children, 7 percent of boys and 8 percent of girls
are potentially missing from the Vietnam data because of work or schooling (this includes
children whose absence is not explained). This corresponds to less than a percent of the boys
and girls that would be expected to appear in the second round of the panel in the Vietnamese
data.
While out-migration for work or school is then unlikely to be a significant source of bias
in the Vietnamese data (at least for recaptured households), it appears to be a much more
substantive issue in the Nepali data. 78 percent of boys and 75 percent of girls are recaptured in
panel households in the Nepali panel. Of the missing, 44 percent of boys and 13 percent of girls
are potentially missing for work or school. These missing children constitute 10 percent of the
boys and 3 percent of the girls expected to be in the household for the second round of the panel.
Hence, while the data from Vietnam suggest that missing children is unlikely to be a substantive
problem in that data, there is considerably more scope for problems in the Nepali data. Specific
country contexts must be considered in discussing biases owing to missing children.
Idle children
Most household surveys of children capture a large number of children that neither work
nor attend school. For example, the 2000 Indian National Sample Survey classifies 13 percent of
rural children 10-14 in India as neither working nor attending school. These children are
typically labeled "idle," and the exact interpretation of their status is controversial. Biggeri et al
(2003) discusses the interpretation of idle status in household surveys from six different
countries. They argue that measurement error in activities (especially mismeasurement of
domestic work), unemployment, and unobserved health issues are responsible for a significant14
part of the "idleness" status. Measurement issues may be particularly important in cross-country
comparisons as understandings of "work" may vary from country to country.
Idleness is not necessarily simply measurement error in work. Idleness can be fully
rational in a time allocation model with schooling costs such as that of section 1. Equation 1.2
specifies that a child does not attend school when the marginal utility associated with the returns
to education is less than the foregone utility caused by schooling costs and the shadow value of
child time. When children also do not work (H=0, M=0), the shadow value of child time is
simply the marginal utility associated with the return on leisure for the child's future welfare.
Thus, idle status occurs when:
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(eq. 2.1)
That is, true idleness occurs when the marginal utility associated with additional leisure is at least
as large as that of the contribution of the child's work to household welfare. Is this ever plausible
unless the parents put substantive weight on child leisure? There is no empirical evidence to
inform this question, but it could occur when there are not wage employment options open to
children (M=0), and the shape of the home production function F(-) is such that the marginal
product of child labor can become non-positive. This might occur if, for example with young
children, there were some tasks children could do but then afterwards, they were more
destructive to output (perhaps distractive to adult labor) than helpful. Whether the prevalence of
idle children reflects the economic reality of the country or problems in how we collect child
time allocation data is not yet answered. Interestingly, Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007)
find that the poverty elasticity of idleness in Indian data is greater than is the poverty elasticity of
market or domestic work. Hence, even if idleness reflects measurement error, it might not be
classical measurement error.
2.3 Background on the Activities of Working Children
Types of activities
Table 4 presents participation rates in various categories of activity for 34 countries
included in UNICEF's MICS project. The questionnaires are nearly identical in all the countries
in Table 4. The data present a unique opportunity to examine child labor across countries in as
comparable a manner as possible (little can be done for cultural differences in the interpretation
of the questions). Participation rates in schooling, market work, market work for wages, other
market work outside of the household, market work inside the household, domestic work, any
work, work without schooling, and no work and no schooling are reported in Table 4. Note that
while there is considerable variation in schooling, schooling rates are surprisingly high. This
reflects the structure of the questionnaire. It asks whether a child has attended school in the last
year while the labor questions refer to the last week.15
Several important properties of how children work are apparent in table 4. First, work
outside of the household is the least prevalent work category in every country except Azerbaijan,
Kenya, and Venezuela. In these three countries participation rates in market work inside and
outside of the household are similar. Altogether, 8 percent of children in the MICS data work
outside of their household, and only 2 percent work in paid work outside of the household. It is
unclear what the 6 percent of children who work outside their house without pay are doing in the
MICS data, but in other datasets, they are often observed working in labor exchanges on
neighboring farms, working in schools in exchange for materials or a reduction in fees, helping a
relative with their work, etc.. Domestic work is the most prevalent type of work. Across
countries, 65 percent of children 5-14 report working in domestic work, compared to 23 percent
in market work.
Second, the countries with the lowest school attendance rates have the highest incidence
of "idle" children that neither work nor attend schooling. Work is not the residual claimant on
child time outside of school. Moreover, work is not especially prevalent in these countries with
high rates of idleness. They do not have the highest rates of work outside of the household or
work in market work. This is consistent with the idea that no single indicator of activity will
give a particularly complete idea of child time allocation, and research needs to take a
comprehensive view of child time in order to understand how it is influenced.
Third, countries with the highest prevalence of work outside the household also have the
highest prevalence of work inside the household. Sierra Leone has the highest rate of work
outside the household, and the second highest rate of work inside the household. Niger is second
with 43 percent of children working outside the household, while it has the fifth highest rate of
market work inside the household. In section 4.1 below, we discuss the weak nature of the
evidence linking child's market work status and employment opportunities outside of the
household, and the high correlation between work inside and outside the household are
consistent with the idea that children are not working solely because wage labor market factors
draw children away from their homes.
Fourth, participation in market work is highest in countries where domestic work is most
prevalent. This positive correlation in participation rates for market and domestic work also
appears in hours worked. However, the positive correlations between hours in various categories
of work mask a more nuanced view - that participation in various activities is positively
correlated when children work a small number of hours in each activity (as is typical) but not
with extreme hours. This is evident in Figure 1 which presents the joint distribution of hours
worked in market and domestic work for all children 10-14 in the MICS data. Figure 1 is a
contour map of the joint density of hours in market work and hours in domestic work for
children 10-14 in the pooled MICS data. Each contour on the map is a given density. Thus each
point on a given contour is equally likely. Density is increasing in color intensity.
Several key points are evident in figure 1. First, at the peak of the density, children work
more hours per week in domestic work than market work. Ignoring domestic work would
frequently understate total hours worked by a child by a factor slightly greater than 2. Second,
children working a large number of hours in market work are more likely than not to spend
additional time in domestic work. This is evidence by the humps in the market work direction.
No such humps are evident with hours in domestic work. Third, as hours per week in domestic16
work increase, it becomes less likely to observe the child doing significant time in market work.
This is evident in the increasing slope of contours as one heads up the domestic hours worked
distribution.
The joint distribution of hours worked in Figure 1 illustrates the problem with "child
labor" definitions that focus on market work alone, especially definitions based on the intensity
of hours worked. For example, suppose a researcher decided to be concerned about children that
worked more than 20 or more hours per week. If only work outside the household was
considered, this would be 8 percent of the MICS 10-14 sample. If market work inside the
household is also included, 23 percent of children work more than 20 or more hours per week.
When domestic work is also considered, 38 percent work 20 or more hours per week and 17
percent work 40 or more hours per week. Hence, ignoring domestic work may seriously
understate estimates of total hours worked and thereby the incidence of child labor if hours
worked is used to define it.
Occupation and industry of economically active children
In table 4, it is clear that most working children participate in domestic work. Among
children engaged in market work, most of that work is inside the child's household. The
industrial and occupational composition of employment in market work is not available in the
MICS data. Comparable cross-country estimates of the industrial and occupational composition
of child involvement in market work do not appear to exist. One possible source of this
information is that most SIMPOC child labor surveys use similar questionnaires, and they tend to
collect information on occupation and industry. In this section, we tabulate available
information on industry and occupation for economically active children as reported in
downloadable, English language SIMPOC reports.
Table 5 shows the industrial composition of economically active populations for
available countries.
5 In almost every listed country, a majority of children economically active
children are involved with agriculture, forestry, or fishing industries. The exceptions are the 5-
17 populations of Costa Rica, Panama, and the Ukraine where these industries are still the largest
employers of children. In most countries, the combination of hotel and restaurants and wholesale
and retail trade are the next most important industrial sectors for economically active children.
When they can be disaggregated, wholesale and retail trade tends to have a larger share of
economically active children than does the hotel and restaurant sector. Manufacturing tends to
be small relative to agriculture related and wholesale and retail trade sectors, but it employs a
larger share of children than does mining or construction in every country in the table.
Interestingly, private households are large employers of economically active children in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Zambia. Many of these children are child domestic workers, and the phenomena
5 Of the MICS countries from table 4, only Kenya and the Philippines also have child labor surveys. It is interesting
to note, that MICS estimates of participation rates in market work differ from estimates of the economically active
population in the SIMPOC surveys for these two countries. The difference in the Philippine data is small. 16
percent of children are involved in market work in the MICS data, 11 percent in the SIMPOC survey. However, the
differences in the Kenyan data are large. 3 percent of Kenyan children 5-14 are involved in market work in the
MICS surveys, but the SIMPOC surveys report an economic activity rate for this population of 15 percent. It is not
clear why these estimates differ.17
of child domestic workers in Africa and elsewhere is infrequently studied in detail within
economics.
The comparability of industry classifications in the SIMPOC surveys across countries is
not as complete as one would like. Nor are the classifications particularly detailed. The 2002/03
Bangladesh Child Labor Survey is unusual in the incredible detail it provides on the industrial
classification of economically active children. Table 6 tabulates the 4 digit industrial distribution
of the economically active populations of children 5-17 in Bangladesh. Only sectors with at least
0.5 percent of economically active children in either rural or urban areas are reported in Table 6.
In examining the detailed industrial composition of employment in Bangladesh, it is important to
remember that there is no reason to believe that Bangladesh is representative of other low-
income countries. There are an estimate 7.5 million economically active children 5-17 in
Bangladesh. This corresponds to 18 percent of children 5-17.
The useful information within the detailed classifications of Table 6 is about what
children within the aggregate sectors are doing. Children involved in agriculture and related
industries are involved in the growing of cereals, vegetables, poultry farming, and inland fishing.
Cereal cultivation is the largest single sector with 39 percent of all economically active children
directly involved. In the retail trade industries, groceries and general stores are the largest
employer of children. In manufacturing, wooden furniture and fixtures stand out. For
construction, site preparation is relatively more important.
The disaggregated occupational composition of economically active children can provide
further insight into what children do. Information at the 3 digit level is available in the
Bangladesh child labor force survey, and these data are tabulated in Table 7. 46 percent of
children 5-17 are farm crop workers. The next largest occupations are salesmen and shop
assistants (7 percent), poultry farmers (5 percent), sales supervisors (4 percent), fisherman (3
percent), and non-motorized road vehicle drivers (3 percent).
Gender differences
Gender differences in activities can be considerable in some countries. Boys generally
have higher participation rates in market work than girls and lower participation rates in
domestic work. For example, in the MICS countries, girls are 18 percent more likely to be
involved in domestic work and nearly 30 percent less likely to participate in paid market work.
Estimates of gender differences tend to be extremely sensitive to what types of activities are
considered in a study. Studies such as Assaad et al (2003) for Egypt, Levison and Moe (1998)
for Peru, Levison, Moe, and Knaul (2001) for Mexico have documented the misleading picture
that omitting domestic work can create for analysis of the determinants of child work.
In both market and domestic work, boys and girls often participate in different tasks.
This is evident in the large gender differences in the industrial composition of economically
active children in Bangladesh (table 6). Boys are involved in a wider variety of industries. Boys
are more likely to be engaged in the growing of cereal crops. Girls are more involved in growing
vegetables and poultry farming. 14 percent of economically active girls are in poultry and 16
percent in vegetables while less than 2 percent of economically active boys are in each industry.
Children involved in textile and sewing handicrafts and private household services are almost18
entirely female whereas boys are more involved in fishing, wooden furniture manufacture,
construction site preparation, retail trade of grocery and general stores (as sales assistants and
sales supervisors, table 7), and transport (non-motorized vehicles, table 7). We should not
extrapolate from Bangladesh to assume such distinct gender differences in other countries, but its
example shows that these gender differences can be large.
Large gender differences in types of tasks can complicate researcher decisions about how
to treat gender. Do differences in activities reflect a fundamental difference in how girl time
allocation decisions will be made with respect to the household's economic environment? If so,
this would suggest that boys and girls should be considered separately in research. Qualitative
evidence from specific country contexts can help inform where girls should be considered
separately from boys, but bifurcating data by gender seems a reasonable default position.
Substantive gender differences in tasks and determinants of work can be especially
challenging for studies that rely on within household comparisons (household fixed effects) of
children. Assume average birth spacing is two years, the probability an observed child is a girl is
0.5, and that gender draws are independent within parents. This implies that a household fixed
effects study of working children 10-14 will rely on gender differences in activities and tasks for
half its variation.
Urban –rural differences
The research challenges associated with gender also arise with urban-rural data. Children
tend to work more and for longer hours in rural than urban areas. For example, Edmonds and
Pavcnik (2005a) tabulate urban-rural differences in the MICS data used in Figure 1 and table 4.
31 percent of rural children 5-14 are engaged in market work in rural areas compared to 19
percent in urban areas. Domestic work also has a higher prevalence in rural areas although the
difference is smaller (68 percent compared to 61 percent). 26 percent of children work 20 or
more hours per week in rural areas compared to 14 percent in urban, and 9 percent work 40 or
more hours in rural areas compared to 4 percent in urban.
If children only worked more intensely in rural areas, then researchers could pool urban
and rural children in their analysis, but children also tend to work in different types of activities.
For example, in the MICS countries, the prevalence of unpaid market work is nearly double in
rural areas, and paid employment accounts for 50 percent larger share of all market work in
urban areas. A careful look at the urban-rural differences in the detailed Bangladesh data is
illustrative for why researcher's default assumption should be to treat urban and rural child labor
decisions distinctly.
In general, employment is more concentrated in rural areas in Bangladesh. For boys,
urban-rural differences in employment are similar to what one would expect with rural areas
more weighted to agriculture. A majority of economically active boys in rural areas are farm
crop workers (table 7) with most being involved in cereals (table 6). Salesman and shop
assistants, fisherman, and non-motorized vehicle drivers are the next most prevalent occupations
among rural boys. In urban areas, boys are most active in sales. 27 percent of boys in urban
areas are working as sales supervisors, salesmen, shop assistants, and street vendors (table 7).
Much of this appears to be in retail grocery and general stores (table 6) as well as tea stalls.19
However, farm crop workers in cereals, fisherman, and non-motorized vehicle operators are also
prevalent in urban areas.
Urban-rural differences in occupation and industry of the economically active population
in Bangladesh are more pronounced for girls. A majority of girls in rural areas are involved in
cereals, vegetables, or poultry farming. While poultry is the second largest industry of
employment for urban girls, together these agricultural industries are less than a quarter of urban
employment for girls (table 6). Spinners, weavers, knitters, etc. are unusual in rural areas, but 13
percent of economically active urban girls are in these occupations (table 7). Employment of
girls in the manufacture of bidies or in private households is also much more prevalent in urban
areas (table 6).
A difficulty in bifurcating data into urban and rural segments is that it presumes the two
area types are segmented. In some contexts, there is no clear line either defining or separating
urban and rural. In fact, there is an interesting literature that documents how household
specialization changes with proximity to major urban areas (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2004) and that
this in turn affects schooling and both market and domestic work (Fafchamps and Wahba 2006).
Thus, it is difficult to draw generalities with regards to how and whether urban and rural areas
should be treated differently by empirical researchers. Moreover, the example of Bangladesh
illustrates that the extent to which urban and rural activities are comparable may differ by gender
as well (Amin, Quayes, and Rives 2006 also make this point in data from Bangladesh).
Age patterns
C138 established the idea that whether an activity is viewed negatively for a child
depends on the child's age, and this has been codified into SIMPOC's definition of child labor.
The idea behind this is that what may be appropriate for a 14 year old might not for a seven year
old. This is logical, but implicit in this discussion is that 7 year olds tend do the same sorts of
activities as a 14 year old. This does not appear to be the case in the limited available evidence.
Figure 2 pools the MICS countries and plots participation rates in various activities
separately by age and gender. The four pictured categories are market work outside of one's own
household, market work, any work (the difference between any and market work is children who
only work in domestic work), and any work without also attending school. Participation rates in
each of these categories looks smooth in age for boys until age 10 when there is a sizeable
increase in participation rates in market and domestic work and again for age 12. Girls appear to
experience discrete jumps at age 8, 10, and 12. The increase at age 8 for girls appears to be most
dramatic in domestic work whereas most of the increase at age 10 and 12 for girls is in market
work. Overall "any work" patterns for girls look smooth at ages 10 and 12, suggesting that the
increase in market work and 10 and 12 for girls complements the domestic work that began
increased substantively starting around age 8.
Moreover, within market work, there are changes by age in the types of industries in
which children are employed. This is evident in the SIMPOC data tabulated in Table 5. When
available, the industrial composition of employment is also broken down by age. There are some
interesting differences across age. For example, in Tanzania, the fraction of economically active
children employed in private households is decreasing in age whereas the fraction in agriculture20
and related industries is increasing in age. However, the opposite is true for Kenya. Declining
shares in agriculture and related industries with age is also present in Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia,
and Nicaragua. But the age patterns are ambiguous in Zambia and the Philippines. Hence, while
there is no clear age pattern across countries in the industrial composition of employment, there
appear to be patterns within countries that highlight how important age can be in the analysis of
child labor.
The evidence in figure 2 and table 5 implies that researchers should be as flexible as
possible in how they treat age in their analysis. A full set of gender interacted age effects seems
reasonable for regression work. This is especially true for market work although a gender
interacted polynomial in age may be suitable for some types of activities (such as participation in
any work for girls above age 8 in the data used in figure 2).
A related issue concerns what ages researchers should consider. International
organizations interested in child labor typically focus on children 6-14 for most activities but the
under 18 are often considered in particularly abhorrent situations such as prostitution. However,
C182 is careful to allow each country to set appropriated ages for different types of work, and
individual country policies regarding work and schooling are useful for researchers in deciding
what ages to consider and how to group those ages. While work laws tend not to be enforced in
most current developing countries (more on this later), they are useful at providing insight into
country specific views on the ages at which work is a concern. Researchers have to be careful,
however, not to let subjective policy statements about "harmful" work drive what types of ages
they consider as whether work is harmful ultimately depends on understanding why a child
participates in it.
Research needs to be particularly concerned about schooling ages, and grouping children
based on the category of schooling they would normally attend for their age can be prudent
(especially when drop out rates at schooling transitions are high). For example, observing a
seven year old who worked without attending school in a country where schooling typically
begins at age 8 might reflect something very different than if the child were at a country where
schooling begins at 5. Likewise observing a thirteen year old out of school in a country where
thirteen year olds are usually in primary school may imply something different than in a country
where thirteen year olds are in secondary school. Moreover, in many settings, the elasticity of
child time allocation to factors in the environment appears to be increasing in age at young ages,
and explaining child time allocation at pre-school ages is a challenge. Hence, country specific
attention to the appropriate age grouping of the data seems merited.
Worst forms of child labor
The ILO's SIMPOC estimates that a total of 8.4 million children are involved in child
trafficking, in forced or bonded labor, are soldiers, are prostitutes or involved in pornography, or
participate in illicit activities (ILO, 2002). 68 percent of these children are in bonded or forced
labor. Since hazardous activities are defined at the country level, cross country evidence on their
extent is not available. Country level estimates are also typically not available. However, in
implementing C182, the ILO has been active in assisting countries in assessing the prevalence of
worst and hazardous forms of child labor as well as in developing plans for the eradication of
these activities. Nepal was one of the first countries to initiate one of these "Time Bound21
Programs," and the findings from the baseline work for this program are illustrative of the types
of activities that governments label as hazardous and the prevalence of worst forms in a very
poor country.
Estimates of the extent and incidence of worst forms of child labor in Nepal are in Table
8. These estimates are from ILO (2001). There are approximately 8 million children below the
age of 16 in Nepal, and approximately 1.5 percent of these children work in these worst forms of
child labor. Child porters and domestic works are the two most common types of “ worst forms”
of child labor. Among child porters, there are two main types: short distance porters that work in
urban markets and bus parks and long distance that work in the countryside. The ILO estimates
that typically long distance porters stay and work with their families while short distance porters
have often migrated to find work. Estimates are that there are about 42,204 long distance porters
and 3,825 short distance porters. 88 percent are boys. Domestic workers are most prevalent in
high status urban households, though domestics typically come from rural areas. In Kathmandu,
1 out of 5 households employ children. The ILO estimates that 43 percent of employers of child
domestics are government or non-government service holders. Domestics are believed to be
evenly split between paid (to parents) and unpaid (more correctly, paid in a lump sum) workers.
The other children included in Table 8 because of the nature of their employment are children in
mines, in the carpet sector, and ragpickers, who pick rags and other rubbish out of garbage
dumps for resale.
Bonded laborers and trafficked children both fall under worst forms of child labor as
well. Bonded children in Nepal are in bondage either because parents took out debts against the
child's future earnings or because they were used as collateral on loans. The ILO estimates that
some 17,152 children in bondage in Nepal, although this estimate is controversial because it does
not include children whose parents are bonded in a system of bonded labor that pervades western
Nepal (Sharma et al 2001). Child trafficking is particularly hard to measure and evaluate.
According to the ILO (2001), 12,000 girls are trafficked into the commercial sex industry each
year in Nepal. By and large, these girls work in brothels in India. Unfortunately, because of the
relative rarity of these activities and the challenges of capturing them in randomized surveys,
little research exists on whether these activities are rightly viewed as a type of child work (where
human rights is more obviously an issue) or whether they should be viewed as some other type
of activity altogether.
One difficulty with classifying some activities as hazardous and including them as a
worst form of child labor is that children can face hazards in the most common kinds of labor,
too. Especially as children get older, they become active in all aspects of agriculture, and it is
not unusual to see reports of injuries in operating farm machinery in child labor surveys. The
self-reported injury rate from child labor surveys of children working in agriculture is actually
higher, at 12 percent, than 9 percent level in manufacturing (Ashagrie 1997). Agriculture can
also be hazardous for children because of exposure to dangerous chemicals such as chemical
herbicides or pesticides, exposure to heat or weather, repetitive work injuries, and threats posed
by animals, reptiles, insects, parasites, and some plants. Hence, even though in principal, the
distinction between hazardous child labor and other types of activities seems less vague than the
distinctions some draw between child labor and light work (where "child labor" is labeled as
work that is somehow known to be harmful to the child), in reality, a case can be made for
looking at some of the more common forms of child labor even if one is only interested in22
activities that might fall under C182. The next section discusses the case for attention to child
activities further.
Are worst forms different?
In the following sections, this chapter reviews evidence on why children work. This
evidence is culled almost entirely from work that would not be considered hazardous or a worst
form of child labor under C182, because the relatively rare worst forms of child labor are
difficult to capture with randomized surveys. Hence, before turning to that evidence it is worth
reviewing theories as to why selection into worst forms might be different.
Three views about differences in the selection process into common forms and worst
forms of child labor seem to dominate the academic literature. In one view, worst forms are no
different than other types of work from the parent or child's perspective, and factors that drive
children to select into worst forms are the same factors that drive them to work in the first place.
A variation on this view notes that the work may be more unpleasant but this unpleasantness may
be fully compensated through higher wages. In this case, the link between worst forms and
income will be the same as that of more common forms of child labor, and the resulting policy
prescriptions will be the same. In a second view, worst forms of child labor are partially
compensated so that they pay more (Dessy and Pallage 2005). Thus, the entry process is similar
to other types of work except that poorer households are more likely to select into worst forms,
because the marginal utility for the additional income exceeds the disutility coming from the
particular type of work. In a third view, children in worst forms of child labor enter because of
poor information about what the work entails (Rogers and Swinnerton 2002). Thus, ex-ante
children select into the work under the assumption that it is similar to other types of work, and
there are barriers to exiting. This explanation is most often voiced to explain selection into
prostitution, but it may be equally substantive for other worst forms of child labor. In reality,
because of inference problems with rare events, we have little evidence on why children select
into worst forms and whether selection is driven by characteristics that differ from those
discussed below for more common forms of work.
3. The Case for Attention to Working Children
Few issues in developing countries draw more attention in rich countries than child labor.
This attention is typically motivated by human rights concerns. Horrific newspaper issues of
children burned to death while chained to their job in garment factories in Bangladesh or forced
into prostitution in Thailand drives much of this concern. These human rights concerns are well
grounded, but, as most working children are from poor families and are helping in their family's
activities, the typical working child is not in a situation where the human rights issues are
obvious. As such, much of child labor related policy is not directed at worst forms of child labor
but instead at the more prevalent forms of child labor in developing countries. This section
considers the academic case for attention to the more prevalent forms of child labor.
3.1 Child Labor in International Policy
Researchers for years have studied adult labor supply with great interest, but the research
interest in child labor is augmented by policy's interest in the topic. Consumer boycotts and23
student protests against products with some child labor component during production are
relatively frequent occurrences. One often reads of protests in American universities over the
involvement of children in the production of athletic clothing. Outrage over the involvement of
children in producing soccer balls hit a fever pitch in the late 1990s when it was learned that
FIFA licensed products contained a considerable child labor component. Beyond boycotts,
labeling campaigns such as the Rugmark campaign to label hand-knit carpets as "child labor
free" garner considerable popular support.
This consumer activism has been matched by legislative interest. For example, the U.S.
Congress has repeatedly considered legislation that would prohibit imports into the United States
of all products made with child labor. Under threat of such sanctions, export oriented garment
factories in Bangladesh released more that 10,000 child workers under the age of 14 in the mid
1990s. More recently, the U.S. House of Representatives has deliberated the "Child Labor
Elimination Act" that would impose general trade sanctions, deny all financial assistance, and
mandate U.S. opposition to multilateral credits to 62 developing countries with a high incidence
of child labor. This threat is implicit in a 2002 act of the U.S. Congress that mandated a study by
the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs about the relationship between
military and education spending in countries with a high incidence of child labor. Under current
law, the U.S. can withdraw a poor country's eligibility for trade preferences under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) based on a country's poor record on child labor.
Moreover, the 2000 Trade and Development Act restricts eligibility for trade benefits to
countries that the Secretary of Labor certifies as showing progress towards eliminating the worst
forms of child labor. This policy interest in child labor in developing countries is a relatively
recent issue, and corresponding to it is growth in the academic literature that seeks to understand
why children work and measure the short and long term consequences of work.
3.2 Work and Schooling
Is schooling attendance lower for working children?
There are fixed number of hours in a day. As such, time spent working necessarily trades
off with other uses of child time such as play, study time, or time in school. Despite their
importance for child development, especially at young ages, very few researchers consider play
and leisure in efforts to measure the opportunity costs of working (although concerns about play
were at the forefront of concerns about child labor in early 20th century U.S.: Fuller 1922,
Pangburn 1929). In contrast, the extent to which work affects schooling attendance,
performance, and attainment is perhaps the second most researched question in the child labor
literature (second, to the income elasticity of child labor supply). The Minimum Working Age
Convention (C138) in part necessitates this interest in that it permits light work in children as
young as 12 provided it does not interfere with schooling. When and how does work interfere
with schooling?
The main challenge in this literature is that schooling and child labor decisions are joint
outcomes out of a single time allocation problem. Hence, the interpretation of any found
correlation between labor status and schooling is controversial. Do children work because they
are not attending school? Do children not attend school because they are working? Do other
economic or cultural factors simultaneously influence both schooling and work decisions?24
Before turning to the problem of establishing causation, a simple description of the association
between schooling attendance and work in the MICS countries will be useful
Figure 3 shows school participation rates by gender and the type of activity a child
participates in for children 10-14 in the MICS data (all countries are pooled and the data are
weighted by population). Several points stand-out in figure 3. First, children can work and
attend school. In fact, in the under 10 population, working children have slightly higher
schooling rates than non-working children although this reflects age trends in both the start of
schooling and work. Second, of different categories of activity, schooling attendance rates are
lowest among children in market work outside of their household. Third, children who work
only in market work without any domestic work tend to have lower schooling rates than children
who work in domestic and market work. These two pieces of evidence are often cited as
justification for only looking at wage work or market work respectively, but they may proxy
hours worked and have little further implication. Children who only work in market work
without any domestic work are typically working substantive hours, and children that work
outside the household tend to spend more time working than those who help in the family
business.
Figure 4 shows average total hours worked in the last week by type of activity and gender
for the same population as figure 3. Total hours worked are highest among children that work
outside their household in market work and lowest among children that only perform domestic
work. In general, girls work more than boys (despite having similar school attendance rates),
except among children that participate in market work only.
If the lower schooling attendance rates of children who work in market work alone or
work outside the household reflects hours worked, this would imply that the decline in schooling
attendance with total hours worked should be steepest in the neighborhood of 30 hours worked
as is typical for those who only work outside the household. Figure 5 plots gross school
attendance rates worked for children 10-14 in the MICS data against total hours worked (market
plus domestic) in the last week. 95 percent confidence intervals are also pictured. School
attendance rates appear relatively flat with respect to total hours worked until about 8 hours
worked. The probability of observing a working child attend school declines gradually between
8 and 29 hours, then the rate of decline increases dramatically starting around 30 hours per week.
The derivate of the curve in figure 5 is greatest between 35 and 45 hours worked per week. This
is not surprising as it implies that it becomes most difficult to work and attend school
simultaneously when the child is working full time. Nonlinearities similar to that of figure 5 are
also apparent in Ray and Lancaster's (2003) study of child labor and schooling attendance in 7
countries with child labor surveys administered by the ILO's SIMPOC.
One clear difficulty in assessing the tradeoff between hours worked and schooling
attendance is that the tradeoff depends on how one defines work. Hours worked are largest and
schooling attendance rates are lowest for children working outside of their home. However, a
failure to consider work within the household or work in domestic work can create a misleading
picture of the trade off between schooling and work, especially for girls. Assaad et al (2003)
observes that the low attendance of Egyptian girls relative to boys appears to be associated with a
substantial domestic work burden of girls. Because boys do not face the same work burden
within the home, they face fewer barriers to schooling such that in the Egyptian data, they do not25
observe a tradeoff between working and schooling attendance for boys. The sensitivity of
attainment to work also depends on the definition of work. Levison and Moe (1998) using
Peruvian data and Levison, Moe, and Knaul (2001) in Mexico document that whether there is a
tradeoff between schooling attainment and work depends on whether work includes domestic
work, especially for girls.
In fact, school attendance rates do not appear to vary significantly with whether hours
worked are in market or domestic work. Figure 6 plots school attendance rates by hours worked
in market and domestic work separately using the MICS data. 95 percent confidence intervals
are also pictured, and there is significant overlap in the confidence intervals. Beyond 10 hours of
work, the school attendance rates associated with time in market work are slightly below that of
time in domestic work. However, the differences are never statistically significant, and the shape
of both curves looks as would be expected from Figure 5 given that work in one type of activity
(e.g. market work) is associated typically with some work in the other activity (e.g. domestic
work).
In contrast to market and domestic work, schooling attendance rates associated with
hours worked inside and outside of the household appear very different. Figure 7 contains a plot
of school attendance rates by hours worked inside and (separately) outside the household.
Between 12 and 53 hours per week, a child who is working a given number of hours outside of
their household is less likely to attend school than is a child who is spending the same amount of
the time inside of the household. A large part of the reason for this apparent difference between
work inside and outside of the household is that children working outside of the household
typically also work significantly more hours inside the household. In the MICS data, each hour
in work outside of the household is associated with an additional nine-tenths of an hour work
inside the household on average. In contrast, each hour in work inside the household is
associated with one tenth of an hour work outside the household. Hence, the total hours worked
for a child working 20 hours a week outside of the household is 38 hours. In Figure 5, a child
working 38 hours has a school attendance rate of slightly above 80 percent, within the
confidence interval of the observed schooling attendance for a child working 20 hours a week
outside the household. Thus, the difference between schooling attendance rates for children
working inside and outside of the household appears to owe more to differences in the resulting
total hours worked by the child rather than something else intrinsic to work outside of home.
Is schooling achievement and attainment lower for working children?
If lower attendance is meaningful for human capital accumulation, it should translate into
lower schooling attainment. Moreover, beyond attendance, work may undermine human capital
accumulation by interfering with learning as evident in test scores or schooling completion rates.
Panel data on child labor histories is rarely available, so studies typically compare current labor
supply to current attainment. This is hard, because current work status necessarily depends on
past education and work histories as these affect the value of child time and whether it's optimal
for the child to work. This makes interpretation difficult, but studies typically find that
attainment is lower for working children. Ray (2003) observes that an additional hour of wage
work in Ghana is associated with more than a year's less completed educational attainment.
Psacharaopoulos (1997) notes that children in wage work in Bolivia have nearly a year less26
completed schooling than non working children and that working children in Venezuela have
almost 2 years less attainment.
Beyond the obvious challenges of inferring causation from these correlations, another
difficulty in interpreting evidence on attainment is that standards for advancement vary across
schools and may be correlated with factors of interest. For example, it is not difficult to imagine
that passing in a poor quality school in a poor area might reflect a different knowledge level than
passing in a very good school in a rich area. However, work is also correlated with worse
performance in other measures of academic achievement. For example, Akabayashi and
Psacharopoulos (1999) note that working children spend less time studying which is reflected in
both math and reading test scores in their Tanzanian data. Heady (2003), using the same Ghana
data as Ray, notes that despite the absence of a correlation in the data between wage work and
school attendance, reading and mathematics test scores are substantially lower among wage
working children than non working children.
Is there a causal relationship between work and schooling achievement and attainment?
Causal studies of the impact of child labor on schooling face the challenge of isolating
some factor that affects child labor without simultaneously affecting schooling. This is difficult,
because child labor, schooling, and leisure decisions are joint; it is hard to imagine how one can
be affected without all other decisions being affected. Consider the analytical model of equation
1.1. Choices of schooling, leisure, and all types of work depend on the shadow value of child
time which is, in turn, a function of choices of schooling, leisure, and all types of work. Hence,
without directly observing the shadow value of child time, there is no way to identify a causal
impact of one type of activity on another without additional assumptions.
Studies typically rely on either modeling assumptions like factors that alter the value of
the child's time only directly affect child labor (that is, relative prices do not affect time
allocation decisions) or on legal variation in child labor or schooling regulations, again assuming
that they have no direct effect on child labor (see Orazem and Gunnarsson 2004 for a review).
Even beyond the direct effect these types of factors have on time allocation or on the shadow
value of child time in a simple household model, variation in the value of child time or regulation
is apt to be correlated with latent socio-economic characteristics of the child's environment.
Hence, authors estimating the causal impact of work on schooling face a considerable challenge.
Instrumental variables estimates of the effect of child labor on schooling tend to produce
a stronger association between child labor and schooling than in the raw data (for examples:
Boozer and Suri 2001, Rosati and Rossi 2003, Ray and Lancaster 2003, Gunnarsson et al 2006).
This is not surprising as the instruments typically capture variation in the child labor-schooling
relationship that is more variable than the full variation in the data. For example, instruments
that work through the value of child time are then using variation in child labor that owes to the
families need for the child's contribution or the relative return to work rather than school. It is
not surprising to learn that this variation leads to a greater elasticity of schooling with respect to
child labor relative to alternative reasons for child labor such as social norms about working, the
absence of accessible quality schooling, etc. Legal variation is likely correlated with institutional
quality and thereby living standards. Hence, for similar reasons, as the value of child time, these27
instruments, when valid, might be capturing variation in child labor which is inherently more apt
to trade off with schooling.
Do changes in the price of schooling affect child labor supply?
Several studies implicitly consider the link between schooling and child labor by
examining how child labor and schooling reply to a change in the relative price of schooling. In
general, they find that cash or in kind transfers that are conditioned on school attendance increase
schooling but have a much smaller effect on child labor. For example, Ravallion and Wodon
(2000) consider market work participation and schooling attendance responses to the Food for
Education Program (FFE) in Bangaldesh in which families receive food rations as long as they
send their children to primary school. They observe that households who participate in this
program have higher school attendance. Market work participation declines with this school
attendance although the decline in market work is about a third of the increase in schooling. A
similar finding is in Cardoso and Souza (2004) who compare market work and schooling
attendance in families that receive cash transfers as a part of Brazil's Bosca Escola program to
similar families that do not receive the payment. Bosca Escola conditions cash transfers on
school attendance, and Cardosa and Souza find larger increases in schooling than declines in
market work. Endogenous program participation is a concern in any study that compares
program participants to non-participants. Ravallion and Wodon address this by instrumenting
for program participation with whether the program is present in a child's village, and Cardosa
and Souza use propensity score matching to create a control group with similar observable
characteristics to program participants.
There is a debate about the implications of the finding that changes in the price of
schooling lead to larger changes in school participation than in work participation. Some argue
that this implies the absence of a connection between either schooling and child labor or poverty
and child labor. There are several reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, if one observed
changes in the consumption of two goods (leisure and schooling in this case) with a price change
in one of the goods, but the quantity of one good changed more than another, would one
conclude that there is no budget constraint? Second, this finding might reflect that there is more
of an intensive margin with work than school. School attendance is a rather discrete thing. That
is, when a child attends school, that typically means they attend a full days of classes (which is
often in the neighborhood of 4 or 5 hours a day). However, market and domestic work are much
more flexible. A child in response to attending school for 4 hours a day could have a precisely
corresponding change in total hours worked (indicating a 1 for 1 trade off) but yet still work. In
fact, in a much smaller sample with detailed time use data, Arends-Kuenning and Amin (2004)
document that the decline in hours worked among FFE participants is similar in magnitude to the
increase in time in school. Third, if children are working because of poverty, schooling subsidies
may induce a substitution away from play and leisure to schooling, rather than work. In fact,
Arends-Kuenning and Amin (2004) argue that before the FFE program arose in Bangladesh,
children on average were not working so many hours that their labor burdens prohibited
schooling. The idea that children work because of the family's poverty does not imply that
children can have no leisure, especially in a setting where parents care about their child's welfare.
Hence, it seems difficult to argue that a movement into schooling without a corresponding
change in participation in market work can be interpreted as evidence against a child labor-
schooling connection.28
Modeling the joint determination of schooling and other time allocation decisions
Most researchers generally treat the analysis of schooling and work separately. That is,
they estimate some limited dependent variable model (linear probability, logit, probit) for
schooling and work separately. This is attractive for several reasons. First, it is transparent and
the properties of these estimators are well understood. Second, it will lead to results that are
consistent and comparable to studies that only consider schooling or only consider types of child
work. However, because schooling and time allocation decisions are joint, studies frequently
adopt empirical methods designed to model the correlation between schooling and work
decisions.
The bivariate probit is probably the most common alternative to the single variable
models. Conventionally, it is similar to a SUR regression in that it allows for correlations in
errors between the schooling and child labor regressions. It can be efficient when bivariate
normality of errors is correct, although this is not universally true when the same covariates are
included in each regression. If there were viable exclusion restrictions, the model can be used to
infer the effect of change in one endogenous variable on the other (that is, a type of work's effect
on schooling), although there is still the difficulty of finding plausible exclusion restrictions.
Moreover, there are several limitations that researchers need to consider. The bivariate probit
has the standard probit problems (need to evaluate the cdf to compute a marginal effect that will
vary with covariates, need for large samples per fixed effect to recover fixed effects,
inconsistency under heteroskedasticity), and two important additional issues. First, when there
are two outcomes of interest (child labor and schooling), computing the effect of a change in any
covariate on child labor and schooling requires evaluating the joint density rather than the
univariate density as in the standard probit. Second, when children are classified as either
working or in school, the error distribution will become degenerate. Thus, the bivariate probit is
not appropriate for data where most children either work or are in school so that the product of
the two is zero in expectation. Hence, application of the bivariate probit approach requires some
caution on the part of researchers.
Another frequent approach to modeling child labor and schooling is a multinomial choice
model such as the multinomial logit (MNL) or probit (MNP). These models are especially
attractive for structural models of time allocation. They are, however, inherently difficult for
evaluating causal effects, because computing marginal effects of some covariate on the choice of
schooling and work combination is not straightforward.
Typically, the different choices in a multinomial model are different activities that
children may perform, and this approach seems broadly consistent with the simultaneous nature
of decisions about time allocation. The computational simplicity of the MNL and the ease with
which one can estimate fixed effects make it the more popular than the MNP. However, the
MNL relies on the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). What does
IIA mean in the case where children can participate in multiple tasks? Consider a setting where
a child chooses between wage employment and the family farm. IIA implies that if a third
choice is added (schooling or work in a family business), the third choice should not affect the
probability the child chooses wage work over work on the family farm. IIA would be violated if
the third choice drew children disproportionately out of either wage work or work on the farm.29
For example, a family business might draw more from the family farm than wage work.
Schooling might draw more from wage work than working in the family farm.
Alternatives to the MNL that do not rely on IIA are available. If choices could be ranked
and ordered, a nested logit might be feasible. However, given the joint nature of time allocation
decisions, this seems problematic. Perhaps it might be feasible in cultural settings where there is
strong qualitative evidence to support a particular nesting in familial decisions. The multinomial
probit (MNP) does not require a hierarchy of choices, nor does it require IIA. However, it is
used less frequently for several reasons. First, the model needs to estimate the entire covariance
structure. Hence, the number of parameters that need to be estimated can be extreme. This
requires large sample sizes and the model often has difficulty converging. Second, the MNP is
flat near its optimum, and this can lead to parameter estimates that are arbitrary but within the
tolerance of the optimization routine and hence difficult to detect.
A hierarchical choice model such as the sequential probit (SEQP) is also popular.
Modeling typically proceeds by first modeling the choice of whether to attend school or work,
then proceeding to model the choice of different types of work, conditional on surviving the
previous choice of types of work. That is, the SEQP is essentially a selection model where the
researcher uses the results of lower sequenced choices as corrections for selection into higher
sequenced choices. When the same covariates are used in each step of the sequence, the SEQP
should be identical to the MNP (assuming no misspecification). Hence, the purpose of the SEQP
is to allow different variables to affect different choices. The logic behind this approach is not
obvious. The shadow value of time for the child reflects the opportunities open to the child, and
hence it seems impossible to imagine a sensible exclusion restriction. Moreover, when the
included variables differ in the sequence of choices of activities, estimates will depend on the
order of the sequence in addition to the exclusion restrictions and functional form of the selection
correction. Perhaps qualitative evidence can make the case for some ordering and a set of
exclusion restrictions in a particular country context. Overall, though, given the difficulties with
all of the alternatives, it is not surprising that univariate models are the predominant tools for
examining work and schooling choices.
Are there future consequences of working?
Because of the conceptual difficulty in isolating some exogenous factor that affects either
schooling or child labor, most studies of child labor and schooling tend to focus on economic
factors that influence both child labor and schooling without explicitly trying to parameterize the
path through which participation in one activity affects participation in the other. However,
another alternative is to exploit timing differences in when the adult or older child is observed
and when child labor occurred. Factors that have changed over time but were correlated with
whether the individual worked as a child can be used as instruments.
Much of the work on the effects of child labor in childhood on adult labor market
outcomes comes from Brazil, where the 1996, large-scale PNAD household survey asks
individuals at what age they entered the workforce (which is likely interpreted as beginning
fulltime market work) Ilahi et al (2000) observe that adults age 18 and older who started fulltime
work before age 13 have adult wages that are 13-17 percent lower than adults who entered the
workforce later. Emerson and Souza (20044) extend the analysis of Ilahi et al by addressing the30
endogeneity of the age at which an adult started working as a child with state-time variation in
the number of schools. Does the finding of lower adult wages for child laborers reflect anything
more than lower educational attainment? It appears to. Early entry into the labor force lowers
the return to a year of education by roughly 20 percent in Ilahi et al's data. Interestingly, in
individuals with no education, they observe slightly higher wages for children that start working
earlier conditional on the adult's age. This likely reflects an experience premium as without any
education and conditional on age, earlier entry means more time to accumulate experience.
Emerson and Souza (20044) speculate that the tradeoff between returns to experience and
education depends on what sector the individual works in as an adult and child.
The tradeoff between additional experience and education is considered explicitly in
Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2005). Using panel data from Vietnam, they evaluate how the labor
status of children influences their education, wages, and health five years after they are observed
working. In their analysis, they focus on children who are enrolled in school and compare
enrolled in school and participating in market work children to children enrolled in school
without market work. They impose this sample selection rule in order to isolate the effects of
market work itself without confounding the effects of working with the effects of not being in
school. Thus, their attention is only on the effects of working per se; they do not capture how the
future of children who work exclusively is affected by their work. When they correct for the
endogeneity of market work participation as a child with economic conditions in the base year of
their data, they find that each additional hour of work as a child while attending school is
associated with a nearly 3 percentage point decline in the probability the child is in school 5
years out and a 0.06 year decline in grade attainment. The mean hours worked for a working
child in the base year of their data is 24 hours per week in market work. Hence, going from 0
hours to the average is associated with a more than 90 percent decline in the probability the child
attends school and a nearly 20 percent decline in completed schooling five years after the child is
observed working while in school. They also observe that the probability the child engages in
wage work and the child's wage earnings conditional on participating in wage work are
increasing in the child's hours worked. Beegle et al calculate that over a relatively short horizon
(as might be appropriate in poor, credit constrained families), the value of increased earnings and
the return to experience will outweigh the opportunity cost of foregone education.
3.3 Work and Health
Is the health status of working children worse?
The consequence of child labor may extend beyond schooling attendance and attainment.
Woodhead (2004) surveys the psychological ramifications of work as a child, and it is not
obvious how one should view the psychosocial impacts of child work. Research has focused
more on the effects of child labor on child health. Much of the literature focuses on the injury
and morbidity risks associated with the child's work environment. For example, Graitcer and
Lerer (1998) list morbidity, injury, and hazard risks faced by children in different occupations
and industries. While manufacturing draws a lot of popular attention, family work, including
work on the farm, also poses risks. Moreover, Forastieri (2002) points out that the increased
nutritional needs associated with arduous work may exacerbate malnutrition, leaving the child
stunted and impairing the child's productivity into adulthood, and Parker (1997) emphasizes that
children who start work at a young age will be exposed to environmental hazards in the work31
place for longer, perhaps at time when the effects of these hazards on development are more
substantive.
However, working does not necessarily impair a child's health. To the extent that child
labor brings additional resources to the child, this may improve health and nutrition (especially
in the destitute populations where child labor is most prevalent). The benefit of this additional
income to the child may be greater than other sources of family income as the child may retain
greater control over her own earnings. Further, the fact that the child is a productive,
contributing member to the household may affect the child's ability to capture other family
resources or influence how they are spent in ways that benefit the child. These types of gains to
the child must be balanced against any lost education (and its returns to health) as well as the
consequences for malnutrition, morbidity, and injury.
Several studies attempt to gauge the net effect of child labor on child health. Evidence
that working children have worse health at the time of their work is generally absent from the
literature. O'Donnell et al (2002) look at data from 18 developing countries and observe that
across these 18 countries self-reported health status looks unrelated to whether the child
participates in market work, is in school, both, or neither. Francavilla et al (2003) look at data
from 6 developing countries and find no evidence of a connection between domestic work and
self-reported morbidity or BMI either. It is unclear whether the absence of evidence reflects a
lack of any relationship, the countervailing factors discussed above, measurement problems, or
heterogeneity in the effect of working on health. For example, children working outside, in the
family farm in the summer might be no worse off because of their work while children working
12 hours a day in a tannery might be substantially worse off. However, because the former is
much more common that the later, there is no apparent relationship on average in the data.
Does child labor affect future adult health?
There are two basic classes of mechanisms through which a child's labor status may
influence adult health. First, physical injury at work may lead to health problems that survive
into adulthood. Second, psychological stress or trauma at work in childhood may lead to health
problems in adulthood. Speculation about this second mechanism owes to the psychology
literature which shows a strong correlation between stress in childhood and the persistence of
mental disorders such as depression, anxiety and panic disorders, and schizophrenia or even
health problems such as diabetes, heart disease, and immune disorders (see Heim and Nemeroff
2001 for a review). There is a debate over the interpretation of this evidence as there is a strong
correlation between severe stress in childhood and stressful life events in adulthood (Horowitz et
al 2001), but some argue this association reflects that childhood traumas induces a vulnerability
to the effects of stress later in life. Most of this research focuses on stresses like the loss of a
parent and severe physical abuse at very young ages, so whether this evidence is relevant for
typical child labor is an open question. Blattman (2006), for example, considers the
psychological impacts of forced abduction into the military among children from northern
Uganda, and he finds little evidence of sustained psychological distress after the end of conflict.
Three recent studies consider whether child labor impacts future adult health. Kassouf et
al (2001) observes in Brazilian data that individuals who start work earlier have worse self-
reported health status as adults. They observe that the younger a person starts working, the32
greater the probability that the individual reports being ill as an adult. This finding may reflect
something about the impact of child labor on child health and how that persists into adulthood,
the impact of education on adult health, the impact of income on adult health, or something about
the child or adult's environment associated with both youthful work and adult health. Two
papers using Vietnamese panel data employ instrumental variable strategies to consider the effect
of working as a child on young adult health outcomes five years later. O'Donnell et al (2002)
compare the BMI, self-reported morbidity, and height in 1998 of children who worked in
agriculture in 1993 to those that did not. They instrument for a child's participation in agriculture
in 1993 with labor market and education conditions in the child's community in 1993. They find
that children working in 1993 have higher self-reported morbidity rates in 1998. Using the same
data but a different identification strategy and a subset of the sample, Beegle et al (2005) observe
similar patterns to O'Donnell et al but the patterns are not statistically significant in Beegle et al.
While O'Donnell et al looks at rural children 6-15 in 1993, Beegle et al considers rural children
8-13 who attend school in 1993. Beegle et al also relates self reported health status to variation
in total hours worked, using a different source of variation. While the two papers are not directly
comparable because of data and identification differences, it is not surprising that there don't
appear to be detectable marginal effects of working one additional hour while working vs. not
appears to have more substance for long-term health. Evidence on specific mechanisms through
which child labor might propagate through to adulthood seems to be largely speculative.
3.4 Child Labor Externalities and General Equilibrium Considerations
The ramifications of a child's working status may extend well beyond the child. There
are three active research topics that consider the consequences of child labor that extend beyond
the working child. First, as the working child is supporting the family and its members, there
may benefits to siblings of having a working child. Second, there may be intergenerational
implications of a child's labor status, a so-called child labor trap. Third, they may be general
equilibrium ramifications of a high prevalence of child labor that merit attention.
Do working children support their siblings?
When most working children are helping in their family, it is very difficult to quantify the
economic contribution of working children to the household as their compensation is often not in
monetary terms. Further, concerns about surplus labor or training aspects of the child's
contribution to the household complicate distinguishing the child's marginal product from her
average product. Nevertheless, efforts to value the child's contribution to family income
typically guess it to be substantial. Psacharopoulos (1997) observes that income earned by
working Bolivian 13 year olds amounted to 13 percent of total household income on average.
Menon et al (2005) attempt to compute the value of child's own farm labor to largely subsistence
farm households in rural Nepal. They estimate that children contribute roughly 11 percent of the
value of total agriculture production in Nepal or about 9 percent of GDP.
To what extent do siblings benefit from the economic contribution of their siblings?
There are several possible mechanisms. In poor households additional income or output, may
help maintain the consumption of family members. A number of studies, discussed below,
document a role for child labor in how households cope with shocks. Beyond shifting out the
budget constraint, working older siblings may provide money that is directed explicitly towards33
younger siblings. Alternatively, working older siblings may provide additional labor services to
the household which lower the productivity of younger siblings, thereby encouraging their
education.
Direct evidence on the influence of a child's income on the activities of siblings is rare.
One often hears assertions, especially in the South and East Asian context, of older sisters
working to support their sibling. Parish and Willis (1993) discuss this literature in detail,
although they find little support for this hypothesis in Taiwanese data. Instead, they argue that
early marriage is a more important channel through which older girls help their siblings. In
contrast, Edmonds (2006b) finds some evidence that older siblings help their siblings through
their work. He argues that one possible channel for this support owes to older siblings
comparative advantage in working in both market and domestic work. In data from Nepal, he
documents that older siblings are more likely to work than younger siblings, and their time
allocation depends on the sex composition of younger siblings. In particular, time spent in
market working is increasing in the number of younger boys in the household. Edmonds
speculates that this additional market work is to help afford schooling and other investment
expenditures that younger boys are more apt to command, but he lacks direct evidence of this.
Perhaps the most direct evidence of older siblings working to support younger siblings is
in Manacorda (2006) who finds strong evidence of externalities towards siblings in early
twentieth century U.S. He considers the relationship between a child's school attendance and
participation in wage work and the fraction of co-resident children that are active in wage work.
To address the obvious endogeneity concerns in correlating siblings' labor supplies, he uses state
variation in the minimum age of employment laws and the age at which work permits become
available. That is, consider a 10 year old child with siblings age 14 and 15. Across U.S. states in
1920, there is variation in whether 1, both, or neither sibling can work in the formal wage labor
market. Thus, whether the older sibling is able to bring in wage income to the household will
vary with the sibling's age and the state of residence. He finds considerable sharing of resources
across children. The greater the fraction of siblings who works, the lower the child's own labor
supply. Moreover, Manacorda observes a rise in schooling with the fraction of siblings who can
work that is about equal to the decline in work and no substantive change in idleness. However,
the benefits of having children work appear to largely accrue to children. He does not observe
any substantive change in either the labor supply of mothers or fathers as the fraction of working
children increases. One important note is that his identification strategy works off variation in
wage work that is constrained by child labor laws. Hence, affected families are apt to be those
where child income is most needed to support siblings. As such, it might be isolating variation
where externalities are largest.
Does child labor perpetuate across generations?
Are working children more likely to have working children? The most obvious
mechanisms for intergenerational persistence of child labor are through child labor's impact on
education. Barham et al (1995) develop a model where financing for education is obtained from
within the family. Hence, low educational attainment leads to lower income leads to lower
educational investments in the next generation, an educational poverty trap. Beyond the effects
of income, lower parental education might affect child health and nutrition which in turn feeds
back to the relative productivity of schooling and work. Another option is that a parent's own34
experience growing up affects their attitudes about child labor. In turn, then, work experience at
a young age might cause a parent to feel that such work is appropriate.
As discussed earlier, several studies document an effect of child labor status on future
adult income. Using the same Brazilian data as Ilahi et al (2000) used to examine the effects of
child labor on adult income, Emerson and Souza (2003) look at whether the child labor status of
a parent affects the child labor status of the child. 17 percent of children whose father began
working before age 14 are employed. 6 percent of children are working whose father did not.
Mother's child labor status shows similar patterns with differences that are slightly larger in
magnitude. Further, this intergenerational correlation in child labor persists even when they
control for the educational attainment of both parents and family income. Possible explanations
for this include measurement error in both parental education and family income that is
correlated with parental child labor status or omitted socio-economic factors that persist over
time that would be correlated with past and current child labor supply. These factors might
include local or family labor market conditions, school quality, latent relative talent for work or
school, or social norms / parental attitudes that are correlated with child labor status. Lillard and
Willis (1994) try to disentangle the reasons why educational attainment is correlated across co-
resident generations in Malaysians. They estimate that about two-thirds of the impact of parental
education on children's educational attainment is through direct and indirect effects of parental
schooling. Omitted factors appear to account for the remaining third. However, more research is
necessary to disentangle the mechanisms behind the observed intergenerational transmission of
child labor.
Does child labor promote high fertility?
While the long-run implications of high population growth are often debated, a relatively
common view is that high fertility rates are a source of long-run poverty traps. Emerson and
Knabb (2003) for example is formal theoretical treatment of the idea that higher fertility can
create a poverty trap, in their case through child labor: because families expect children to have
to work, they have lots of children. Then because families have lots of children, they need them
to work.
Do poor families have children in order to put them to work? The "wealth flows" theory
of fertility posits that families have children, because they expect positive net transfers from the
child, while the "evolutionary" view posits motives such as altruism, genetic survival, the
consumption value of children, etc (Kaplan 1994). A necessary condition for the "wealth flows"
view is that the net flows from child to parent are positive.
A number of studies find a connection between child employment opportunities and
fertility. Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), using data from rural India, find evidence of a
connection between the economic contribution of children and fertility, child labor, and
schooling decisions. Family attributes positively associated with the pecuniary returns to market
work (size of landholdings, farm productivity, child wage rates) are negatively related to
schooling and positively related to fertility and market work. Examining data from the U.S.,
Rosenzweig (1977) argues that the declining value of children as assets in agriculture is an
important factor in declining farm birth rates for post war U.S.35
A number of accounting studies attempt to directly compute whether the net return to
children is large enough to motivate fertility. The most cited evidence from this is from Mead
Cain (1977). In a village in north central Bangladesh, he estimates that male children become
net producers as early as age 12 and compensate for their own cumulative consumption by age
15. However, whether his findings generalize is an open question. In subsequent work in other
Asian countries, Cain (1982) found that the individual earnings of boys exceeded consumption at
far older ages, and Kaplan (1994) in data from a forager-horticulturist group in Peru, finds that
Cain's observation is not robust to considering a larger basket of consumption goods than Cain
examined. In fact, a more common finding is that it seems unlikely that parents are repaid all of
the costs associated with children (Mueller 1976, Lee and Bulatao 1983, Stecklov 19971999,
Lee, Kaplan, and Kramer 2002,). Stekelov (1999) for example finds that the annual rates of
return on children in Cote d'Ivoire are between -6 and -10 percent. Two challenges throughout
this work, however, are what discount rates to consider and whether and how to value the
insurance value of children both as potential laborers in their youth and as sources of old-age
security. Together, there appears to be little compelling evidence that variation in child labor
opportunities can explain a large portion of the high fertility rates in developing countries.
Does child labor affect local labor markets?
In their seminal study, Basu and Van (1998) point out that if children and adults are
substitutes in production (the "substitution axiom"), the prevalence of child labor depresses adult
wages. Basu and Van focus on the implications of this depressive effect of child labor on the
prevalence of child labor. In particular, they posit what they term the "luxury axiom:" children
only work when parental income is below subsistence levels. With the combination of the
luxury and substitution axioms, Basu and Van argue that child labor depresses adult wages
which in turn makes child labor necessary. Multiple equilibriums in the labor market are then
possible (see Basu 2001 for a general equilibrium treatment).
Because of this study's importance, a slightly more formal presentation is useful. A
number of additional assumptions are necessary to keep the present exposition transparent. First,
assume that the household consists of one parent and one child. The parent chooses whether the
child works. Second, there are N one parent, one child households that may differ in what they
perceive as their subsistence needs (s varies between   , L H s s ). Third, parental labor supply is
perfectly inelastic. The adult daily wage from working is m. Fourth, when children work, they
earn a daily wage of w. Define an indicator c that is 1 if the child works. Household income can
then be written m+wc. Finally, all household consumption is financed by adult and child labor.
Households do not have assets that may contribute to household income and do not have access
to credit markets.
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Define s as the subsistence level of expenditure, above which parents no longer have
children work. The luxury axiom implies that if m>s, children do not work and household
income is m. Effective labor supply for a household is 1 when children do not work. If parental
income does not cover subsistence (m<=s), children work and household income is m+w. The
6 Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) also emphasize a distributional axiom. In an economy where child labor persists
despite the country being sufficiently rich so as to eliminate child labor (the multiple equilibria case discussed
below), the existence of child labor is the result of inequality in the distribution of assets.36
substitution axiom implies a strong relationship between child and adult wages. Namely, if one
child's labor is equivalent to a (a<1) units of adult labor, then the wage children are paid is
w=am. Similarly, then, when children work, effective labor supply for a household is 1+a.
Figure 8 depicts the resulting market labor supply function written in terms of adult labor
income and effective units of adult labor. Market labor supply is the sum of all individual
household labor supply functions and is marked ABCD. When daily wages are above the
highest subsistence level sH, no children work, and the market labor supply function is defined
by the segment AB. If wages are below the lowest subsistence level sL, all children work. The
segment BC is drawn to be downward sloping (rather than the discontinuous horizontal line that
each household perceives) to acknowledge that the subsistence level of expenditure s may vary
across households based on household and community attributes as we discuss below.
Market equilibrium adult (and thus child) wages are given by the price at which the
supply of effective units of labor equals the demand for effective units of child labor. One
possible labor demand curve is pictured in figure 8 and labeled LL. In the depicted equilibrium,
labor demand is sufficiently high, that there is no child labor in the economy. Because adult
wages are high, no children work. The effective employment in the economy is N and adult
wages are indicated by m*. Note that if labor demand is very low (so it intersects labor supply
along the CD segment but not along the AB segment), the economy is very poor and all children
work.
Does the prevalence of child labor depress adult wages? Evidence which is broadly
consistent with the luxury axiom (Edmonds 2005) and the substitution axiom (Levison et al
1998) will be discussed in greater detail below. However, while this is a critical question in the
child labor literature, direct evidence on whether child labor affects adult labor markets is scarce.
The reason for a lack of evidence is the joint determination of adult and child wages, especially
when the substitution axiom holds. However, it is reasonable to ask how plausible it is that child
labor, which is mostly outside of the formal labor wage market, can suppress adult wages. In
countries where children form a substantial share of the active labor force, this effect seems more
plausible than countries where it does not. Figure 9 contains the plot of the share of the
economically active population that is 10-14 against the fraction of children 10-14 that are
economically active for countries where at least 1 percent of the population 10-14 is
economically active using the LABORSTAT data (ILO 2000, see section 2.2). All numbers are
in percentages –0.01 is one hundredth of a percent. The size of the circles in the figure
represents the 10-14 population in the country.
Two important issues are evident in Figure 9. First, children are a larger share of the
economically active population when their economic activity rates are higher. This could be
mechanical if population is independent of economic activity rates. That said, the positive
gradient in figure 9 is not particularly steep –going from 0 children working to the largest
observed economic activity rate of children is associated with a two thousandths of a percentage
point rise in the share of the economically active population that is children. Second, children
constitute a very small share of the total economically active population, even in countries where
economic activity rates of children are very high. There are only two countries in the world
where children are more than a hundredth of a percent of the economically active population. Is
it possible that variation in the activities of less than a hundredth of a percent of the economically37
active population can influence equilibrium wages in the labor market? Questions such as this
are largely unanswered in the literature.
If child labor depresses adult wages in the local labor market, then the implications of
child labor may extend much further than the working child. Ljungqvist (1992) for example
develops a model where the prevalence of unskilled labor suppresses the wage of the uneducated
workers relative to the educated. This causes the cost of education to be high relative to the
labor earnings of an unskilled worker. Unskilled workers with few assets then choose not to
obtain an education, because the marginal utility of foregone consumption during education is
greater than the family's valuation of the return to education. Banerjee and Newman (1993)
emphasize that depressed wages coupled with capital market imperfections can constrain
entrepreneurship, leading to a stagnant, low wage economy. Thus, to the extent that child labor
suppresses adult wages, this may have long run implications for growth and development.
4. Determinants of Child Time Allocation
The framework in equation 1.1 highlights several influences on child time allocation
including the marginal utility of income, the parent's valuation of the child's future welfare, how
education and play affect the child's future welfare, the productivity of the child in family
activities, the costs of schooling, and the earnings opportunities available to the child. Academic
research on the determinants of child time allocation is often categorized as either labor demand
or labor supply. Loosely defined, labor demand is typically concerned with the availability of
employment whereas labor supply focuses more on questions related to willingness or ability to
work. The distinction between the two is often difficult in the context of adult labor in high
income economies. Despite the absence of formal tests of the separation hypothesis (e.g.
Benjamin 1992) for child labor, the general assumption among researchers is that distinguishing
between demand and supply is especially arbitrary for child labor in low income countries where
most children work with their parents in a family activity. Take for example, the literature on
how household composition influences child labor. On one hand, the presence of younger
children may raise the return on child time in domestic activities (labor demand), but on the other
hand, younger children may also raise the marginal utility of income and thereby change labor
supply. Should this research be classified as labor supply or demand?
Nevertheless, this section is organized by mimicking the labor demand and supply
dichotomy. The first section focuses on what might be considered labor demand. What direct
influence do local labor markets have on the activities of children? This includes evidence on
how production technology, environmental factors, the industrial composition of local labor
markets, the employer composition of local labor markets, and internal and international trade
affects the employment opportunities open to children. The second section considers research on
family factors that influence the activities of children. This includes research on agency
problems, adult and child labor supply interactions, and the interaction of siblings. These factors
are easily viewed as both labor demand and supply, and hence merit their own section.
The third and fourth sections consider issues that are typically considered as labor supply.
Modern researchers tend to focus on returns to schooling as the main opportunity cost of work,
and section 3 surveys the literature on the returns and costs of schooling affect on child labor.38
No topic has garnered more attention that the relationship between child labor and poverty, and
section 4 considers this literature.
4.1 Local Labor Markets and Child Labor
Most of the work on why children work focuses on why families send their children to
work. Comparatively few papers consider child productivity in the family or the wage market.
This lack of research reflects that very little child labor is in the formal labor market and that
suitable data for examining labor demand in the formal labor market is extremely limited. Most
researchers work with household surveys which are generally not suited to modeling the formal
employment sector and which will rarely have power to analyze the comparatively rare event of
wage employment. Establishment surveys with detailed data on child labor appear to be non-
existent.
Production technology
How is child labor influenced by the technology used in production? Put another way,
are there certain types of production that are especially apt to draw in working children? Marx
argues that a supply of children and women is critical for the early stages of industrialization,
because they are both cheap and suited to affine tasks that require little fingers. A similar
argument is in Goldin and Sokoloff (1982). With data from early 19th Century U.S., they
emphasize that comparative advantage appears to be the explanation for high female and child
labor participation rates in early industrialization. The proportion of the northeastern
manufacturing labor force composed of females and young males seems to have grown from
about 10 percent at the start of the 19th century to 40 percent by 1932. The low relative
productivity of women and children in the North's agriculture sector (hay, dairy, grains) kept the
opportunity cost of their labor low relative to that in the South. In fact, Goldin and Sokoloff
(1984) argue that this may partially account for why manufacturing industries were
disproportionate in the northeast.
Because most working children are by their parent's side in the family farm or business,
an emphasis on industrialization to explain the high rates of child labor around the world is
clearly unsatisfactory. Moreover, in a contemporary setting, very few studies even document a
link between changes in the activities of children and either the industrial composition of local
labor market or the types of employer in a community. Edmonds (2003) is one exception. Using
both cross-section and a household panel in Vietnam, he considers both the association between
the activities of children and the types of industries and employers in the child's community. He
observes that domestic is more prevalent and market work less prevalent in locations where
handicraft industries are located but observes very little association between the activities of
children and variation in other types of industries (over time or between locations) including
manufacturing. For type of employer, Edmonds observes that the presence of state or large
private employers reduces the incidence of market and wage work, while hours worked is
slightly larger in communities with significant small employer presence. However, the
endogenous placement of industries and employers is a serious concern and it is not addressed,
and his findings cannot be taken as more than suggestive of future avenues for research.39
Are there tasks that might be important in industrialization that require children for
anything other than cheap labor? The literature on child development suggests possible ways in
which children might have an advantage in several activities. Sloutsky et al (2004) showed color
pictures of animals for memorization to a small number children around age 5 and young adults
around 20. Children appear more effective at memorization of details because of differences in
their approach to memorization. The young adults memorized by categorizing the animals
whereas the children appeared to memorize by comparing each new animal to a reference
animal. When the experimenters asked the young children to categorize animals for
memorization, their performance deteriorated. Other work has found that children perform better
than young adults in comparing visual objects and in drawing spatial analogies (Gentner et al
1977). Studies that compare young adults to older individuals suggest that the tendency towards
categorization and thereby false analogy grows stronger with age (Koutstaal et al 1997).
Research like this might imply that children would have an advantage at detailed work requiring
pattern memorization such as carpet weaving or knitting.
The most detailed case-study we have on child productivity in manufacturing focuses
explicitly on an industry where these developmental advantages should be most important: the
hand-knitted carpet industry. Levison et al (1998) find little empirical support for the “ nimble
fingers”view. Adults and children tend to work on the same types of carpets and that children
are 21 percent less productive in hand-knitting than adults (productivity is measured in square
inches knit per hour). This case seems consistent with the overwhelming empirical fact about
child labor in today's developing countries: formal sector wage employment of children is
extremely rare. If children were critical for the early stage of industrialization, then its low
prevalence would be a surprise. That said, our understanding of labor demand would clearly
benefit from additional work like Levison et al (1998).
While it is unclear whether there are activities for which children have an absolute
advantage in, there must be activities in which children have a comparative advantage. It is this
comparative advantage that Goldin and Sokoloff appeal to in order to explain north-south
differences in the employment of women. When the return to these activities in which children
have comparative advantage is high relative to other uses of child time, we expect children to
work everything else equal. Interestingly, Galbi (1997) argues that the nature of the child's
comparative advantage in early English cotton mills was that adult laborers did not know how to
be factory workers. In fact, he argues, that children were replaced in English cotton mills when
the children became adults, trained and socialized for factory work.
Collection activities are often mentioned as activities where children will have
comparative advantage. For example, Nankhuni and Findeis (2004) note that children in
deforested areas of Malawi spend significantly more time collecting wood for fuel than do
children in less deforested areas, and this collection time is associated with reduced schooling
participation. Several studies document a connection between variation in access to water
facilities and child schooling. For example, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) find that
schooling is higher in Brazilian households with piped water; Cockburn (2002) notes that work
time is lower and schooling higher in Ethiopian households with better access to water; and
Guarcello and Lyon (2002) observe in Yemen that households connected to a water network are
more likely to send their children to school and less likely to report their children as idle. While
these studies do not address the non-random nature of water access, they are suggestive of how40
important the return to child time in activities other than schooling can be for child time
allocation.
Several recent studies note that children work more in households with more self-
employment activities (Edmonds and Turk 2004 for Vietnam, Parikh and Sadoulet 2005 in
Brazil), and Wydick (1999) notes a correlation between work and household involvement in a
microcredit program. For example, using detailed time use data from Botswana, Mueller (1984)
documents that the more productive capital the household has, the more productive work its
children perform. Using Mueller’ s data from Botswana, Chernichovsky (1985) observes that this
association between market work inside the household and the presence of productive capital
varies depending on whether substitutes for child labor are present in the household. Cockburn
(2002) goes into further detail in Ethiopian data. He notes that small livestock and land appear to
be market work increasing whereas oxen, bulls, ploughs, land quality, and again, proximity to
water are child labor decreasing. Shafiq (2006b) points out that, while greater assets may lead
children to report working more because of the availability of employment opportunities, the
human capital ramifications of this are unclear. In his data from Bangladesh, children work
more in the presence of productive assets, but they are also more likely to attend school.
Some closely related evidence also illustrates how technology changes that replace the
types of activities typically done by children can alter schooling and the activities of children.
For example, Brown et al (1992) documents technological changes in the U.S. Fruit and
Vegetable canning industry that lead to a shift to adult labor. Levy (1985) shows a relationship
between the mechanization of Egyptian agriculture and the decline of child labor in cotton. Two
important technologies he emphasizes are the spread of tractors and irrigation pumps. Dessy and
Pallage (2005) emphasize the importance of technology in child labor formally in arguing that
one way to view child labor is as the result of a coordination failure between parents and firms
investing in skill intensive technologies. Technology changes can also affect child time outside
of the formal wage labor market. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2004) observe that in Nepali data, there
appears to be greater household specialization as proximity to urban areas increases, and
Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) argue that children are more likely to attend school and not work
as specialization increases with urban proximity. Interestingly, they note that while work in the
household is reduced with urban proximity, there is a rise in child labor outside of the household
although it is not enough to offset the total decline in hours worked.
Trade
One frequently hears popular anecdotes about children working in export industries, and
it is often asserted that the ability to trade with high income countries causes children in
developing countries to work. Put another way, this argument implies that trade creates work
opportunities for children that would otherwise not be present. Maskus (1997) is a formal
presentation of this idea. In his model, the poor country produces an export good that is labor
intensive and an import-competing, capital intensive good. The export sector subcontracts to the
informal sector which employs children. The demand for child labor then depends on product
demand for the export good. An expansion of the export sector then increases child labor and
equilibrium child wages.41
A number of studies have examined data on cross-country trade flows to consider
whether there is any evidence of a link between trade and child labor in aggregate statistics.
They typically document a negative correlation between child labor and openness which is
defined as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006a) is
one such study that explicitly attempts to account for the endogeneity of openness. They
instrument for openness with trade based on geography. The main identification assumption in
this approach is that trade which is driven by geography does not affect child labor except in its
impact on total trade flows. They also observe that child labor is lower in countries that trade
more. Moreover, addressing the endogeneity of trade nearly doubles the magnitude of the
elasticity of child labor with respect to openness.
What explains why child labor is lower in countries that trade more? Edmonds and
Pavcnik find that the negative association between openness and child labor mostly reflects the
well documented positive link between trade and income: once they condition on a country’ s
income, they find a very small and statistically insignificant relationship between trade and child
labor. This result holds in the full sample, when they split the sample into different country
groups, consider only trade between high and low income countries, or focus on exports of
unskilled-labor intensive products from low income countries. Thus, the cross-country data
provide no support for the claim that trade perpetuates high levels of child labor in poor countries
via the labor demand channel.
Given that most child labor is in agriculture and family businesses, it is perhaps
unsurprising that there is no evidence of a labor demand effect on child labor through trade in the
cross-country data. More detailed industry or within country data on changes in industrial
employment with growing trade is promising for shedding more light on how international
markets might affect the activities of children.
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b) examine the relationship between market work, domestic
work, and trade using panel data on rural Vietnamese households. Vietnam liberalized its rice
export quota during the 1990s and lifted restrictions on trade in rice across Vietnamese regions.
Subsequently, from 1993 to 1998 the price of rice increased on average by almost 30 percent
relative to the consumer price index, and rice price changes varied widely across communities of
Vietnam. Edmonds and Pavcnik relate child labor to regional and intertemporal variation in rice
prices. Despite the growth in labor demand associated with a booming rice sector, they find that
market work and domestic work decrease by more in communities that experience greater
increases in rice prices. The declines in working children are greatest in households that were
net rice producers prior to market reform. Part of this decline in work owes to an income effect,
but part also owes to a rise in household specialization that Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006b)
document in the context of these rice trade liberalizations.
Land and labor are the two primary inputs into rice production, and overall both are
sufficiently equally distributed in Vietnam that most households are well positioned to enjoy the
additional income stemming from this trade liberalization. Of course, it is possible that a growth
in trade could have opposite effects when the income gains are not distributed to those whose
employment opportunities are rising. For example, Kruger (2004) observes that during the
coffee boom of the mid-1990s in Nicaragua, there is an overall increase in market work that is
especially large in poor households in coffee producing areas. Her findings mirrors what Alessie42
et al (1992) observed with cash crop price increases in Cote d'Ivoire: increases in cash crop
prices are associated with more children working in the cultivation of those crops. One
explanation for Kruger's findings is that because of the concentration of land in coffee (and the
resulting market power in local labor markets), poor laborers have received increases in income
that are minor compared to the growth in labor demand, and hence market has increased.
Another interpretation of these findings is emphasized in Kruger’ s (2007) study of the coffee
boom’ s effects on working children in Brazil. In that context, she emphasizes that when booms
are expected to be transitory households should seize temporary employment opportunities,
especially if it is easy to make up for lost schooling time in the future. Her findings are then
consistent with evidence of delaying schooling or temporary withdrawals from school in
response to macroeconomic crisis as discussed in section 4.4 below.
In the Vietnam rice price case, much of the affected population is exiting poverty while
such improvements in living standards are not evident in Kruger's coffee data. Edmonds,
Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007) look at the connection between trade policy, child labor, and
poverty directly in their study of schooling and child labor responses to India's trade reform in
1991. They observe that children who were in areas with a concentration of heavily protected
industries prior to liberalization and thereby are more impacted by tariff cuts, do not experience
the same increases and schooling and declines in work without schooling evident elsewhere in
India over the 1990s. This pattern of relatively rising work without schooling and declining
schooling does not appear to be explainable with falling returns to schooling (they appear to be
increasing) or rising unskilled wages (which appear to be falling). Rather, they reflect the
relative rise in poverty in areas that experience a larger decline in protection. Further, they argue
that the avoidance of schooling costs lies behind this trade policy –child labor- schooling
connection. This combination of micro-studies emphasizes how multidimensional the
interaction of trade and child labor can be and that the effects of international trade on the
working status of children will be context specific.
4.2 Child Labor and the Family
Who makes child labor decisions?
Unitary models of the household are typically used in the child labor literature. The
model of section 1 is one example with its single decision-maker. Implicit within these is an
assumption of either unanimity of preferences within the family or a dictatorial household.
Typically, parents are viewed as the primary decision-makers for child labor supply and
schooling. This raises the classic parental agency problem. While parents may make child labor
decisions, they do not fully internalize the costs of these decisions. Moreover, this assumption
that parents make child labor decisions has led many to assert that child labor supply is evidence
of parental callousness and indifference to their children. Specifically, if parents make decisions
about child labor supply and do not consider either the current or future welfare in so-doing, then
they will select higher levels of child labor than the child would choose or than governments
would consider socially optimal. “ Nimble Fingers”theories of child labor take this parental
agency problem to an extreme. They posit that parents always take advantage of employment
opportunities open to children and therefore that labor demand is the dominant determinant of
whether and how children work.43
In recent years, more attention has been paid to the fact that there is typically not one
decision-maker in the household, and empirical studies uniformly reject the unitary household
model. Decisions about child time allocation will be influenced by mothers, fathers, extended
family, and perhaps even children themselves. Edmonds and Sharma (2006) consider an
extreme example of how child time allocation can be affected by multiple decision-makers. In
studying a population in Western Nepal with a high intrinsic risk of bondage, they argue that
child labor is increased and schooling reduced in part, because neither parents, children, or
bondholders have security over the returns to investments in children. They argue their case can
be read as an extreme representation of the classic parental agency problem.
Several recent studies study deviations from the unitary household model in more conventional
situations. A common question is how parental characteristics affect the activities of children.
Emerson and Souza (2007) for example observe that the elasticity of child labor supply with
respect to parental education is greater for fathers than mothers and that it is more important for
the son's labor supply than the daughter's. Whether this reflects something intrinsic to education,
relative earnings ability, actual incomes, type of occupation, or some omitted geographic
characteristic correlated with child labor and schooling decisions is outside the scope of the
study. A perennial difficulty in tests of the unitary household model is to find characteristics that
are associated with variation in the influence of different family members but that do not
simultaneously affect child labor and schooling decisions, but Emerson and Souza's findings are
suggestive that researchers may observe patterns in child labor that is consistent with what other
studies of intrahousehold allocation have found. Similar findings for education are surveyed in
Strauss and Thomas (1995), and they argue that the evidence strongly supports effects of
parental education that go beyond the effect of education on income.
Basu (2006) considers how the status of women in the household affects child labor
supply. In his model, both mothers and fathers dislike sending their children to work, but they
differ in their preferences over consumption goods. As female status improves, the family opts
for less child labor, because it becomes increasingly difficult to agree on other decisions over
which there is disagreement. However, as women's status improves and she becomes dominant
in the household, child labor may rise as she can exert more influence over consumption choices
in other goods. For example, suppose that utility depends on the child's labor status and
consumption of two different goods. Additional consumption of good 1 does not improve the
woman's utility, and additional consumption of good 2 does not benefit the man (but it does the
woman). Thus, as female power increases in the household, first the family shifts to less child
labor, then it shifts to more good 2 consumption and more child labor. Thus, the relationship
child labor and female power in the household is predicted to be a U-shape. Basu and Ray
(2002) examine this in household survey data from Nepal. The maximal female education in the
household as a share of the sum of the maximal female and male education in the household
proxies female power. In this data, they find suggestive evidence of this inverted U-shape
hypothesis.
Comparatively little attention has been directed to the child's own role in child time
allocation decisions. The focus on parents is driven by the observation that parents have
comparatively more power within the household than do children. The fact that most working
children are employed within the household in activities that are apt to confer little in the way of
status or economic independence seems consistent with this view. Moreover, work is typically44
considered in tandem with schooling, and schooling is expensive in ways that may require the
parents to finance it. If children cannot pay for alternatives to work, then parents necessarily
influence child labor supply. However, there is some evidence that suggests that when
opportunities outside of the household are open to children, they may be able to influence
household decision making.
Moehling (2005) is perhaps the most compelling direct evidence on the ability of
working children to influence household decision-making. She examines data from the U.S.
collected between 1917 and 1919. She observes that the share of total household expenditures
on child goods is increasing in the children's contribution to household income. Unless the
child's work demands this expenditure, it is hard to understand why more income to children
increases spending on child goods more so than other types of income without some impact of
child's income on family decision-making. Interestingly, Moehling (2006) notes that despite the
fact that young children typically turned over their entire pay envelope to their parents, it still
seems to be treated differently than other sources of income although her results for younger
children may reflect something about the younger children's requirements for work. Basu (2006)
also points out that there may be a cycle of power in the household. As children work, their
ability to influence household activities increases, and thus they may choose to work more.
How important is the child's role in deciding her own labor supply? If she can influence
household decision-making by working, it seems the potential is large. However, very little
research has considered the child's own role in deciding her own labor supply or schooling. One
suggestive piece of evidence is from Iverson (2002). He interviews child migrants in one
location in a rural South Indian district about why they migrated and the extent to which they
have contact with parents. He reports that the labor supply of young children and girl migrants
seem to be largely determined by parents. However, boys who start working at ages 13 and
above, report little contact with parents which may reflect that they are working by their own
choice. Iverson speculates that autonomy is an important motivation for this group's migration
decision; these early teen migrants may have migrated and work in order to have greater control
over there lives.
The implications of some child influence over their time allocation can be very important
for interpreting evidence that purports to show a link between the labor market opportunities of
children and child labor supply. This evidence is often interpreted as parental callousness about
the welfare of their children or indifference to education. However, it may reflect more about the
child's own valuation of their time. In particular, if children are myopic relative to adults, they
may respond more to changes in their employment opportunities than parents.
If this is the case, there may be relatively little scope for anti-poverty policies, etc., to
affect the labor supply of this group. Future research understanding the child's own role in her
time allocation is perhaps the most pressing need in the child labor literature.
Parental attitudes towards work and schooling
One of the key reasons why child labor is viewed as a human rights issue is that parents
likely have considerable influence over child time allocation. They may capture many of the
benefits of child work while not personally bearing the costs (except in as much as they45
internalize the child's welfare). As discussed above, it is unclear how important child and
parental agency are in child time allocation, but to the extent that parents have influence
(especially over young children), then parental attitudes towards work are of potentially great
importance.
Accusations of parental callousness towards their children and disregard of the costs of
work abound in the policy debate and in the academic literature. The focus of the anti-child
labor campaigns in the Progressive Era of the United States was largely on changing parental
attitudes towards work. Zelizer (1985) emphasizes the important role changing attitudes towards
children played in the changes in schooling and work in the U.S. during the later half of the
nineteenth, first part of the twentieth century. Analogous campaigns to stigmatize work for
children are pervasive in many developing countries today.
There is ample basis for this focus on norms in the treatment of children in qualitative
work on child labor and schooling decisions. For example, the Public Report on Basic Education
in India (1999) found that 37 percent of parents listed a lack of parental interest in educating
their children as an explanation for why boys had never enrolled in school. However, it is very
difficult to disentangle cause and effect in studies of child labor and parental attitudes towards
work and school, and statements about motives are often a challenge to interpret.
There are a few approaches taken in the econometrics literature to study the influence of
parental attitudes on work decisions. One approach is to look at correlations between the
parent's background and the child's activities. This evidence has already arisen in section 3.4 and
obviously attitudes towards work are only one component of how parental background can
influence child time allocation. A second approach is to look at some measure of parental
attitudes or gender bias within the household and correlate these with child time allocation.
These studies are surprisingly rare, perhaps because of the challenge of capturing variation in
attitudes or gender bias that is not simultaneous with other factors influencing child work. A
third approach is to correlate community average behaviors with an individual household's
schooling or work decisions. The hope is that the community mean reflects local values and not
anything else about the community. In reality, the econometric challenges presented by this
approach are insurmountable.
Several studies assert that regression residuals capture social norms or parental attitudes
for child labor decisions. This is strange. By construction, in linear regressions, residuals are
mean zero and orthogonal to included covariates. However, it seems unlikely that norms and
attitudes towards work have no influence on work decisions on average or that these beliefs
would be orthogonal to observable household characteristics. Moreover, regression residuals
will be influenced by misspecification of the model, mismeasurement of any included covariates,
and the researcher's subjective choice about what covariates to include in the estimated models.
Perhaps the most frequently cited evidence directly on parental attitudes towards child
labor is Parsons and Goldin (1989). They consider the association between savings and child
wage labor supply among industrial families in the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. They note
that the marginal propensity to save out of child income is significantly less than 1 and that there
is a positive correlation between asset levels and child labor income. In both cases, child income
appears to be treated like adult income in the household. Moreover, Parsons and Goldin observe46
that child income appears to have little effect on total family income. Each dollar of child
income implies a 9/10 reduction in male household head income. They hypothesize that this
reflects family migration toward areas with better child labor opportunities that comes at the
expense of adult income. Indeed, Parson and Goldin paint a bleak picture of how parents
allocate the time of their children. They write: "These working-class families apparently sold
the schooling and potential future earnings of their offspring very cheaply" (p 655).
There are, however, several difficulties with this interpretation of the patterns observed
by Parsons and Goldin. In particular, the source of variation in child income is unclear in their
data. Suppose, for example, that parents are altruistic towards their children and only have
children work when it is critical to meet basic needs (as assumed in Basu and Van 1998, section
3.4). In that case, we would expect to observe lower adult earnings as child labor earnings are
higher, but the causality runs from adult earnings to child earnings. In this case, child income is
compensating for the loss of adult income, so the marginal propensity to save or spend should be
similar for each. With imperfect insurance markets, part of the family's basic needs must include
a saving component to help cope with future shocks. Hence, the marginal propensity to save out
of income is likely to be above 0. The positive correlation between child income and asset
accumulation is more of a puzzle, albeit one that can be explained in several ways. It may reflect
the same concerns as savings (and may be the instrument for savings); it may reflect the
indivisibility of fixed schooling costs (school costs tend to need to be paid on irregular intervals
like the start of the school year); or it may reflect a latent correlation between the degree of
economic activity in an area and the activities of children. Recall, that even perfectly altruistic
parents send their children to work when the relative returns are highest. Hence, it is very
difficult to draw concrete conclusions about the callousness of parents in this data.
Future studies of norms or attitudes towards child labor and schooling would be better
served in trying to codify or measure such attributes directly. In general, the role attitudes and
norms play in child labor is poorly understood. It is clear that child time allocation is in general
elastic with respect to the household's economic environment, but it is not clear whether this
elasticity is bounded by social attitudes towards work, whether there are some children who are
especially vulnerable in this regard, and whether this elasticity reflects changing norms or if
norms are just one component of how child time allocation decisions are made. Ultimately, the
interest in parental norms is most acute for its implications for the design of policy, and it is
unfortunate that so little work has been done to study how policy efforts to change attitudes
towards work have influenced child time allocation decisions.
Child and Adult labor supply interactions
Most working children work inside their home. There are several explanations for this.
Parents may prefer to have children at home to better monitor their working conditions or
simply, because they enjoy their proximity. There may be strong norms against child work
outside of the household which lowers the perceived return from having a child work outside of
their home. Children may also be more productive workers at home. Parents may be more
effective at monitoring or disciplining children. Moral hazard problems may be especially acute
with children who may not perceive or care about threats of social sanction outside of the
household.47
There is a literature on the activities of children in family run businesses in developed
economies that emphasizes the productivity of children relative to hired in labor. Sanders and
Nee (1996) for example consider the role of children within the self-employed immigrant
families in the U.S. They emphasize the importance of child labor within these families because
it is both very reliable and continuous over time in comparison to other sources of labor. In her
study of Chinese take-out businesses, Song (1999) emphasizes the work of children as translators
and mediators in these businesses. Parents rely on their English language skills for assistance
and guidance, often freeing the parent for oversight duties of hired in help. Song also
emphasizes that parents often prefer family labor, because typically there is not much privacy in
the work environment that often starts in the family home (p71). For children to work within
their own household, there must be a sufficient amount of economic activity and working capital
within the household. Hence, many observers emphasize a positive correlation between family
asset holdings and work inside the household. This is discussed in detail in section 4.4.
When children work outside of their household, there appears to be a strong association
between the types of work they do and that of their parents. Parents may prefer their children to
work with them, be more effective at affecting high levels of effort, have better information
about job opportunities open to children, and there may be geographic clustering in the types of
activities performed. Genicot (2005) also emphasizes nutritional spillovers to children from
adult earnings as an explanation for the association between child and adult work. She considers
(theoretically) a setting were an employer elects to pay a higher wage to enhance his employee's
nutritional status. The worker spends a portion of this higher wage on his child, enhancing the
child's productivity. The employer then prefers to higher the child in addition to the parent in
order to capture all of this externality.
Some of the strongest evidence of complementarities between parent and child in the type
of wage work performed comes from U.S. history. For example, Goldin and Parsons (1981) find
that the median schooling of males whose fathers were employed in textiles (where child labor
was also prevalent) was 3.3 years less than those whose fathers were not, even controlling for
parental income differences. Goldin (1979) observes positive elasticities of male and female
child labor supply with respect to the father's wage in nineteenth century Philadelphia, but she
does not see this pattern in mother's labor supply. From this, she infers that children (rather than
wives) were the most common source of labor income apart from the male head of household.
However, in a contemporary setting, there is much more evidence of same sex
substitution patterns with respect to adult female labor supply. For example, Skoufias (1993)
observes a negative correlation between adult female wages and wage child labor. He theorizes
that this connection is driven by children filling in for absent mothers in the households and
thereby reducing their work outside of the household (although an income effect is hard to rule
out in his case). Wahba (2006) observes declines in wage work for boys in parts of Egypt where
unskilled wages. She emphasizes an income effect explanation. Further, Katz (1995) and
Hazarika and Sarangi (2005) observe increases in girl domestic work as mothers become more
involved in home enterprises or microcredit programs. Katz (1995) speculates that the
availability of an older girl to substitute for the mother in domestic work could act as a binding
constraint on female labor supply in her data from Guatemala.48
Adult –child substitution patterns can be affected by changes in the returns to activities
in which adults or children have comparative advantage. For example, Field (2003) examines
how patterns of child and adult time allocation change when Peruvian squatters receive secure
titles to their land. She finds that children work less outside of their household when titled and
that adults work more outside of the household. Her evidence does not seem to suggest that this
is an income effect as their does not appear to be an identifiable income effect of titling. Instead,
she argues that adults have comparative advantage in providing security for their property.
Hence with insecure property rights, children work away from home, but adults are freed to work
away with titling. Thus, there is support in the empirical literature for both complementarities in
wage labor supply and substitution possibilities between child and adult labor depending on the
economic environment.
Does parental co-residence influence child labor?
There are many ways that parents might influence child labor supply aside from either
complementarities or substitution patterns in child labor. The absence of a parent might either
attenuate the employment options open to children or accentuate the need for children to fill in
for the parent's work. It is worth noting that these two issues work in opposite directions and are
most likely to affect different types of work. Thus, the relationship between child and adult work
can be very sensitive to the types of activities considered. Beyond substitution patterns, the
absence of a parent is likely associated with variation in family income (although the direction of
this variation is unclear), and there is a separate concern from biology that parents might have
differential investment incentives in their genetic offspring, and this can be modeled by allowing
child investment incentives to vary with the biological relationship.
Moehling (2004) considers the association between family structure and child labor and
schooling in the American South at the start of the twentieth century. Living apart from one or
both parents is associated with lower school attendance and greater market work participation,
especially for black children. She is careful to note that the variation in child labor and schooling
for American blacks that is attributable to variation in living arrangements is small compared to
parental literacy, household resources, and school characteristics.
Interest in the relationship between parental co-residence and investments in children has
risen significantly in recent years, because of the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. Most
existing studies find that orphanhood is associated with reduced schooling enrollment. Two
approaches are common in the literature. First, many studies compare children living within the
same household who differ in whether they have had a parent die. Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger
(2004) exemplify this household fixed effects approach in their study of orphanhood and school
enrollment in 10 Sub-Saharan Africa countries using data from demographic and health surveys.
They find that orphans are less likely to attend school than the non-orphans with whom they live.
These within household (household fixed effects) comparisons are complicated by the fact that
the orphans and non-orphans likely come from different backgrounds and certainly differ in one
important experience: the loss of a parent.
A second approach to study the relationship between schooling and parental death is to
use individual level panel data that follow children over time. Evans and Miguel (2005) is one
such study. In a panel of 20,000 rural Kenyan children, they find a substantial decrease in49
participation in school following a parental death and some decline prior to the death. Beegle,
De Weerdt, and Dercon (2006) follow a smaller sample of children from the Kagera region of
Tanzania for over 10 years, and find substantive, sustained declines in educational attainment
and height associated with parental mortality.
The effects of parental death on child work are less clear. There does not appear to be
any individual level panel studies on orphanhood with detail on child work. Guarcello and co-
authors (2004) use some of the same demographic and health survey data as Case, Paxson, and
Ableidinger (2004) from sub-Saharan Africa and cannot draw generalities about correlations
between parental death and various forms of work. Throughout this literature, a chronic problem
is how to separate different mechanisms for the impact of parental death from the non-random
nature of deaths. Are children withdrawing from school to work to substitute for lost parental
wages, to fill in for the parent's role in the household? Alternatively, is withdrawal a trauma
effect of the loss of a parent? Studying child time allocation seems to be a promising way to
better understand the schooling –orphanhood connection, and it is likely to be of interest in its
own right.
How does sibling composition affect child labor?
A number of studies document a positive correlation between family size and child labor,
and this is generally viewed as suggestive of resource and credit constraints on child time
allocation (e.g. Knodel and Wongsith 1991, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997), but it may also
influence the shadow value of child time when there are tasks for which it is difficult to hire in
help. Many researchers have attempted to better understand why children work by looking
inside the household to see how sibling composition affects child labor and schooling. The
reason for this attention is that by looking at differences in how parents treat children, many
believe it might be possible to infer the influence of parental preferences in child labor and
schooling decisions, although it is not obvious how we can learn about preferences from sibling
differences in child labor.
Studies typically look at birth order, sibling sex composition, or birth spacing. There are
a variety of mechanisms through which birth order may affect investments in children. They can
be roughly categorized as mechanisms owing to parent's age, socialization, or resource
constraints. Higher birth order children will have older parents who may be wealthier, more
experienced at raising children, or feel more altruistic but they also face a higher risk of birth
defects and twinning. Lower birth order children grow up in a more adult environment, have the
experience of teaching their siblings, but have comparative advantage to younger siblings in the
wage labor market and in household production. Higher birth order children grow up in
households with more competition for scarce resources such as income and parental time, the
present value of returns on investment may be lower because of longer time horizons until the
market realization of these returns, or they may benefit from sibling transfers. Ejrnaes and
Portner (2004) argue that birth order (conditional on household size) reveals something about
the child's latent genetic talent, because they argue that the probability the family stops having
children is increasing in the child's ability relative to the family's expectation.
While a number of studies document an association between birth order and child labor
or schooling, few studies attempt to distinguish a mechanism. Emerson and Souza (2002)50
observe in Brazil that older boys and girls are more likely to work and less likely to attend school
than their younger siblings. They point out that this could be of credit constraints –older
children might be working because poor families are unable to borrow to finance education.
Edmonds (2006b) observes similar patterns in Nepal and argues that they may also owe to
differences in comparative advantage in household production. He cannot exclude a preference
or credit constraints based explanation, but he observes that sibling differences in total hours
worked are largest in household production, and that the oldest girls especially spend more time
working in domestic work when there are more younger siblings. Parish and Willis (1993)
emphasize a similar supportive role of the oldest girl in Taiwanese households. She helps with
the schooling outcomes of their younger children by caring for younger children and by bringing
in income through wage employment that helps with school fees and allows later entry into the
labor force for younger siblings. However, Parish and Willis argue that her most important
contribution to the household comes through leaving early and marrying.
Two studies stand out in their ability to identify specific mechanisms through which birth
order is correlated with child labor and schooling. First, Manacorda (2006) finds that children
are less likely to work when they have older siblings and are in U.S. states where those older
siblings can work (see section 3.4 for more detail on this paper). Second, Birdsall (1991)
emphasizes the importance of constraints on time in generating birth order effects. In data from
urban Columbia, she shows that education is lower for later born children. She argues that this is
inconsistent with what would expect to see with credit constraints where older children should
support younger children. Moreover, she observes that birth order effects are less likely among
working mothers in urban Columbia. She argues that this reflects that time can be traded for
money in the market so that working mothers can shift in and out of the labor force to keep the
shadow value of time equal in all periods.
The sibling sex composition literature tends to emphasize sibling rivalry, peer effects, or
sex-typing to explain sibling sex composition effects on child labor and schooling. The sibling
rivalry idea is that everything else equal, the child is better off with more siblings who are
comparatively less valued in terms of preferences, market opportunities, social status, etc. For
this to hold there need to be some type of a constraint on credit, transfers, labor markets, or
household production that cause household investment decisions to depend on the sex
composition of children in the household or parental preferences have to vary across children.
Peer effects work through the influence of the sex composition of siblings on the family
environment. A more masculine environment, for example, may influence a girl's social
interactions in the world. Sex-typing occurs when there are certain tasks that are stereotypically
male or female but a child goes against type because of the absence of an appropriately gendered
individual to carry out the task in the household. For example, a boy raised in a household
without girls may engage in tasks that are more typically female in a household.
Peer effects and sex-typing of tasks have drawn the most attention in the developed
economy context, but for developing economies, many writers have emphasized sibling rivalry.
Parish and Willis (1993) for example emphasize in Taiwan that it is the support available from
having an older sister that is critical for schooling. While Parish and Willis focus on the oldest
sister, Edmonds (2006b) observes in Nepali data that the larger the number of older sisters, the
less likely younger boys and girls work. Morduch (2000) finds that moving from all brothers to
all sisters raises completed schooling by nearly half a year in Tanzania. Similar patterns are51
documented in Garg and Morduch (1998) for Ghana, but the result is not as general as Morduch
(2000) observes no such pattern in South Africa. Whether sibling rivalry is more intense
between sexes or within sex groups may vary across cultures. In Malaysian data, for example,
Lillard and Willis (1994) observe that siblings of the same sex appear to be rivals in attracting
investment of resources from their parents in the sense that female education is reduced by more
girls present, boys by more boys.
Much of the attention in the child labor literature has been on sibling sex composition or
birth order. Comparatively little attention has been devoted to issues of birth-spacing.
Implicitly, many of the mechanisms for birth order effects on child labor are actually working
through spacing. For example, two children close in age are more apt to be seen as substitutes in
household production, work, or schooling opportunities. Likewise, the probability of receiving
substantive support from an older sibling is likely to increase with the age gap between siblings.
While there is some suggestive evidence in Edmonds (2006b) that sibling sex differences in
activities are more pronounced when age gaps are small, more research on the implication of
birth spacing for child labor and schooling is needed.
Several empirical problems plague most of the research into how sibling structure effects
investments in children. First, births are typically unobserved. Rather, only co-resident children
are observed. This could easily be resolved by surveys that collect complete fertility histories or
details about non-resident siblings, but in practice, this appears rare in surveys with detailed child
labor data. Second, household composition is typically endogenous to the household's economic
environment (and thereby labor supply) through fostering, mortality, marriage, migration, etc.
Akresh (2004) for example emphasizes how important fostering can be to a family's risk
management strategy. Third, when households include extended families or when polygamy is
prevalent, it may be impossible to even establish resident sibling relationships. Fourth, fertility
is endogenous to factors influencing child labor supply. Sex composition may reflect parental
preferences about the type of children they would like to have. Birth order, for example, cannot
be separated from factors influencing fertility or from household size as higher order birth orders
can only be observed in larger households. Several authors address this later problem with
specifications that compares birth order effects within household size groupings. However, the
empirical challenges dealing with these issues are considerable.
An additional issue is whether to include household fixed effects in the analysis. On the
positive side, this controls for common household factors such as current employment
opportunities inside and outside the household, parental attitudes that may be correlated with
sibling size, and other child invariant characteristics. However, this approach will limit the
analysis to children with siblings, exaggerate sibling differences when they are relatively small,
and may not address most omitted variable concerns as the effects of factors such as local labor
market opportunities or household endowments may vary with age and thereby birth order, age
spacing, or sibling sex composition. To the extent controlling for household fixed effects
expands within sibling differences, they may make controlling for differences in factors
associated with age more difficult. Similarly, within household differences in sibling
composition owe to differences in the sex of the child or differences in parents. Both of which
create estimation problems. Hence, while household fixed effects can be useful, they are often
viewed incorrectly as a solution to most of the empirical problems that plague the empirical
analysis of sibling differences in child labor.52
4.3 Child Labor and the (Net) Return to Schooling
In the developed country context, a number of authors have emphasized that work is not
the main opportunity cost of schooling; rather, foregone leisure is (e.g. Parsons 1975). In the
developing country context, researchers tend to view work as the main opportunity cost of
schooling. If so, there should be a close connection between work and the relative return to
schooling. This section surveys the evidence on a link between the measured or proxied return
to schooling and child labor. Note that in the model of section 1, it is the relative return to
education that matters for child labor supply. For example, for a child that engages in wage
work and schooling, the allocation between schooling and wage work requires:
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Thus, time allocation between wage work and school depends on the local wage, the marginal
utility of income (in the model of section 1 where credit constraints are implicit), and the net
return to schooling. The net return to schooling is the difference between the marginal utility
associated with any future returns to education and the foregone consumption schooling costs
require. A major consideration in the literature on the returns to schooling and child labor is
what factors could lead to a situation where the returns to schooling do not affect child labor. A
lack of parental altruism or credit constraints are the two most frequently cited explanations. We
have considered altruism in the previous section. Here, we discuss credit constraints.
Credit constraints and child labor
Most recent studies of credit constraints and child labor are based on the theoretical work
of Baland and Robinson (BR 2000). BR is a variant on the Ben-Porath model in that it
emphasizes child labor explicitly. BR has a single household decision-maker (a parent) who
decides child labor and schooling decisions after making other household income decisions. The
parent lives two periods. In the first period, the parent chooses savings s and the fraction of child
time spent working, h. m is the household's income each period. Wages from working are
normalized to 1. Thus, consumption in the first period is: 1 c m h s    . In the second period,
in addition to the parent's income m, the parent receives the savings income and gives a bequest
b to the child: 2 c m s b    . Parental utility comes from consumption in period 1, period 2, and
the well being of the child:     1 2 , , p c c U c c U w . Child well-being depends on the return to the
time spent not working,   1 z h  , and income from bequests:   1 c w z h b    .
BR show that if savings and bequests are not zero, then the household chooses child labor
so that cost in terms of foregone consumption today of decreasing child labor exactly equals the
return to the child of foregoing child labor:   1 1 z h    . They argue then that child labor is
privately efficient, although Bommier and Dubious (2004) show that this efficiency is not the
case even with complete markets if children have a disutility of labor. However, if bequests are
zero, then the return to not-working is greater than the household's cost of not having the child
work, and child labor is inefficiently high. Without bequests, children cannot compensate
parents for the foregone consumption that comes from decreasing child labor. Likewise, if53
savings are zero, then, the household's marginal utility of consumption in the first period is
greater than the marginal utility the household attains from increasing child well-being, and child
labor is inefficiently high.
7
Evidence directly on whether credit constraints influence child labor and schooling is
relatively rare, because of the difficulty of disentangling credit constraints from other market
imperfections. For example, a number of studies that will be discussed below consider the
association between child labor and crop shocks, but they cannot in general separate insurance
failures from changes in the relative returns to work or from credit constraints.
There is some suggestive evidence at the cross-country level. Jafarey and Lahiri (2001)
emphasize that borrowing constraints in the aggregate should decline as access to international
credit markets increase and that this in turn should mitigate the need for children to work.
Dehejia and Gatti (2002) consider the link between formal financial development and child labor
in aggregate cross-country data. They measure credit constraints by the ratio of private credit
issued by deposit-money banks to GDP, and call this "financial development." They find that
financial development is negatively correlated with child labor. In particular, a move from the
25th to 75th percentile of financial development among low income countries is associated with
a 17 percent decline in the economic activity rates of children 10-14.
The BR model and other theoretical writings on child labor and credit constraints tend to
emphasize the inability of families to borrow against the future returns to child education.
Testing for constraints on intergenerational transfers or long-term borrowing is generally not
feasible in existing datasets. However, if households are not able to move resources over
relatively short (and potentially measurable) time horizons, then it seems unlikely that they
should be able to move resources over the long-term. Micro-studies of household responses to
crop-shocks have attempted to look at credit constraints to see whether there is a correlation
between household assets and responses to shocks. Unfortunately, isolating the credit channel in
this way seems infeasible given the correlation between household assets and the value of child
time in a setting when most children work at home.
An alternative approach is to consider household responses to anticipated changes in their
economic environment. For example, Edmonds (2006a) examines the response of schooling and
child labor to the timing of anticipated income in the context of the social pension program in
South Africa. The end of apartheid in South Africa brought the extension of the white social
pension program to black South Africans. The pensions are large (125 percent of median black
per capita income in 1999), highly anticipated, and primarily determined by age in the elder
black population. Edmonds compares child labor and schooling in families about to receive a
fully anticipatable social pension income to child labor and schooling in families already
receiving the income. The average rural South African child living with an elder that is not yet
pension eligible spends 3 hours per day working. In the data, pension income to an elder male is
associated with over an hour less work per day. These declines in hours worked occur
simultaneously with increases in school attendance (to nearly 100 percent for rural boys). These
changes in hours worked and schooling with male pension eligibility lead to levels of work and
7 BR show that these results for savings and bequests also hold under reciprocal altruism when children value the
well-being of their parents.54
schooling that are similar to what the data report for nearly eligible elder women. Hence, his
results suggest a role for credit constraints, but only for elder men. Moreover, unlike the data
above that tend to emphasize the economic contribution of children, the South African data
suggest that an inability to afford schooling is the primary reason why children are not in school
prior to receipt of anticipated income.
One interesting appendum to the empirical work on credit constraints and child labor is
the theoretical paper by Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) who point out that with credit constraints
and an agency problem, rising incomes can increase child labor. In their model, each child is
altruistic toward his parent and the savings strategy of a very poor parent includes investing in
her child's education in part to induce a voluntary repayment when the child grows up. To induce
repayment, the poor parent realizes that her consumption decisions must be consistent the child's
preferences, and as a result she provides more education for her child than she would if not for
the "child preference" constraint. As parental income rises, there comes a point when the parent
can optimally circumvent the "child preference constraint" by doing her all of her saving directly,
rather than in part through the child's education, so that the education meant to induce voluntary
repayment stops. At this point, child labor goes up. The interesting dynamics between incomes
and intergenerational transfers is a fertile area for further study.
Does child labor respond to the return to schooling?
The presence of credit constraints within a population does not exclude the possibility of
the relative returns to education influencing child labor. The major challenge in isolating the
returns to education as a causal influence on child labor is that it is very difficult to measure
perceptions about the returns to education.
Typically, researchers rely on the assumption that the expected returns to education at the
time child labor decisions are made depends on the current return to education or literacy. While
likely imprecise, even this approximation is difficult to estimate for two reasons. First, it is
difficult to separate variation in the returns to education from confounding factors influencing
income in the local community. Hence, an apparent response to the returns to education may just
reflect parental income differences. Second, it is often very difficult to measure the returns to
education, because child labor is most prevent in locations where wage work is rare. Most
production occurs in family enterprises, and there is little specialization. Hence, it is extremely
difficult to assign income to individuals in places where child labor tends to be most prevalent,
and analysis based only on wage workers may suffer from severe selection bias that is likely to
be correlated with child work status.
How does one identify returns to education in populations where few individuals work
for wages? One option is to measure the returns to education data at some aggregate level.
Chamarbagwala (2006) is one example. She observes that Indian children in regions with higher
returns to education are more likely to attend school and less likely to work. In addition to the
problems of confounding factors and selection mentioned above, an additional difficulty inherent
in this aggregate approach is that estimates of the returns to education are essentially a common
effect to the level of aggregation with a functional form assumption and the more aggregate the
study is, the less variation researchers have to work with. Hence, Chamarbagwala is one of the
few published studies using this approach.55
A second option is to examine whether there are changes in the returns to education and
schooling for a common factor rather than directly measuring the link between the two. Foster
and Rosenzweig (1996) approach this by estimating a conditional profit function from the
adoption of HYV rice in India and capturing the additional profit associated with more schooling
in areas where HYV has diffused. They report changes in schooling which are consistent with
improvements in the return to schooling (and school construction) by finding the same variables
linked to increased schooling.
A related approach is to infer movements in returns to education through observing other
behaviors that depend on the returns to education. For example, Edmonds, Pavcnik, and
Topalova (2007) infer movements in returns to education in two ways. First, they compare
differences in per capita expenditure by head's literacy or schooling completion. Second, they
examine changes in adult employment by education status. They assume that adult labor supply
is upward sloping and that expectations about the returns to education are based on differences in
the wages of literate and illiterate populations with a given geographic area (the district in India
in their case). They infer what must be occurring then to returns to education in the labor market
by comparing changes in employment of the literate and illiterate populations.
A novel set of studies considers how the schooling activities of rural children are
influenced by urban labor markets to which they could migrate. In addition to being a realistic
description of how expectations of returns to education are formed, this approach minimizes the
problem of a confounding between returns to education and adult income effects and is more apt
to be measurable. Kochar (2004) for example finds that urban rates of return influence rural
schooling in India, especially among landless who are most apt to migrate to urban areas. De
Brauw and Giles (2005) observe that the education of rural migrants does not appear to be
rewarded in the city in China. They make use of geographic and time variation in the
implementation of national identity cards which make legal migration possible, and find that
schooling enrollment declines with the opportunity to migrate. Of course, unlike the above
studies that seek to isolate a returns to education effect, these two studies consider more the
relative returns to schooling in the rural sector. While limited, it may not be possible to isolate
returns to education from changes in labor market opportunities.
An alternative approach to studying the link between returns to schooling and child labor
and schooling is to look at whether improvements in school quality affect child labor. Causal
evidence on a link between school quality and child labor that would meet modern standards of
evidence does not appear in the literature. However, descriptive studies such as those by Lloyd
and co-authors (2003) suggest a connection, and evidence on the link between some measures of
school quality such as pupil-teacher ratios and schooling attainment is well documented. For
example, Case and Yogo (1999) use variation in school quality for blacks in apartheid South
Africa to study the link between pupil-teacher ratio, the returns to schooling, and school
attendance. Their findings are dramatic. A decline in the pupil-teacher ratio by 10 students is
associated with a 2 percent increase in the return to education and an additional 0.6 years of
completed schooling. Hence, while the problems with looking at the return to education are
considerable, there is some suggestive evidence of a connection between returns to education and
schooling which might also be reflected in child labor data provided that the marginal utility of
income today is not the dominant causal factor in the decision to have a child work.56
School costs and child labor
Further, the relevant return to schooling is the return net of direct costs, and like with
school quality, direct evidence on a link between schooling costs and child labor is rare. Several
studies document an association between the mitigation of school costs and schooling (for
example, Duflo et al 2006), and Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) argue that school construction
accompanying the green revolution in India facilitated increased schooling and decreased child
labor in both landed and landless households although they do not directly observe a measure of
child labor in their data.
Slightly more direct evidence of a link between child labor and schooling costs also
exists. Several studies find a link between measured schooling costs and child labor. In rural
Pakistan, Hazarika and Bedi (2003) observe that children are more apt to work outside the
household in communities where schooling costs are higher. Shafiq (2006b) observes that boys
are more likely to work and less likely to attend school in Bangladesh in communities where
schooling costs are higher. Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2007) argue that the avoidance of
schooling costs explains the child labor-schooling-poverty association observed in their study of
rural India, and they find that the relative declines in schooling and increases in work associated
with India’ s tariff reforms are smaller in areas where schooling is less expensive. Edmonds
(2006a) study of credit constraints in South Africa documents some qualitative evidence
suggesting that schooling costs are an important part of why there is a link between credit
constraints and child labor and schooling. Kondylis and Manacorda (2006) study one dimension
of schooling costs, travel time, in detail in rural Tanzania. They observe that children longer
travel times induce children to specialize in either schooling without work or work without
schooling. The interpretation of all of these studies is complicated by the fact that the source of
variation in schooling costs is not well understood, and it is difficult to separate whether this
reflects support of other siblings or the child's own schooling, however, as higher costs for one
child likely imply higher costs for siblings in the same. Nevertheless, these studies provide some
support for the idea that the relationship between child labor and schooling costs and quality is a
fertile area for future research.
One important interpretation point often emphasized in the literature (e.g Shafiq 2006a,
Das and Deb 2006) is that the relevant return on education for family decision-making is the
present discounted value of the future return to education. Thus, differences in discount rates
across households can lead to differences in the family's valuation of education or the marginal
utility of income and thereby differences in child labor and schooling. Why might discount rates
vary across households? Das and Deb model this explicitly as a function of the family's current
consumption, the subject to which we now turn.
4.4 Child labor and Poverty
The link between child labor and living standards
Theoretically, there are many reasons why there might be a negative connection between
family incomes and child labor. First, child labor may be a bad in parental preferences so that as
incomes improve, the family chooses to have children work less. In fact, in the seminal child
labor paper by Basu and Van (1998), they posit the "luxury axiom": children only work when the57
family is unable to meet its basic needs. Beyond subsistence, the luxury axiom posits, families
always opt to keep children out of work. In the model of section 1, the idea that work might be a
bad is captured by families receiving positive utility from child leisure. The luxury axiom is just
a particular characterization of preferences. Second, with diminishing marginal utility of
income, the value of the marginal contribution of the child's income decreases. Note that an
important part of the child's economic contribution to the family might be through not attending
school if direct and indirect schooling costs are high. That said, the economic contribution of
working children can be substantial. Psacharopoulos (1997) observes that income earned by
working Bolivian children of age 13 amounted to 13 percent of total household income on
average. Menon et al (2005) attempt to compute the value of child's own farm labor to largely
subsistence farm households in rural Nepal. They estimate that children contribute roughly 11
percent of the value of total agriculture production in Nepal or about 9 percent of GDP.
Third, higher family incomes may facilitate the purchase of substitutes for child labor that
lower the return to child labor within the household. For example, a washboard, fertilizer
spreader, or a combine harvester may replace child labor within the home. In the model of
section 1, this would be a downward shift in productivity in household work, F(-), and would
only reduce work when work outside the household is at a corner solution. Fourth, the child's
productivity in other activities such as schooling might improve because the family might be able
to afford better inputs to schooling such as nutrition, textbooks, or uniforms. In addition, market
imperfections and other aspects of the family's economic environment (including discount rates)
might be correlated with family economic status and also affect child labor supply.
The important question for policy is to what extent a family’ s standard of living is the
dominant determinant of whether children work. Are returns to education or leisure sufficiently
high or employment opportunities sufficiently unproductive that children can be expected to
transition away from work as incomes improve without additional policy changes? If child labor
is an outgrowth of poverty and nothing else, then it is difficult to make an argument for attention
to child labor without attention to the factors that create a need for the child to work. On the
other hand, if child labor is independent of the family's economic status and if it has long term
consequences for child welfare, then there exists a much stronger case for policy attention
specific to child labor. The answer to the question of living standard’ s role in child labor is
obviously context specific and can be expected to vary both between and within countries as well
as over time. It is not surprising that there are a wide variety of findings evident within the
empirical literature.
The empirical evidence
The cross-country data on living standards and child labor suggests a strong connection
between economic status and child labor. Figure 10 plots the ILO's LABORSTA estimates of
economic activity rates for children 10-14 against estimates of real GDP per capita (using
purchasing power parity exchange rates) from the Penn World Tables 6. 1. Each country
observation is pictured as a circle where the size of the circle represents the size of the country's
population between ages 10 and 14. While child labor is pervasive in poor economies such as
Ethiopia and Nepal, child labor is unusual in a country wealthier than Gabon with a GDP per
capita of $8,400. The curve in Figure 10 is from the regression of a country's economic activity
rate for children on a third order polynomial in GDP per capita (to allow a non-linear58
relationship). The regression curve shown here is weighted by the population of children aged
10-14 in each country, but the unweighted regression curve is nearly identical. With this
specification, variation in GDP per capita explains 73 percent of the variation in the economic
activity rates of children.
Countries differ in many ways that may be associated with child labor and GDP per
capita. Hence, the relationship in Figure 10 cannot be interpreted as causal. Attempts to address
the endogeneity of income as in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006a) do little to affect the strong
correlation between national income and economic activity rates of children.
Most within country studies of the link between income and child labor are cross-
sectional. They specify a linear relationship between child labor and family income, and test the
hypothesis that the marginal effect of family income on child labor on average is different from
zero. In general, researchers that compare poor households to rich households at a single point in
time in a country find mixed evidence of a link between poverty and child labor. Comparative
studies implement the same empirical approach in multiple countries, and the different results
observed between countries in comparative studies such as Bhalotra and Heady (Pakistan and
Ghana, 2003), Ersado (Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe, 2005), Maitra and Ray (Peru, Pakistan, and
Ghana, 2002), Psacharopoulos (Bolivia and Venezuela, 1997), and Ray (Pakistan and Peru,
2000) illustrate how varied the cross-sectional relationship between economic status and child
labor can be.
An intrinsic problem in studies of the link between economic status and child labor is that
poor households differ from rich households in many ways that might be associated with child
labor. Disentangling these omitted factors from the underlying causal relationship is difficult.
Despite the great challenge, there are two basic approaches researchers use to address the
endogeneity of living standards. First, many studies address part of the problem by relating child
labor to variation in income that excludes the child's income (Dammert 2005, Duryea and
Arends-Kuenning 2003, Ray 2000). While this addresses a mechanical source of endogeneity, it
does not deal with the joint nature of child time allocation and family living standards. The
second approach focuses on the broader endogeneity problem and argues that certain factors
affect family income without also affecting the time allocation of children except through family
income. Examples include Bhalotra (2000), Bhalotra and Heady (2003), and Ersado (2005).
Note that the assumptions required for identification are often quite strong in these studies, as
almost anything that affects the family's economic environment should also influence the value
of child time in one activity (schooling, work outside the home, market work in the home,
domestic chores). Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) focus on education rather than child labor, but
they emphasize the types of structural assumptions necessary to accept many of the common IV
strategies.
Another approach to address the intrinsic differences that exist between poor and rich
families is to track children in the same household (or cohort) over time. Of course, using panel
data only replaces the problem of cross-sectional heterogeneity with the problem of explaining
differential changes over time. That said, studies tracking families over time almost universally
find large increases in child labor with substantive declines in family incomes. For example, in
tracking children over a three-year period in rural Tanzania, Beegle et al. (2006) find that
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stop working when households recover from the bad harvest. Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007)
find that children transition in and out of employment with adult unemployment spells in urban
Brazil. Dammert (2006) observes that market work increases in coca growing states of Peru
after coca production (and its associated income) shifts out of Peru for Columbia.
Beyond endogeneity, another methodological issue is important in the child labor - living
standards literature. There are strong theoretical reasons to expect the relationship between child
labor and families to be non-linear. In the Basu and Van (1998) model, children no longer work
when families can meet their subsistence needs with adult earnings. Hence, variation in income
below subsistence should have no effect on child labor, nor should variation in income above
subsistence. It is only over the range of incomes that corresponds to the existing heterogeneity in
perceived subsistence needs in which Basu and Van would expect to see changes in child labor
that are correlated with improvement in living standards. Edmonds (2005) finds support for this
idea directly with panel data collected during Vietnam's economic boom in the 1990s.
Figure 11 plots market work participation rates for children 6-15 in Vietnam in 1993 and
1998 against household per capita expenditures in 1993. The data for this figure comes from the
1993 and 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Survey where information on the activities of children
is collected in over 3,000 rural households that are interviewed first in 1993 and again in 1998.
The top curve in Figure 11, which compares households at different levels of per capita
expenditure in 1993, suggests a strong negative correlation between household living standards
and child labor. For households below the 1993 poverty line, participation of children in market
work exceeds 30 percent. From 1993 to 1998, real expenditure per capita increased by more
than 50 percent for the poorest 10 percent of the population. For Vietnam overall, the incidence
of poverty declined 36 percent. The bottom curve in Figure 11 pictures the relationship between
participation in market work in 1998 and household's per capita expenditure in 1993. Thus, for
each point on the per capita expenditure distribution in 1993 (the x-axis), market work
participation rates are pictured for the same households in 1993 and 1998. Participation rates
drop substantially over time, with the largest declines in child labor occurring in households in
the neighborhood of the poverty line in 1993.
Edmonds (2005) uses the market work - per capita expenditure relationship in 1993 to
recover the implied distribution of subsistence levels across households. He then projects the
changes in child labor that would be expected in the Basu and Van framework based on the
observed improvements in per capita expenditures between 1993 and 1998. He finds that
improvements in per capita expenditure and the implied distribution of subsistence levels across
households can explain 80 percent of the decline in child labor that occurs in households whose
expenditures improve enough to move out of poverty. The strong structure of the Basu and Van
model is not the only model that could generate these findings (a simple Engel curve in
preferences would as would variable discount rates that depend on living standards). Moreover,
factors other than preferences can generate important non-linearity in the child labor - economic
status relationship. For example, one can imagine non-linearity in the household production
function that would lead to discrete changes in the value of child time within the household. A
family might opt to change its production technology to replace the labor of a child, and this type
of shift could generate results as in Edmonds if changes in household production techniques are
correlated with exiting poverty. Nonetheless, non-linearity in the child labor - economic status60
relationship appears very important, as does the correlation between improvements in living
standards and declines in child labor.
Can the effect of rising incomes differ from that of declining poverty?
The empirical literature on child labor and living standards largely attempts to estimate
whether there is a link, but it might serve policy more by considering why there is a link. Indeed,
one suspects that a more nuanced view of the determinants and definition of child labor might
resolve some of the apparent inconsistencies observed across cross-sectional studies. For
example, in the Basu and Van model and in Edmonds' data, child labor declines rapidly in the
neighborhood of the poverty line, but appears relatively income inelastic elsewhere. Hence,
depending on the distribution of variation in income in a population, standard approaches may
miss the importance of poverty in child labor decisions.
Moreover, depending on the definition of child labor and local economic conditions, it
may be that child labor appears to increase with family incomes. Rising incomes might be
associated with changes in the types of activities in which children participate. Edmonds and
Pavcnik (2006b) for example find that growing trade inside Vietnam is associated with a rise in
household specialization which in turn may explain some of the decline in work in the family
farm and business that they observe in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b). Fafchamps and Wahba
(2006) observe a positive correlation between household specialization and wage work in Nepal
as well. Consequently, if child labor is defined as wage work, then it might appear to grow with
rising incomes even if the total time spent working when one includes work within the household
declines. This might explain the rise in wage employment among children with economic
growth that Swaminathan (1998) documents in Gujarat, India or that Kambahampati and Rajan
(2005) have observed across Indian states.
Moreover, in a setting where the lack of employment opportunities is relevant, child labor
may actually increase with rising incomes if they are associated with expanding economic
activity or increased employment opportunities for children within their households. This is
obvious in the model of equation 1.1 as it should be clear that the shadow value of child time
depends on the wages in the local market and the household’ s production opportunities. Several
studies discussed in section 4.1 note a connection between market work participation and
household assets. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) label the positive correlation between market work
participation and household assets or employment opportunities in the household a “ wealth
paradox.”Ganglmair (2005) shows that this "paradox" occurs in Ugandan data when one fails to
control for variation in the employment opportunities open to children and when one only
considers types of work directly engaged with the asset. Shafiq (2006b) points out that, while
greater assets may lead children to report working more because of the availability of
employment opportunities, the human capital ramifications of this are unclear. In his data from
Bangladesh, children work more in the presence of productive assets, but they are also more
likely to attend school.
In fact, several studies find a negative correlation between child wages and child
employment and a positive correlation between child wages and schooling. This may be,
because children are often substitutes for adults. Rising child wages imply higher adult wages,
and child work appears more elastic with respect to adult income than child wages. The finding61
in Edmonds and Pavcnik’ s (2005b) study of rice price changes in Vietnam is suggestive of this.
Children are actively involved in rice cultivation, the returns to that cultivation increase, but
market work declines. Wahba (2006) is more direct evidence. She finds in Egyptian data from
1988 that a 10 percent increase in the illiterate male market wage lowers the probability that a
child engages in wage work by 22 percent for boys and 13 percent for girls.
In fact, the academic literature on how households respond to macroeconomic shocks
tends to emphasize declining child labor with declining income. Thomas et al (2004) examine
education responses to the Indonesian financial crisis. They find that poor households coped
with the shock in part by reducing educational expenditures and educational enrollment. These
declines in education were particularly large for younger children as households appeared to
triage to protect the schooling of older children. Interestingly, Cameron (2000) notes that in
Indonesia, declines in schooling do not appear to be accompanied by a rise in formal
employment amongst children. This is consistent with Thomas et al's observation that young
children were withheld from school to cope with the crisis. In fact, Schady (2004) suggests that
as a result of the decline in employment options for children during Peru's 1988-1992
macroeconomic crisis, schooling attainment for affected cohorts has increased substantially.
This discussion highlights the potential importance of labor demand related factors in child labor
as discussed above in section 4.1.
Thus, even if poverty is a key reason children work, it is possible to find child labor
rising with incomes. More attention to the reasons why there might be a link between family
incomes and child labor can then be important in understanding how child labor will evolve, as
countries grow richer.
Economic shocks, credit constraints, poverty, and child labor
Poor households are more apt to be credit constrained, because their poverty typically
means they lack collateral with which to access credit and they often live in locations with poor
credit institutions. In section 4.3, we have discussed how an inability to access credit can lead to
higher levels of child labor than is privately efficient from the parent's perspective (Baland and
Robinson 2000). The poor also are less likely to have access to formal insurance and more likely
to face uninsured credit risks. Pouliot (2006) adds uncertainty to the Baland and Robinson
model, showing that incomplete insurance markets can lead to inefficiently high levels of child
labor even with functioning credit markets. Several studies document a relationship between
child labor and schooling and an inability of the household to cope with income shocks that
extend beyond any effect the potential for uncertainty has on schooling and work decisions.
The adult labor supply literature in developing countries tends to emphasize how
individual labor supply is used to buffer income shocks. Kochar (1999) for example observes
that Indian men increase their market hours of work in response to unanticipated (weather
related) variation in crop profits and that this rise in labor supply explains reduced form results
that fail to find a significant effect of crop shocks on consumption. Does child labor supply also
act to help cope with shocks? Using the same ICRISAT data as Kochar, Jacoby and Skoufias
(1997) find that child labor and variation in school attendance is an important part of family self-
insurance. They observe declines in schooling and increases in market work in households that
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income using rainfall data to estimate predictable seasonal variation in income and unpredictable
variation in income. They find that small farm households adjust schooling and child labor in
response to both predictable and unpredictable variation in income. Hence, they argue that small
farms are not well insured ex-ante, and they do not have access to seasonal borrowing and
lending. A similar study in Tanzania is Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006). They correlate self-
reported crop shocks with changes in child labor. They observe a significant increase in market
work in households that report experiencing a crop shock, and that this shock is larger among
households with few assets. One important point in Jacoby and Skoufias is that, despite
variation in child labor and schooling with both predictable and unpredictable income variation,
the overall effect of this on schooling attainment appears very modest. de Janvry et al (2006) not
that the conditional cash transfers in Mexico's Progresa program were sufficient to protect school
enrollment in the presence of agricultural shocks, but conditional transfers appeared to have little
effect on the rise in market work associated with the shocks. As they point out, this is to be
expected if child labor supply is part of the household's self insurance strategy.
Insurance failures and child labor are not just interconnected in rural agrarian societies.
Using a longitudinal employment survey from urban Brazil, Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007)
compare households in which the male head becomes employed during a four month period to
household where the head is continuously employed. They find that an unemployment shock
significantly increases the probability that a child enters the labor force (by as much as 60
percent) and decreases the probability the child attends school. They do not observe changes in
labor supply in anticipation of shocks. Hence, they conclude that the child's labor supply in part
compensates for the lack of unemployment insurance. Moreover, unlike the evidence in Jacoby
and Skoufias, Duryea et al observe substantial declines in schooling completion with these adult
unemployment spells. For girls in particular, it seems that the loss of employment for the male
household head often triggers a complete and permanent withdrawal from school.
The idea that child labor is part of the household’ s self-insurance strategy seems broadly
supported in the literature. Yang’ s (2006) study of how Philippine households with overseas
members were affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis is especially useful for framing how to
think about the insurance component of child labor. Migrants from the Philippines work in
dozens of countries. Thus, the financial crisis was broadly felt in the Philippines, but there is a
great deal of heterogeneity in how families were impacted by the crisis depending on what
country their migrant members lived. Yang observes that a 10 percent appreciation in the
Philippine / foreign exchange rate is associated with a 6 percent increase in remittance flows.
Schooling increases, schooling expenditures increase, and work declines in households that
benefited from the appreciation. This behavior is similar to classical permanent income
behavior. Schooling is an investment, and families seem to be “ saving”transitory income
through increased schooling and less work. Likewise, the temporary (as in Jacoby and Skoufias)
or permanent (as in Duryea, Lam, and Levison) declines in schooling and increases in work may
reflect similar permanent income behavior. It is striking that decisions about schooling and work
might reflect how households manage transitory income. These findings illustrate the complex
set of interactions and response to market imperfections and market failures that are important in
understanding the determinants of child time allocation.63
5. Policy
Given the diverse array of social and economic factors that affect child time allocation
decisions, most development related policies can influence child labor. In discussing the
determinants of child time allocation, we have already reviewed research from microcredit
programs, public infrastructure and school construction projects, school quality interventions,
and programs to mitigate schooling costs. Risk reduction and management policies, health
interventions, and production technology projects all could have large impacts on child time
allocation. However, in this section, we consider policies that aim to directly affect how children
spend their time.
Empirical research on child labor related policies that meets modern scientific standards
is extremely limited. This does not owe to a lack of policy attention. Policies towards child
labor can be grouped loosely into six categories: information campaigns, income replacement
programs, flexible schooling programs, reintegration projects, restrictions on employment, and
conditional cash transfers. Only legislative restrictions and conditional cash transfers have a
sizeable academic literature. This research is described below. First, we describe the other four
categories of child labor policies.
5.1 Child Labor Specific Programs
An incredible variety of policies and programs have been directed towards working
children, and there are a considerable number of policy documents that describe these activities.
ILO (2006b) for example reviews several ILO affiliated programs. This section briefly discusses
these types of programs. However, causal evidence that has survived peer review within
economics does not appear to exist for any of these programs at the time of writing.
Information or awareness campaigns attempt to educate parents, employers, and children
that children should not work or should attend school. The mechanisms for delivery of
information vary as does the precise content of information conveyed. Mass media campaigns
are frequent, employing radio or TV programs, news reports, or billboards. Community
mobilization is also common where activists or community leaders reach out personally to
individuals involved with working or out of school children. Another frequent community
mobilization approach is to organize community events that draw attention to whatever type of
activity is being targeted. In practice, information and awareness campaigns seem to be the most
common type of policy directed at working children, and they seem to be motivated in part by
assumptions that parents do not know what is best for their children.
Income replacement programs attempt to compensate families for the loss of the child's
income in the event that the child stops working. Some programs aim to provide alternative
sources of income to the household, often to the mother, by providing working capital and
training. Implicit in these programs is that parents make decisions about whether children work
and that the direct economic contribution of the child's work is a main reason why children work.
Other programs, attempt to redirect children towards work activities that are more compatible
with schooling. For example, one program in Brazil gave working children goats, because it is
easy to care for goats outside of school hours. These child income replacement programs
address the child's agency in work decisions in addition to economic motives for work. Often,64
income replacements programs contain some conditionality component. For example,
conditional cash transfers typically require that children attend school in order receive transfers.
Conditional cash transfers are the one type of child labor related program that have received
rigorous evaluation, and we discuss these in detail in section 5.4.
Flexible schooling programs attempt to make schooling and work more compatible. That
is, they typically do nothing to influence whether the child works, but instead aim to make
schooling compatible with work. In this way, flexible schooling programs mitigate the costs of
working. Many different types of programs are prevalent. School hours can be modified to
accommodate work schedules. Academic calendars can be adjusted to reflect local conditions.
Additional school shifts could be added during off-work times. Independent study modules
might allow students to progress through schooling at their own pace. The assumptions behind
these programs is that it is the timing of school that causes the conflict between work and school
and that the actual time spent working is not enough in itself to impair human capital
accumulation. Some flexible schooling programs also modify the curriculum to increase child
interest in the program. Others, attempt to extend school hours so that children have activities
during times in which they would normally work. The assumption behind these daycare like
programs is that an important portion of child time spent working is just a way to occupy the
child's time.
It is straightforward to imagine how programs designed to prevent children from starting
to work can influence child schooling, but children who are already working need help to reenter
school. Reintegration projects aim to help students return to regular school when students have
missed school or lag behind in school because of work. Working children may be unfamiliar
with the school environment, be poorly socialized for schooling, and may be significantly older
than nonworking children with the same educational background. This makes returning working
children to school a challenge. Most reintegration projects include some counseling directed at
formerly working children, some remedial education to catch working children up to age in
skills, and some bridge program to gradually introduce working children back into the
classroom. This emphasis on how to get working children back into school is often neglected in
economics discussions, because most theoretical models such as that of section 1 treat child time
allocation as seamless between different sectors of work, schooling, and leisure.
Unfortunately, while these policies are pervasive, scientific evaluation of them is not.
This absence of policy research severely limits our ability to design or improve existing policy.
To be effective, scientific evaluation needs to be designed into a project from its inception, with
control populations selected to be comparable, ideally through randomization. This is rare. It is
telling that of the 35 final program evaluations included in ILO (2006b), none of the publicly
available research has been peer reviewed by independent researchers. The typical objection to
formal evaluation is expense, but the growing body of randomized evaluation of education
related initiatives shows that careful, informative, and scientific evaluations can be conducted on
modest budgets. Moreover, considerable money is being spent on evaluation. That research is
just not being held to the standards of peer review that are commonplace in other sciences.
Hopefully, future scientific research on how these projects influence time allocation can both
improve the design of policy and build our understanding of the determinants of work.65
5.2 Restrictions and Prohibitions on Employment
Prohibitions on employment typically target children in specific activities. Often
prohibitions are intended as symbolic gestures, but at times, they may be enforced by industry
groups or the governments, Programs of identification and removal of working children from
specific activities have occurred throughout the world, many the result of international pressures.
Anecodotes abound about what happens to children upon removal from targeted activities, but
rigorous statistical research does not appear available at the time of writing. The case for
targeting one activity at a time is that it is more manageable to implement and enforce.
However, it can lead to some inconsistencies that lead some to question the motives for targeting
a particular activity.
General prohibitions on work or restrictions on working conditions are also common in
low income countries. ILO Convention C138 on the minimum age of employment has been
ratified by 141 countries, and nearly every developing country has some formal restriction on the
age of employment for certain types of employment. Similarly, most countries have compulsory
school ages as well. Beyond these aggregate laws which are similar on paper to those adopted
historically in the U.S. and other high income countries, many countries have committed to
pursue aggressive policies to eliminate child labor from certain sectors and 156 countries have
committed to identify and eliminate worst forms of child labor under C182. Yet, despite all this
policy discussion, there does not appear to be any study of the effectiveness of restrictions on
work that would meet current standards of evidence. Part of the reason for this might be that
bans are often not passed with the intention of enforcement. Instead, the motivation for such
legislation can be that it helps outreach and education programs change social views about
working children. However, there is a theoretical case that can be made for the enforcement of
general bans on child labor.
The Basu and Van (BV, 1998, section 3.4) model is the most common framework used to
illustrate the conditions under which enforced prohibitions on child labor may be welfare
improving. BV gives multiple equilibriums as such, it allows a role for policy in the elimination
of child labor. One frequently advocated policy is an enforced prohibition on child labor.
Consider the labor market equilibriums that arise when demand function is given by a line
marked GG in Figure 12. In this instance, there are two possible stable equilibriums marked E1
and E2.
8 In E2, children work. The presence of child labor depresses wages and hence creates a
need for children to work. The equilibrium E1 creates an opportunity for policy to affect child
labor supply. If policy can prevent children from working, the equilibrium in the economy can
switch to E1. That is, by preventing children from working (i.e. eliminating CD and BC segment
of labor supply), market wages increase, eliminating the household's need to send children to
work.
Obviously, the potential existence of multiple equilibriums is not a sufficient condition
for policy aimed at prohibiting child labor. For example, when labor demand is represented by
FF, there is little that a ban can do to curtail child labor without improving labor demand (i.e.
shifting FF up). Similarly, policy aimed at curtailing the demand for child labor could have the
unintended consequence of moving households from the equilibrium defined by mG2 to the
8 The middle intersection of supply and demand is an unstable equilibrium and is neglected in the present discussion.66
equilibrium indicated by mF if policy lowers labor demand for child labor without the
commensurate increase in demand for adult labor (Dessy and Pallage 2005 is a different model
with the same result). This might occur for example if a consumer boycott drove an industry out
of business in a community.
9 Figure 12 clarifies that whether any case can be made for policy
actions against child labor depends on the characteristics of the local labor market.
Empirical evidence from contemporary low income countries on either the effectiveness
of general bans or restrictions on employment is not available. The case that a ban could be
welfare improving even for those with working children relies on the existence of multiple
equilibria in the labor market. As discussed in section 3.4, this seems hard to imagine as a
general proposition given that children are such a small share of total employment in general.
While there is no evidence of the existence of multiple equilibria owing to child labor supply,
Doran (2006) finds evidence in Mexico of a depressive effect of child labor on adult wages. The
problem with identifying an effect of child labor on adult wages is that one needs something to
affect child labor without separately impacting the adult labor market. Doran argues that the
conditional cash transfer program in rural Mexico discussed below (Progresa) withdraws
children from work without otherwise effecting local labor market characteristics (see the
chapter on Progresa in this volume for related work). Doran observes that in randomly selected
Progresa treatment communities less children work during the corn harvest and there is an
associated increase in adult wages and adult employment relative to control communities. This
raises the possibility that some of the foregone child labor earnings can be replaced by increasing
adult wages although Doran does not observe full replacement.
The most compelling evidence on the effects of general prohibitions on child labor come
from the historical experiences of developed countries. Several careful empirical studies exploit
variation in the implementation of the child labor and compulsory schooling laws across the U.S.
states to examine whether these legislative measures were the driving force behind the drastic
declines in child labor at the turn of the last century and increases in secondary school enrollment
and educational attainment between 1910 and 1940. Moehling (1999), for example, finds little
evidence that minimum age laws for manufacturing employment implemented between 1880 and
1910 contributed to the decline in child labor during this period. She compares differences in
participation rates of 13 and 14 year olds across states with and without a minimum working age
of 14 before and after the enactment of laws. This difference-in-differences– in-differences
strategy can distinguish the effects of the law from differential pre-existing trends in child labor
across states with and without minimum age limits that could have influenced the
implementation of the law. While the participation rates of children covered by the law declined
in states that enacted the laws, boys in control groups experienced similar declines. The results
for girls suggest that declines in child labor might be driven by endogenous child labor law
implementation: states were more likely to implement the minimum age legislation if other labor
demand and supply factors reduced their reliance on child labor prior to the reforms. Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005) formalize this idea in a model with endogenous adoption of child labor laws.
While the overall contribution of child labor laws to child labor declines may have been
small in the U.S., there appears to have been some marginal contribution. A number of studies
9 See Davies (2004) for a theory on the consumer boycotts of products that are not child labor-free and why firms
might select to produce their product child-free when their competitors do not do so.67
have emphasized this. For example, Lleras-Muney (2002) documents an association between
schooling completion rates and increases in the age at which children can apply for a work
permit or reductions in the school entrance age in the U.S. in the early twentieth century. She
finds some evidence of an effect of school continuation laws among white males but no other
demographic group. Manacorda (2006) uses this variation in education owing to work permit
ages to look at spillovers to siblings from child labor supply, and a number of studies have used
this variation in educational attainment to evaluate the returns to education (Acemoglu and
Angrist 1999, Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens 2006). Overall, however, Goldin and Katz (2003)
emphasize that all these legislative measures combined can explain at most 5 percent of the
increase in high school enrollment and subsequent educational attainment between 1910 and
1939.
5.3 Trade Sanctions and Labor Standards
Popular discontent in developed economies about child labor in developing countries
have lead to numerous calls for harmonized labor standards, trade sanctions against countries
with high levels of child labor, and consumer boycotts of products made with child labor. While
empirical evidence directly on any of these issues is non-existent, it is worth reviewing the issues
raised in the theoretical literature. More rigorous surveys of the theoretical work in this area are
in Maskus (1997), Basu (1999), and Brown (2001).
Calls for harmonized labor standards typically envision a regime where some
international arbitrator would oversee adherence to certain core labor standards. One common
argument is to incorporate labor standards into the WTO. Either the WTO or ILO would
monitor compliance with these standards, and violators would be punished via trade sanctions.
10
In fact, the idea of core labor standards is already enshrined in the ILO, and the abolition of child
labor is one of the ILO's core four labor standards that many argued should be followed
independent of level of development. Moreover, harmonization is argued to be necessary to
avoid a race to the bottom, where governments lower their standards to attract business and gain
competitive advantage. In fact, one can theoretically show that coordinated bans on child labor
might be more effective in reducing child labor than a national ban when capital can easily move
across countries (Basu 1999), but one cannot show that this outcome is necessarily the case.
Others have suggested the use of unilateral trade sanctions by the rich countries as a stick
to fight child labor. Such policies have often been debated in the U.S. For example, the Child
Labor Deterrence Act (the Harkin Bill) aimed to prohibit imports of products into the U.S. that
are manufactured by child labor. While this legislation has yet to pass, the Sander’ s Amendment
to the 1930 Tariff Act passed in 1997. It prohibits imports of goods produced by forced or
indentured child labor. The 2000 Trade and Development Act restricts eligibility for trade
benefits to countries that the Secretary of Labor certifies as showing progress to eliminate the
worst forms of child labor.
Consumer boycotts of products produced by child labor have become popular in rich
countries. Consumers who do not wish to consume goods produced by child labor can do so by
10Abolition of child labor is one of the ILO’ s four core labor standards that some view should be respected by all
nations regardless of their level of economic development. Discussion of international labor standards is beyond the
scope of this paper and is covered in Maskus (1997), Basu (1999), and Brown (2001).68
purchasing products labeled as “ child labor free”at a premium. Visible examples of such
policies include RUGMARK-approved hand knotted rugs and “ FIFA approved”soccer balls.
Davies (2004) considers consumer boycotts in the context of a model or Bertrand competition
with product differentiation. The threat of boycott allows for the creation of a profitable niche
for adult-labor firms which in turn implies the creation of an analogous niche for child-labor
firms. Moreover, he shows that even in the case of monopoly, a monopolist can segment the
market by offering different product lines and then price-discriminate to increase profits. It is
very difficult to show that this sort of product line specialization will be welfare improving for
children. Basu and Zarghamee (2005) think about product boycotts with a focus on labor supply
rather than demand. They emphasize that when wages are set locally, a product boycott can
depress child wages. When children work only to help families meet subsistence needs, a
decline in child wages can cause more children to need to work. Boycotts can increase child
labor. Brown (2006) argues that donation labels where monitoring agencies denote some
fraction of the purchase price to child welfare would be a more efficient way to reduce child
labor. That said, empirical scientific evidence on the impact of boycotts on children is entirely
absent.
The potential for unintended consequence is not limited to consumer boycotts. In
general, it is not clear what types of policies these sanctions, threats, or boycotts are trying to
affect, and it is hard to distinguish whether they reflect a genuine interest in the wellbeing of
children in poor countries or are forms of hidden protectionism with all of these policies. When
policies aim to restrict the employment options open to children, they can in turn have a
depressive effect on child wages. If bans are not completely successful in eliminating or
affecting enforced policies to prevent child labor, they may make child labor worse in two ways.
More children may need to work to compensate for lost income, or children may be reallocated
to sectors where monitoring is more difficult (see Basu 2005 for a formal discussion). It is not
obvious that children are better off working in non-export sectors or underground. Scientific
evidence on what happens to children displaced from export sectors is essentially nonexistent
even in the most publicized prohibitions on the employment of children owing to the threat of
sanctions involving Bangladeshi Garment industry and Pakistani soccer balls (See Elliott and
Freeman 2003 for a description of both cases, pp. 112-115). In the case of Bangladesh, some
suggest that most displaced child laborers went to work for lower wages in garment factories that
did not produce for export while others describe children displaced into prostitution and stone
crushing. However, it is unclear on what scale these diversions occur and whether they might be
offset by improvements in other children's lives.
5.4 Conditional Cash Transfers
A number of countries have adopted policies designed to discourage child labor and
increase schooling by lowering the cost of schooling via educational subsidies. Examples
include PETI and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, the Mid-day meals program in India, and the Progresa
program in Mexico. The idea of these programs is to condition transfers on household's taking
certain desirable actions such as attending school. Consequently, they both lower the relative
costs of schooling while raising family incomes. PETI appears to be the only conditional cash
transfer program at present that explicitly targets working children, and it is novel in that it
requires after school activities for children as a way of mitigating the number of children who69
work and attend school. Most other conditional cash transfers only affect work as a by product
of the cash transfers or as a result of the schooling requirement embedded in the program.
The Progresa program is particularly important, because it embedded scientific
evaluation into the design of the program at the start. Consequently, it is the most researched of
the conditional cash transfer program, and it is the most emulated. Schooling incentives in
Progresa increase with the age of the child in order to compensate the household for the older
child's greater opportunity cost of schooling. In addition, at secondary school ages, girls receive
larger cash payments for attending school than do boys. Because of the conditionality of the
program, it is not possible to separate the effects of changing household income from changes in
schooling costs. Nevertheless, the evaluation data on Progresa is extremely encouraging.
Schultz (2004) finds a significant reduction in wage and market work associated with eligibility
for Progresa. Skoufias and Parker (2001) also document declines in domestic work for girls.
Similar findings have been found in other countries as well. Schady and Araujo (2006) for
example document declines in market work in Ecuador's program. Interestingly, grants in
Ecuador's cash transfer program were not conditioned on schooling, but it appears that a
significant number of recipients believed them to be.
The advantage of this type of positive program that indirectly discourages child labor
through increasing schooling is that it also addresses the agency problems, credit market
imperfections, and difficulty in monitoring most forms of child labor that may interfere with the
efficacy of other child labor related interventions such as child labor bans, compulsory schooling
laws, etc. Of course, the effect of these schooling incentives on child labor may be small relative
to their effects on schooling, as Ravallion and Wodon (2000) found in their evaluation of
Bangladesh's Food for Education program which pays students in rice for attending school.
It is also worth emphasizing that the idea that conditional cash transfer are in some
(imprecise) way the optimal policy tool to combat child labor or encourage schooling is largely
without formal justification. Moreover, it assumes that it is worthwhile to encourage schooling.
That is, it presumes the availability of quality schools that are advantageous to the child relative
to work. This point is emphasized in Jafarey and Lahiri (2005) who point out that improvement
in education quality may be more effective relative to (unconditional) cash or in-kind transfers
when credit markets operate. Conditional cash transfer programs are discussed at length in other
chapters of this handbook.
6. Conclusion
The recent boom in empirical work on child labor has substantially improved our
understanding of why children work and what the consequences of that work might be. This
survey aims to assess what we currently know about child labor and to highlight what important
questions still require attention.
Child labor research needs to carefully define exactly what measures of time allocation
are being considered. Studies that consider too narrow a scope of activities are apt to generate
misleading conclusions. Children are active in a wide variety of tasks and appear to substitute
between them easily. Thus, if a child is observed working less in one task (like wage work), one
cannot assume that she is working less. Moreover, though wage work appears less likely to be70
associated with simultaneous schooling, differences in schooling associated with variation in
hours worked are much greater than those associated with location of work. Work is typically
classified as market work or domestic work. Domestic work (often labeled "chores") is too often
ignored in child time allocation studies. For a given number of hours worked, domestic work
appears as likely as work in the farm or family business to trade off with school. Hence, studies
of child labor need to consider as wide a range of activities as the data permit. There is
considerable scope for learning about total labor supply or schooling changes by looking at
changes in participation in various disaggregate activities.
Policy interest in child labor in today's rich countries arose during the late 19th century
because of what Zelizer (1994) terms the "sacralization" of children's lives. She writes: "The
term sacralization is used in the sense of objects being invested with sentimental or religious
meaning" (p. 11). This view is behind much of policy's and the public's interest in child labor in
developing countries today. This issue arises within economics because of concern about
whether child labor is driven by agency problems –do parents fully consider the tradeoffs and
costs of work when sending their children to work? However, despite some suggestive evidence,
the primacy of agency problems in determining child labor supply has yet to be established.
Instead, most contemporary research in economics on child labor is interested because of
the impact of work on human capital accumulation. There are a finite number of hours in a day,
so at some margin, there must be a tradeoff between work and schooling. However, work and
schooling are simultaneous outcomes of a single decision-making process. Identifying a causal
relationship between the two seems likely to be an uninformative exercise. Moreover, work is
not the residual claimant on child time outside of school, and the incidence of children who
neither work nor attend school appears highest where schooling is the lowest. Consequently, it is
somewhat problematic to motivate interest in child labor out of a concern for schooling. Studies
of schooling should consider child labor supply in attempts to understand schooling variation,
but the existing evidence is insufficient to motivate studying of child labor alone without
considering schooling if human capital is the researcher's only concern. Researchers have
considered several other consequences of child labor that might go beyond the child's time
constraint and agency problems such as whether there are health consequences, externalities,
effects on attitudes and values, occupation choice, fertility, or local labor markets. Much of this
work is in its infancy.
The interconnection of child labor and poverty seems intuitive, but evidence has been
more difficult to establish. This is because the assertion that child labor stems from poverty is
often taken to imply that the only reason children work is because of high marginal utility of
income. The data are inconsistent with this extreme view in general.
In fact, a more general description of the child labor problem is that the child works when
the utility from working today is greater than the utility associated with not working. This raises
several issues that the literature has considered about why children work. Perhaps the most
important issue is the least researched: who makes child labor decisions –that is, whose
marginal utility matters?
There is some evidence that child time allocation is influenced by the net return to
schooling. While estimating the return to schooling is a challenge, there is suggestive evidence71
that it influence child time allocation. Several studies document a correlation between the
employment opportunities open to children inside and outside their household and child time
allocation. Hence, there should be situations when work is the most efficient use of child time,
and there is nothing in the literature which precludes this.
The fact that work can be optimal does not exclude the possibility that child labor's
prevalence owes less to its efficiency but more to the family's need for the child's contribution to
the household. There appears to be a fairly broad consensus that credit constraints force families
to make child labor decisions without fully considering future returns to education, and several
studies document that declining poverty is associated with rapid declines in the fraction of
children who are working, especially in market work. For this to be true, there needs to be both
credit constraints among the very poor and substantive changes in the marginal utility of the
child's contribution as the family exits poverty. However, while transitioning out of poverty may
be associated with declining economic activity levels, higher income households are apt to have
more employment opportunities both outside and inside the household. This creates a difficult
econometric problem for researchers if both labor supply and labor demand change in opposite
ways with rising income. A failure to understand this has caused many to assert that there is
little link between poverty and child labor. Fortunately, as research progresses, there has been
increasing attention to all of the different factors that can influence child labor.
While the quantity and quality of research on child labor has been increasing dramatically
in recent years, there are several omissions in the literature that need to be resolved (beyond the
agency issues we have already mentioned). Policy appears to be largely operating in a vacuum
from research. Namely, rhetoric is increasingly directed against "worst forms of child labor," but
I am not aware of any current empirical work on why children select into worst forms that has
survived peer review in a contemporary mainstream economics journal. Moreover, outside of
conditional cash transfer programs, policies targeted at these worst forms and more common
forms of child labor are not being evaluated in a scientific way as far as I can find. This is
unfortunate. Not only could more effective policies be designed but fundamental questions
about why children work could be answered in the process. Hopefully, future work on child
labor will aim to combine rigorous research on these unanswered questions with formal
evaluation of child labor policy.
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Source: author's calculation from MICS data. Joint density estimates use a bivariate normal kernel with bandwidth
chosen following Silverman (1986, page 20). Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect the number of
individuals they represent. Hence, the picture is representative for the pooled populations of the MICS countries.84























5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Male Female
Outside own Hh Market Work



















Graphs by Gender Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the picture is representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries.85
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Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the picture is representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries.
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Male Female
Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the picture is representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries.86
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Total Hours Worked in the Last Week
Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the picture is representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries. The pictured curve is from a nonparametric regression: an indicator for whether a child attends
school is regressed on total hours, total hours squared, and a series of the form sin(j*total hours) and cos(j*total
hours) j=1,2,3 where total hours is transformed to range between 0 and 2*π. Fitted values (*100) and the 95 percent
confidence interval are pictured. Only fitted values between 0 and 2.5 standard deviations above the mean are
pictured.
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Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the curves are representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries. The pictured curves are from nonparametric regressions: an indicator for whether a child attends
school is regressed on total hours worked in domestic work (squares) or market work (circles), total hours squared,
and a series of the form sin(j*total hours) and cos(j*total hours) j=1,2,3 where total hours worked in the location is
transformed to range between 0 and 2*π. Fitted values (*100) and the 95 percent confidence interval are pictured..88
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Source: author's calculations from the pooled MICS data. Each child in the MICS countries is weighted to reflect
the number of individuals they represent. Hence, the curves are representative for the pooled populations of the
MICS countries. The pictured curves are from nonparametric regressions: an indicator for whether a child attends
school is regressed on total hours worked within the household (squares) or outside the household (circles), total
hours squared, and a series of the form sin(j*total hours) and cos(j*total hours) j=1,2,3 where total hours worked in
the location is transformed to range between 0 and 2*π. Fitted values (*100) and the 95 percent confidence interval
are pictured.89
Figure 8: Wage Determination and Market Equilibrium for Child Labor
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Economic Activity Rate of Children 10-14
Note: 1 = 1 percent.
Source: Economic Activity for 2000 from LABORSTA ( http://laborsta.ilo.org) and Population aged 10-14 weights
(circle size) from UNStat.90
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Source: Economic Activity for 2000 from LABORSTA ( http://laborsta.ilo.org), GDP per capita from Penn World
Tables 6.1, and Population aged 10-14 weights from UNStat.
Figure 11: Living Standard Improvements and Market Work among Children 6-15 in
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Source: General Statistical Office (1994, 1999): Vietnam Living Standards Survey, Rural Panel, 1993 & 199891
Figure 12: Labor Demand and the Potential for Policy InterventionsTable 1:  Commonly used terms
Class Term Definition
SNA Economic Activity
Economically active Participates in the production of economic goods and services or is unemployed and 
seeking such employment
Employed Economically active, excluding the unemployed, but including those temporarily out of 
work with a formal connection to a job.
Economic Work Economically active, excluding the unemployed and those temporarily out of work
Market oriented economic work Economically active in in the production of goods or services for the market or barter
Wage Work Receives cash or in-kind payments for economic work
Non-market economic work Economically active in the production of goods or services for own consumption
Subcategories:
  Own account production of goods and services
  Own account construction and substantial repair services by owners of dewellings
  Own account collection and gathering activites
Family Work Economic work in own or family business or farm
Market Work Economic Work
Subcategories:
  Inside household
 Outside household (sometimes separated into paid and unpaid)
Non-SNA Activities
Non-economic work Participates in productive activities that are outside of the SNA definition of economic 
activity
Alternatives: Non-economic activity, non-market household activity, non-market 
household production
Community service and volunteer work Non-economic work provided outside of own household
Domestic Chores Provides services provided to own family members
Alternatives: Household chores, housework (sometimes excludes shopping)
Subcategories:
  Child and Elder Care
  Cooking
  Cleaning
  Small repairs
  Shopping for household goods and services
Domestic Work Non-economic work excluding community service and volunteer work
The designation of an activity as SNA is based on its classification in the 1993 U.N. System of National Accounts.  See Guarcello et al (2005) for additional discussion.  
See text for definition of economic goods and services.Country Total births  # Dead # Absent
Albania 2.06 0.06 0.01
Angola 3.26 0.77 0.29
Azerbaijan 2.44 0.25 0.01
Burundi 3.16 0.54 0.09
Cameron 2.82 0.39 0.36
CAR 3.38 0.61 0.39
Chad 3.46 0.65 0.27
Comores 3.35 0.22 0.23
DRCongo 3.12 0.56 0.22
Gambia 3.24 0.48 0.48
Guinea Bissau 3.06 0.64 0.46
Guyana 2.62 0.20 0.14
Kenya 2.83 0.25 0.21
Lesotho 2.26 0.23 0.25
Madagascar 2.76 0.36 0.26
Niger 3.35 0.79 0.33
Saotome 2.57 0.30 0.25
Sierraleone 3.33 0.93 0.65
Swaziland 2.46 0.21 0.47
Tajikistan 3.01 0.36 0.02
Uzbekistan 2.52 0.17 0.02
Vietnam 2.24 0.10 0.02
Table 2:  Number of Children by women who gave birth 
in the last 15 years
source:  Author's calculation from the 2000 MICS microdata: 
http://www.childinfo.org/MICS2/MICSDataSet.htm.Table 3:  Missing Children 6-14 in Selected Panel Data
Country Nepal Vietnam
Round 1 1996 1993
Round 2 2001 1998
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls
704 675 2,515 2,410
# Present 546 503 2,354 2,241
Why Missing? Counts
Dead 5 19 19 13
Married or Household Split 83 131 130 142
Work 38 5 1 4
Schooling 24 12 5 6
# Children in household in R1 
that should be 6-14 in R2
Source:  Author's calculations from the Nepal Living Standards Surveys (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 1998 & 2005) and the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (General Statistical 
Office 1994 & 1999).Table 4:  Participation Rates in Various Activities by Country for children 5-14
Any Inside Hh Outside Hh
Sampled Countries 89.2 22.7 18.2 8.4 64.6 68.0 6.4 4.4
Albania 54.7 31.3 29.5 3.5 56.1 62.7 32.6 12.7
Angola 93.2 25.7 20.4 8.8 77.0 78.2 5.9 1.0
Azerbaijan 99.1 8.6 4.0 5.3 61.4 63.3 0.7 0.2
Burundi 88.1 31.2 27.6 6.9 84.3 87.3 11.2 0.7
Cameron 94.5 55.0 42.7 30.8 81.1 85.2 5.0 0.4
Central African Republic 85.5 62.2 50.3 37.3 85.0 88.9 13.6 0.8
Chad 95.0 62.6 55.2 26.7 82.5 88.3 4.6 0.3
Comores 77.1 38.1 32.2 16.3 61.1 66.8 15.9 6.3
Cote d'Ivoire 93.2 37.7 35.3 6.2 68.6 76.7 5.5 1.2
Democratic Republic of the Congo 53.5 19.2 12.9 10.4 50.3 52.3 17.4 29.1
Equatorial Guinea 94.9 33.7 31.0 5.4 84.9 85.8 3.1 0.6
Gambia 93.1 25.1 20.6 6.1 49.4 57.6 4.6 2.3
Guininea-Bissau 93.0 65.5 62.4 15.3 77.3 87.2 6.3 0.6
Guyana 97.4 26.3 15.9 14.7 72.8 75.2 2.3 0.3
Kenya 95.9 2.8 1.0 2.2 66.3 66.8 2.8 1.0
Laos 93.1 31.1 29.3 3.9 69.7 71.3 6.3 0.5
Lesotho 96.6 20.4 17.1 6.1 70.2 72.7 2.6 0.8
Madagascar 88.9 12.0 8.8 3.8 20.5 29.2 5.8 5.3
Moldova 97.3 30.5 23.2 11.8 86.3 88.0 2.1 0.6
Mongolia 95.2 21.4 20.6 1.4 91.2 91.7 4.6 0.2
Niger 88.1 67.1 44.4 42.9 88.7 93.7 11.4 0.4
North Sudan 86.0 16.4 14.2 4.1 52.8 56.7 10.1 4.0
Philippines 95.4 15.5 12.1 4.7 80.9 81.8 4.3 0.2
Rwanda 86.5 27.4 22.7 7.9 82.1 84.3 12.3 1.2
Sao Tome 88.7 15.5 10.0 7.8 80.0 81.3 9.5 1.7
Senegal 89.6 33.7 20.6 17.9 86.9 91.1 9.7 0.4
Sierra Leone 93.5 72.1 59.0 51.4 86.3 89.8 5.9 0.4
South Sudan 95.9 13.1 11.2 3.8 35.2 39.8 2.3 3.2
Swaziland 93.7 10.2 7.9 2.7 83.3 81.7 4.9 1.1
Tajikistan 97.2 12.4 10.0 3.4 72.5 74.6 2.6 0.3
Trinidad 98.0 3.2 2.3 1.1 56.3 56.6 1.1 0.8
Uzbekistan 96.4 15.2 10.6 5.8 78.1 79.8 3.4 0.3
Venezuela 92.0 8.1 3.9 4.5 62.4 64.6 3.8 4.2
Vietnam 95.1 24.4 23.4 1.9 51.7 57.8 4.3 0.6



























Bangladesh 5-17 53.6 2.8 0.2 14.4 3.1 2.5 13.9 4.5 4.4 0.4
Cambodia 5-17 0.5 6.3 1.0 16.0 0.7 2.3 0.4
Costa Rica 5-17 43.4 9.0 7.0 4.8 21.7 5.9 8.0
Costa Rica 5-14 56.6 7.3 4.8 4.9 19.5 2.8 4.1
El Salvador 5-17 48.3 0.8 0.3 16.0 2.4 2.1 2.1 4.8 2.2
Ethiopia 5-9 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2
Ethiopia 10-14 2.0 0.3 1.7 3.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.3
Ethiopia 15-17 4.3 0.7 3.2 6.4 0.2 2.0 2.0 0.5
Ghana 5-9 70.4 2.7 0.4 4.3 2.5 18.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3
Ghana 10-14 62.3 2.1 0.5 5.9 5.2 23.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Ghana 15-17 57.1 2.9 0.5 8.7 3.7 22.4 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.2
Honduras 5-9 0.0 8.5 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
Honduras 10-14 0.0 6.9 1.4 0.6 3.9 0.1
Honduras 15-17 0.3 9.3 4.5 1.4 9.5 0.4
Kenya 5-9 88.9 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.3 5.9 2.4 0.0
Kenya 10-14 78.9 0.1 0.5 1.8 0.4 0.7 1.9 0.1 6.1 8.8 0.7
Kenya 15-17 70.4 0.3 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.1 1.3 4.7 16.7 0.6
Namibia 6-10 80.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 5.2 13.0
Namibia 11-15 79.2 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.8 4.8 14.0
Namibia 16-18 71.8 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.7 1.5 7.5 12.1
Nicaragua 5-9 8.4 4.3 2.1
Nicaragua 10-14 9.7 7.0 2.0
Nicaragua 15-17 13.1 11.4 7.5
Pakistan 5-14 10.8 1.8 3.7 8.0 0.0
Panama 5-17 47.0 2.3 0.2 3.5 3.1 2.3 16.6 3.7 11.1 7.8 2.4
Phillippines 5-9 58.1 2.8 0.0 3.6 0.0 2.0 22.2 2.0 2.0 3.6 3.6
Phillippines 10-14 59.5 4.7 0.5 4.2 0.5 1.7 20.4 1.3 1.4 3.3 2.6
Phillippines 15-17 46.1 5.9 0.5 5.3 2.7 3.2 16.2 3.9 2.2 8.6 5.1
Phillippines 5-17 53.3 5.2 0.4 4.6 1.4 2.4 18.6 2.5 1.8 5.7 3.7
Sri Lanka 5-17 63.6 1.3 14.8 2.0 0.9 5.4 1.1
Tanzania 5-17 0.1 0.3 0.0 2.2 0.0 17.4 0.0
Tanzania 5-9 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 27.8 0.0
Tanzania 10-14 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 16.8 0.0
Tanzania 15-17 0.2 0.7 0.1 4.2 0.1 7.8 0.0
Turkey 6-17 10.2 10.4 0.0
Ukraine 5-17 9.0 21.0 19.0 0.0
Zambia 5-9 91.3 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 2.2 0.0 3.8 1.5
Zambia 10-14 92.9 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 3.3 0.0 2.1 0.7
Zambia 15-17 73.3 1.8 0.1 2.0 0.4 0.5 10.7 1.0 8.7 1.4






















 Age categories determined by availability in report.  Industry groupings determined by availability in report.  A missing reflects that industry was not available in report.  
Sources: Bangladesh - Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2003); Cambodia - National Institute of Statistics (2002); Costa Rica - Trejos and Pisoni (2003); El Salvador - 
ILO-IPEC (2004); Ethiopia - Central Statistical Authority (2003); Ghana - Ghana Statistical Service (2003); Honduras - Cruz (2002); Kenya - Central Bureau of Statistics 
(2001); Namibia - Ministry of Labour (2000); Nicaragua - Silva (2003); Pakistan - Federal Bureau of Statistics (1996); Panama - Cornejo, Rodriguez, Adames, and 
Castillo (2003); Phillippines - National Statistics Office (2003); Sri Lanka - Department of Census and Statistics (1999); Tanzania - National Bureau of Statisistics 
(2001); Turkey - State Institue of Statistics (1999); Ukraine - State Statistics Committee (1999); Zambia - Central Statistical Office (1999); Zimbabwe - Ministry of 








82.4 2.1Table 6:  4 Digit Industrial Composition of Working Children 5-17 in Bangladesh, 2002-203
Industry Description Total Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Growing of cereal crops (Paddy, Barley, Jowar etc.) 38.9 44.4 23.6 15.0 7.6 51.3 27.4
Growing of vegetable (Potato, Patal, Tomato etc.) 5.4 1.7 15.7 0.4 3.0 2.0 18.6
Growing of tea, coffee and other beverage crops 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4
Farming of cattle, sheep, goats, horses areas etc. 1.1 0.9 1.7 0.5 1.6 1.0 1.7
Poultry farming 4.3 1.0 13.6 0.4 11.0 1.2 14.2
Felling of frees and rough shaping of timber 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9
Inland fishing (excluding shrimp farming) 2.7 3.2 1.2 2.0 0.6 3.5 1.3
Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 0.5 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.8
Rice milling 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.6
Manufacture of bidies 0.8 0.4 1.9 1.2 5.0 0.3 1.2
Cotton textiles except handlooms 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.6 0.4 0.2
Handloom textiles 1.5 1.2 2.1 1.3 2.4 1.2 2.0
Wearing apparel except fur apparel 1.3 0.9 2.3 2.0 8.4 0.7 0.9
Manufacture of corrugated paper and paper board containers 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.0
Manufacture of structural metal products 0.9 1.1 0.1 2.0 0.3 0.9 0.1
Manufacture of wooden furniture and fixtures 2.2 2.8 0.3 4.9 0.5 2.3 0.3
Manufacture of cane and bamboo furniture 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.8
Wood, cane and bamboo decorative handicrafts 0.8 0.4 2.0 0.3 1.6 0.4 2.1
Textile and sewing decorative handicrafts 1.2 0.0 4.2 0.2 12.6 0.0 2.3
Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.0
Site preparation 2.0 2.6 0.2 3.9 0.6 2.2 0.2
Building of complete construction or parts there of civil engineering 1.0 0.6 1.9 1.4 4.9 0.5 1.2
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.3 0.1 0.5 0.1
Retail trade of pan, cigarettes, biddies, betelnuts and tobacco 0.8 0.9 0.3 1.6 0.6 0.8 0.2
Retail trade of rice, pulse, wheat and flour 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3
Retail trade of fish and sea food 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.2
Retail trade of grocery and general store 4.1 5.1 1.5 9.3 1.4 4.1 1.5
Retail sale of vegetables 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.8 1.5 0.8 1.2
Retail sale of textiles clothing, hosiery, foot ware and leather goods 0.7 0.8 0.7 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.6
Retail sale in specialized stores N.E.C 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.6
Other non-store retail sale 1.0 1.2 0.4 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.3
Restaurants and non-residential hotels 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.7 0.5 0.7 0.4
Tea stalls 1.7 1.9 1.0 2.8 1.3 1.7 0.9
Land transport of scheduled passenger (Bus, Railway, etc.) 0.6 0.8 0.1 1.7 0.4 0.6 0.0
Land transport of non-scheduled passengers 1.8 2.4 0.1 4.5 0.4 1.9 0.1
All trade transport operation by road, whether scheduled or not 1.7 2.2 0.3 2.0 0.8 2.2 0.2
Activities of pre-primary school (Kindergarten, Coaching centre etc. 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.1 0.5
Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.1
Tailoring services 1.7 1.4 2.5 2.2 3.3 1.2 2.3
Private household with employed persons (maids, cooks, etc.) 1.3 0.3 4.0 0.4 6.4 0.3 3.5
Other Industries N.E.C. 11.7 12.8 8.5 21.1 10.3 10.9 8.1
Bangladesh(%) Urban(%) Rural(%)
N.E.C. - Not elsewhere classified.  Only industries with at least 0.5 percent of economically active children in urban or rural Bangladesh are listed.  Source: Table C52 of the 
Report on National Child Labor Survey (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2003)Table 7:  3 Digit Occupational Composition of Economically Active Children 5-17 in Bangladesh, 2002-2003
Occupation Description Total  Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Teachers N.E.C (Religious/ Physical Education) 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.1 0.5
Transport conductors (Bus or train conductor, Helper) 0.6 0.8 0.1 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.1
Working proprietors (Wholesale and retail trade) 1.0 1.3 0.2 1.9 0.1 1.2 0.3
Sales supervisors (wholesale & retail trade) 4.1 4.1 4.0 7.4 6.4 3.3 3.5
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 7.4 9.1 2.7 17.2 3.4 7.2 2.5
Street vendors & door-to-door salesman 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.4 2.0 1.3 1.0
Waiters, Bartenders and related workers 1.4 1.6 0.6 2.8 0.8 1.4 0.6
Maids and related housekeeping service workers N.E.C. 1.4 0.4 4.2 0.6 6.3 0.3 3.7
Hairdressers, Barbers, Beauticians and related workers 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.1
Agricultural crop farmers  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.8
Farm crop workers  45.6 47.3 40.9 16.0 11.0 54.6 47.9
Livestock workers 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.3
Dairy farm workers 0.7 0.4 1.3 0.4 1.6 0.4 1.2
Poultry farm workers 4.5 1.2 13.7 0.6 11.1 1.3 14.4
Loggers 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.9
Fisherman 3.2 3.7 1.6 2.6 0.8 4.0 1.9
Spinners and winders (Textile) 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.3 2.5 0.5 0.8
Weavers and related workers 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.1 1.1 1.2
Knitters 0.8 0.5 1.5 0.8 4.4 0.5 0.8
Spinners, Weavers, knitters, dyers and related  N.E.C. 1.1 0.2 3.6 0.2 12.6 0.1 1.5
Grain millers and related workers 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.7
Food preservers 0.4 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.8
Cigar makers 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 2.1 0.0 0.0
Tobacco prepares and tobacco product makers N.E.C. 0.7 0.4 1.5 0.8 2.9 0.3 1.2
Tailors and dressmakers 1.7 1.4 2.4 2.1 3.1 1.2 2.3
Sewers and embroideries 0.9 0.4 2.3 0.8 4.2 0.3 1.9
Cabinetmakers 1.1 1.3 0.3 1.9 0.3 1.2 0.3
Cabinetmakers and related wood workers N.E.C. 1.0 1.3 0.1 2.7 0.5 1.0 0.0
Motor vehicle mechanics 0.6 0.8 0.1 1.6 0.1 0.6 0.1
Structural metal workers 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Jewellery and precious metal workers 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.8 0.4 0.5 0.0
Basketry weaver and brush maker 1.4 0.6 3.4 0.5 3.7 0.6 3.4
Reiniorced concreters and related workers 0.8 1.1 0.0 2.2 0.1 0.8 0.0
Construction carpenters 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.2
Other construction workers N.E.C. 0.9 0.6 1.8 1.2 4.4 0.5 1.2
Road non-motorised vehicles drivers 3.3 4.3 0.4 5.6 1.0 4.0 0.3
Labourers N.E.C. 7.5 8.9 3.8 15.3 7.2 7.3 3.1
Bangladesh(%) Urban(%) Rural(%)
N.E.C. - Not elsewhere classified.  Only occupations with at least 0.5 percent of economically active children in urban or rural Bangladesh are listed.  Source:
Table C50 of the Report on National Child Labor Survey (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2003)Table 8:  Prevelance Rates of Worst Forms of Child Labor in Nepal
Number (%)
Children in bonded labour 17,152 13.5
Child ragpickers 3,965 3.1
Child porters 46,029 36.2
Child domestic workers (a) 55,655 43.8
Children in mines 115 0.1




(a) for urban areas only
source: ILO (2001).Table 9:  School Attendance Rates in Various Activities by Country for Children 10-14
Any Inside Hh Outside Hh
Selected Countries 84.5 86.8 76.6 89.2 91.0 78.1 88.8 91.6
Albania 58.6 58.4 65.0 54.7 53.1 69.6 56.0 51.8
Angola 90.1 89.6 91.6 91.6 92.4 92.3 91.6 89.0
Azerbaijan 98.9 98.8 99.1 98.8 98.9 100.0 98.9 99.5
Burundi 80.0 80.0 79.9 86.6 91.7 69.2 86.1 81.0
Cameron 91.9 91.7 93.0 93.0 94.8 87.4 92.7 95.3
Central African Republic 79.5 79.5 80.3 82.3 88.7 74.3 82.0 90.3
Chad 92.4 92.5 91.8 93.3 96.7 92.9 93.3 96.7
Comores 81.4 81.7 80.3 77.1 72.4 82.8 77.7 79.2
Cote d'Ivoire 88.0 88.4 87.5 90.9 92.3 84.6 90.4 92.2
D.R. Congo 69.1 67.9 70.6 69.0 68.8 67.7 69.0 66.9
Equatorial Guinea 95.4 95.1 94.7 96.6 97.5 94.7 96.5 94.1
Gambia 86.5 86.2 88.0 89.7 91.7 88.5 89.6 92.9
Guininea-Bissau 90.6 90.1 93.6 93.2 95.7 83.2 92.3 94.9
Guyana 94.3 94.1 93.7 95.7 96.5 97.5 95.7 99.0
Kenya 77.5 96.9 65.5 95.9 96.3 56.4 95.4 95.5
Laos 85.9 86.4 78.8 89.5 92.7 79.8 89.3 93.6
Lesotho 93.2 93.5 90.6 96.1 96.9 88.2 95.8 96.3
Madagascar 72.8 76.8 61.9 78.7 79.8 72.9 77.0 89.3
Moldova 97.9 97.7 98.2 98.4 98.8 98.2 98.4 96.0
Mongolia 90.6 91.3 84.6 94.4 95.4 77.3 94.3 92.6
Niger 81.5 78.1 81.9 84.0 90.3 78.6 83.6 88.9
North Sudan 68.5 67.9 70.9 84.1 88.6 65.7 82.8 91.2
Philippines 86.2 88.7 77.6 93.4 95.0 59.3 93.0 98.9
Rwanda 81.2 81.4 76.8 86.5 90.4 80.4 86.3 85.0
Sao Tome 81.3 82.5 77.7 86.1 86.9 62.9 85.7 81.1
Senegal 81.6 83.3 78.6 85.3 87.2 79.2 85.0 89.9
Sierra Leone 91.9 91.1 92.1 92.3 94.6 93.8 92.4 92.4
South Sudan 91.1 92.6 82.4 93.3 94.8 96.0 93.5 97.3
Swaziland 91.6 93.6 82.6 93.2 93.4 87.4 93.2 92.8
Tajikistan 95.5 96.5 93.2 96.4 96.7 98.1 96.4 95.9
Trinidad 89.0 93.9 79.3 97.3 97.7 70.0 97.1 98.0
Uzbekistan 99.3 99.7 98.4 96.5 95.8 100.0 96.6 98.7
Venezuela 89.6 90.4 88.3 95.5 96.0 82.7 95.0 94.4
Vietnam 84.8 86.4 56.4 91.0 95.7 85.7 90.5 96.6
source:  Author's calculation from the 2000 MICS microdata: http://www.childinfo.org/MICS2/MICSDataSet.htm.
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